The Latin American Development Process and the New Developmental Alternatives: Military "Nasserism" and "Dictatorship With Popular Support"

• Author: Howard J. Wiarda
• Published date: 01 September 1972
• Date: 01 September 1972
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297202500308
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL ALTERNATIVES:
MILITARY "NASSERISM" AND "DICTATORSHIP
WITH POPULAR SUPPORT"
HOWARD J. WIARDA
University of Massachusetts
VEl~ THE PAST decade a great deal of attention, scholarly and official,
has
been
has
devoted
been
to the
devoted to
question
the
of national development. Particularly in
question of national development. Particularly in
Latin America, this was to be the &dquo;decade of development,&dquo; a phrase that
signified the hopefulness and optimism of the times and that found concrete expres-
sion in the Alliance for Progress, in the Peace Corps, and in the great outpouring
of books and articles in the early- to mid-1960s dealing with national development
themes. Yet, at this point a decade later, it seems clear that Latin America has not
developed as expected or anticipated, that in many areas living standards are
declining and the gaps between haves and have nots are widening, that disintegra-
tion, decay, and sheer stagnation rather than development have frequently charac-
terized the Latin American countries during this period, and that the prospects
for the future appear dirn.’
None of the great developmental panaceas advanced in previous years seem
any longer to offer promise. The Latin American democratic-Left, once con-
sidered the great hope of the Hemisphere, seems almost everywhere to be in de-
cline. The democratic-Left remains a significant force in many of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, to be sure, and one should not underestimate the accomplishments
of the two Llerases, Betancourt, Figueres, Leoni, Frei, Munoz, and others. But
it is clear that throughout Latin America and in Washington as well the bloom is
off: the moderate middle way of the social democrats has yielded -or has been
forced to yield -
to a rash of conservative-oligarchic governments on the one hand
and on the other to a growing chorus of clamorous voices calling for revolution
and popular dictatorship.2
2
NOTE : This paper is part of a study of the development of a framework for the analysis of
sociopolitical change in Latin America. Ideas for the study were generated while the
author was a faculty fellow at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, during the
1969—70 academic year. An earlier version was presented at the Sixteenth Annual Meet-
ing of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, University of California at
Santa Barbara, November 6—7, 1970. The author wishes to thank the Mershon Center
for its support, Iêda Siqueira Wiarda for her comments on the original draft, and the
members of the PCCLAS for their questions and observations on the paper. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1
See See for example, the report of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1968: Some Aspects of the Latin American Econ-
omy Towards the End of the Nineteen-Sixties (New York: United Nations Economic
and Social Council, 1969) ; and Raúl Prebisch, Transformación y Desarrollo: La Gran
Tarea de América Latina (Washington: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1970).
The term "development" as used in this paper refers to both socioeconomic development
and modernization as well as to political growth and institutionalization. What is meant
by "development" in the Latin American context is made explicit in the second section
of the paper.
2
Howard J. Wiarda, "The Crisis of the Latin American Democratic Left," Dissent (Novem-
ber-December 1969), pp. 528—36; and Susanne Bodenheimer, "La crisis del movimiento
464

---

465
If the democratic-Left has seemed to fare badly in recent years, the prospects
for the other reform-oriented or revolutionary groups appear to be equally dismal.
Christian democracy does not seem to represent the wave of the future, as was
once thought. And with the possible exceptions of Cuba and Chile, the old-time
Communist parties in Latin America have proved to be tired and rigid bureaucra-
cies, incapable of gaining much public support or even the allegiance of workers
and youth. At the same time, the guerrilla movements that were so prominent a
few years ago have largely petered out or been crushed. The Cuban revolution
has not so far proved to be exportable. Moreover, even in Cuba itself, the con-
sensus seems to be growing that particularly in the economic sphere the ambitious
goals of the Revolution have not been accomplished and that at least for the fore-
seeable future Cuba is unlikely to achieve the growth rates and to develop in the
fashion that the Revolution’s leaders had envisioned.3
Yet the search for new solutions, new developmental strategies, still goes on.
For it remains clear that despite the limited successes of the previous formulas
and despite the decidedly unrevolutionary character of many social groups in Latin
America,4 popular pressure for change has continued to mount and revolutionary
sentiment has grown. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly questionable whether
the traditional structure and its mechanisms for accommodation and assimilation
are any longer adequate.
5
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate briefly two new developmental stra-
tegies that have recently been offered: military &dquo;Nasserism&dquo; and &dquo;dictatorship with
popular support.&dquo; These strategies will be examined within a framework that
seeks to take cognizance of the unique aspects of the Latin American develop-
ment process. The development of such a framework may enable us not only to
evaluate these newer developmental strategies with a greater degree of precision
but may also help us account for the inadequacies of the developmental formulas
previously put forward, as well as providing some grounds for speculation regard-
ing future developmental prospects in Latin America.
THE LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Few of the theoretical frameworks for the study of national development put
forward in recent years have much relevance or usefulness for the analysis of
socialdemócrata en América Latina," Estudios Internacionales [Chile], No. 12 (enero-
marzo 1970), pp. 544-67.
3
See particularly the devastating report by one of the regime’s foremost advisers and long-
time sympathizers, René Dumont, Cuba: est il socialiste? (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1970),
as well as the briefer English excerpts published in Dissent (September-October 1970),
pp. 411-28. See also the excellent series of articles by James N. Goodsell in Christian
Science Monitor, beginning August 25, 1970.
4
See on this John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American
Conservatism in a Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969) ; Luis Mercier Vega,
Roads to Power in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1969) ; and Claudio Veldiz,
ed., The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press,
1967).
5
See, among others, Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, eds., Politics of Change in
Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1964), Introduction; Tad Szulc, The Winds of
Revolution: Latin America Today — and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1963) ; and
Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American
Government and Politics (New York: Praeger, 1963).

---

466
sociopolitical change in Latin America. With some 150 years of independent life
behind them, the Latin American countries could hardly be classified as &dquo;new
nations.&dquo; Nor is the &dquo;Westem-non-Western&dquo; continuum of much usefulness in
studying these semi-feudal extensions of Western, albeit Iberic, Europe, circa 1500.
Moreover, it has become clear that neither the &dquo;stages of growth&dquo; approach nor the
&dquo;emerging nations-developing areas&dquo; approach is wholly appropriate for compre-
hending the change process in Latin America, for these models are largely based
on the Northern European or Anglo-American experiences and fail to take ade-
quate account of the experiences of the Southern European countries, particularly
Spain and Portugal, and their New World fragments.6
6
Within the confines of the present paper, it is of course impossible to develop
a full-blown framework for the study of Latin American political development.’
Nevertheless, some of the major components and parameters of such a scheme
should be outlined, for this will better enable us to assess the possibilities and the
systemic functionality of the two new developmental alternatives here described.
A good starting point for the study of Latin American society and polity -
not just of the traditional order but of much of the present-day style and struc-
ture as well - is to think in terms of a fairly well-defined, rigid yet adaptable,
hierarchically and vertically segmented system of class and caste stratifications,
social rank orders, estates, juridical groupings, corporate bodies and intereses, re-
volving around and tied directly to the authority of the central state or its leader.
The historical origins of this system lie in the remote Iberic-Latin past, most par-
ticularly the late-medieval era. Spain, Portugal, and the colonies they established
in the New World have long been based upon a social and political order that is
authoritarian, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, feudal, and corporative to its core.
Indeed, since that area was largely by-passed by all the great revolutions that we
associate with the emergence of the modern order - the Protestant reformation,
the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution, the scientific revolution and the
...