The Limits of Opposition: A Case Study of U.S. Reflagging Operations During the Iran-Iraq War.

• Author: Heller, Christian
• Position: Case study

Introduction

On May 29, 1987 President Ronald Reagan addressed the United States to begin the largest U.S. Naval operation since World War II (WWII). Years of indiscriminate mining and attacks on merchant shipping had turned the Persian Gulf into an international warzone. He spoke in terms familiar to any president since WWII by citing freedom of navigation and opposition to the Soviet Union.i His words marked a decision to reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers and begin military naval escorts through the Persian Gulf. Operation Earnest Will is largely forgotten in the common historical mind but serves as a prime case study of the complex legalities that apply to U.S. naval operations. Merchant vessels have changed their registration from country to country for hundreds of years and the U.S. Coast Guard administers numerous requests every year. The decision by the Reagan administration, however, was the first bulk reflagging in U.S. history and its intention, rather than being for convenience or economic purposes, was almost entirely geo-political. Despite staunch domestic and legal opposition, the operation progressed Washington's desires for greater regional influence in the Persian Gulf, as well as its international desires to counter the Soviet Union's advances into the Middle East.

The decision to reflag the tankers faced two major legal questions. First, domestic opposition emerged--particularly in Congress--due to concerns about the administration's actions in the Middle East in light of the War Powers Act. (1) Second, the legality of the reflagging operation under international law was in question. The simple question, "Was it legal?" remains unsolved, but for the purposes of advancing U.S. foreign policy and demonstrating the capabilities of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf the decision was a major success for the administration. The incident illustrates how American military and political leaders were able to manipulate, work around, and ignore opposition from international and domestic audiences to create an international consensus for Persian Gulf naval operations which advanced U.S. foreign policy.

The Context of Re-flagging

By 1984 the Iran-Iraq war was four years old and continued to threaten American economic stability. The possibility of a new global recession from an oil disruption remained a foremost concern of the Reagan administration towards the conflict. (2,3) From 1973 to 1974, during the Arab oil embargo, oil prices tripled in the U.S., unemployment rose by 3.5%, and inflation more than tripled to 11%. (4) The subsequent recession of 1974-1975 was the worst since the Great Depression. (5) Aftershock from the 1979 Iranian Revolution increased unemployment and inflation by 3% and 4% respectively. (6) The net cost of oil imports to the OECD rose from $180 billion in 1979 to $254 billion in 1981. (7)

In 1980 Iraq invaded the new Shia theocracy with large-scale air raids and a ground invasion. Iranians rallied in defence of their country and by December Saddam Hussein was on the defensive. Following a failed Iranian attack in January 1981, both sides settled into the first long stalemate of the war. Through 1982 the war remained deadlocked and the combatants began mining the Persian Gulf in efforts to control harbours and shipping routes. Iraq warned the international community that it would mine Iranian ports and declared a shipping exclusion zone extending 65 kilometres north from Kharg Island, the primary Iranian oil terminal.

In 1984 Iraq escalated the conflict in the Gulf by expanding "The Tanker War". Baghdad followed its initial attack with 53 additional strikes against Iranian vessels and oil facilities, while Iran responded with 19 attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels due to their support for Baghdad. (8) Iran focused its attacks against Kuwaiti vessels primarily because the small nation was almost entirely dependent upon Gulf shipping to export its oil.

Tanker attacks against Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels continued to rise in 1985. (9) In 1986, following numerous successful Iranian attacks, Iraq became desperate and escalated its attacks in the Gulf to try and slow down the Iranian assault. The number of annual attacks more than doubled that year and Iran began conducting night attacks utilizing its speedboat swarm-style tactics. (10,11)

In January of 1986 Iran escalated the situation further and antagonized U.S. policymakers directly by boarding a U.S. cargo ship. In response, the U.S. published a "Notice to Mariners" warning that surface vessels that did not establish radio communications with nearby U.S. warships would be subject to defensive measures. (12) That failed to stem the attacks. By the time the U.S. began its reflagging operations in 1987 the entire Persian Gulf found itself drawn into a state of war and the non-Communist world was at risk of losing its main oil supplies.

Kuwait, initially unresponsive to U.S. contingency planning efforts, was nearing a crisis by 1987. Despite declared neutrality, Kuwait maintained close financial and logistical ties to Iraq throughout the conflict. Its ports were "virtually turned over to the Iraqis" as the war continued. (13) Kuwait's support for Iraq brought it into the conflict and made it a target. Almost a dozen terrorist attacks by Kuwaiti Shi'a opposition groups, including an attempt on the Amir's life in 1985, rattled the small sheikhdom's leaders. After the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council refused to act on its behalf, the Kuwaiti government made official requests to both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect its shipping. The initial request to the United States passed through the U.S. Coast Guard and was "handled as routine." (14) Kuwait accelerated the process by contacting the U.S. Embassy directly rather than waiting for a Coast Guard decision. In February, the Soviets agreed to the Kuwaiti request and a public statement was made by the Sheikhdom. (15) This announcement forced the national security staff to inform President Reagan of the Soviet decision and focused the President's attention on the Gulf. (16) Though the U.S. was officially neutral, Washington had provided limited support to Iraq to include loans, intelligence, and diplomacy (for instance, ignoring Iraq's use of chemical weapons in 1983). (17) The administration now began refining various options to militarily intervene in a region which every administration since World War II had deemed vital to the United States in order to counter the Soviet encroachment.

Congressional Opposition

The Reagan administration believed that reflagging Kuwaiti tankers and introducing additional U.S. warships to the Gulf region did not constitute an act of war or warrant activation of the War Powers Act. Repeatedly, administration officials stated that the situation involved no "imminent involvement in hostilities" and asserted that...