The Juvenile Court Process

• DOI: 10.1177/0306624X6601000302
• Author: Lenore R. Kupperstein,Ralph M. Susman
• Date: 01 September 1966
• Published date: 01 September 1966
• Subject Matter: Articles

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In addition, a very different and in some was more fundamen-
tal challenge to the juvenile courts has at times been raised by
some partisans of more formal, criminal-court-like procedures
that (it is argued) de-emphasize personal responsibility. Are the
juvenile courts, as they presently. function, well fitted to com-
municate to the offender a conception of himself as a responsible
person, as one capable of controlling his own behavior and
answerable for his own behavior, rather than as a victim of his
background and circumstances?
These are some of the questions-none of them new, of course
-that are being raised in a new and more insistent way by per-
sons both friendly and hostile to the humane philosophy in
which the juvenile courts were conceived. They are the central
issues, although not the only ones, to which members of the
this panel, all of them exceptionally well informed and thought-
ful students of the juvenile court, have addressed their papers.
The Juvenile Court Process*
LENORE R. KUPPERSTEIN AND RALPH M. SUSMAN
HE
juvenile court, first established by law in i8gg, was con-
~ceived as a judicial body operating within the framework of
a civil proceeding and entrusted with the care, custody, and
treatment of problem youth. The most notable fact of the juve-
nile court movement was the removal of the juvenile offender
from the jurisdiction of criminal law and the concomitant estab-
lishment of special proceedings for handling those youngsters
over whom the court would assume responsibility.
In essence, the philosophy of juvenile justice theoretically ac-
corded primary consideration to the needs of the offender rather
than to the deviant act itself, for the latter was considered as
symptomatic of a more general social or psychological problem
or pathology. Under this philosophy, strict adherence to the
accusatory or adversary proceedings of the judico-legal tradition
would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of juvenile la~v. The
Delivered to the American Society of Criminology meeting in Philadelphia,
November 20, 1966.

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67
necessary shift of focus was in the direction of a more benevolent,
paternalistic orientation which has been adopted in various
degrees in the juvenile courts and incorporated in the special
proceedings under which they operate.
with the establishment of the juvenile court, it also became
necessary to define its jurisdictional limits and to confer some
sort of legal status upon those juveniles who would become its
ivards. Thus, the term delinquent was invented and defined as a
child (within certain statutory age limits) who had committed
an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be considered
a crime subjecting the offender to the sanctions of the penal law.
Subsequently, the term was broadened to include those young-
sters who committed what became known as &dquo;juvenile status
offences&dquo; such as truancy and incorrigibility which by definition
and circumstance could only be committed by juveniles. The
courts’ jurisdiction was further extended into what is now the
no-man’s land of the ill-defined and frequently overlapping
statuses of dependent and neglected children. Thus, the juris-
dictional powers of the juvenile court have gradually expanded
to encompass almost any child (within certain age limits fixed
by law) brought to its attention and deemed in need of protec-
tion, supervision, and treatment.
The lack of precedent and clearly defined legal mandates have
made the task of the juvenile court particularly difhcult. The
situation is further confounded if one considers that the court
simultaneously subscribes to several, not easily reconcilable,
goals-those being the preservation of law and the protection
of the community-while at the same time, and ideologically
most important, providing service or treatment deemed in the
best interest and in accordance with the needs and welfare of the
child.
.Accommodation to this situation has resulted in an evolution
of compromise at the procedural or operational level whereby
the numerous juvenile courts throughout the country have
variously adopted their procedures in correspondence ivith their
respective positions along a hypothetical continuum ranging
from the more traditional legalistic stance to a more service-
oriented administrative operation. The continuing controversy
over which position the courts should assume revolves around
the following issues: The legalists tend to take opposition to-

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68
ward the service-oriented, non-adversary approach on the
grounds that in such proceedings, the juvenile is denied his con-
stitutional guarantees derived from lack of provision for legal
counsel, application of the rules of evidence, and right of appeal.
They question why the juvenile should not be accorded the same
protection given an adult from possible abuse by the state. In
general, they feel that absence of &dquo;due process&dquo; procedures and
ambiguity in delinquency statutes results in tremendous varia-
tion in the manner of law enforcement and in the handling and
treatment of the juvenile offender. Furthermore, primary focus
on the offender, rendering the actual offense fairly insignificant
in the proceedings, is viewed as inconsistent if the judicial pro-
ceeding is legally bound and the offender is ultimately subject to
what amounts to penal sanctions.
The strongest opposition to the use of adversary proceedings
is vocalized by clinicians and social workers. Adherence to the
adversary system of justice, they feel, is in violation of the spirit
of juvenile law and would amount to a regression almost to the
point of again placing the juvenile offender under the jurisdic-
tion of criminal law. Treatment or service-oriented proceedings,
on the other hand, are held to be more consonant with the
clinical concept of delinquency where the offense is viewed as
only a manifestation of some more deeply rooted individual
social or psychological problem.
In general, most courts tend to adopt a more-or-less middle
position on the continuum and take full advantage of the wide
latitude provided in the juvenile court ~aw. The unfortunate
result in too many instances has been an ever-expanding pattern
of arbitrary and sometimes capricious practices under the osten-
sible motives of providing guidance, direction, protection, and
rehabilitation for the problem child. In addition, there has
evolved a confusion of roles and an inadequate admixture of
legally-based, but service-oriented proceedings tending to ob-
scure the separate and distinct functions and objectives of each
phase of the process.
One illustration of the confusion and ill-effects of this type of
operation may be seen in a brief discussion of the petitioning and
arraignment processes. The petition, similar to an accusation, is
the legal document which must be filed before the court can
initiate official action in the case. Once filed, the court automatic-

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69
ally assumes jurisdiction over the alleged ofFender and orders his
appearance before the court for a hearing on the charges lodged
therein. While most actions in the juvenile court are initiated by
police upon apprehension of the juvenile, petitions may also be
filed by other agencies or institutions or by private parties alleg-
ing statutory violations or alleging that the child is in need of
supervision. It should be noted, however, that these petitions
are filed in the child’s behalf except in cases of dependency or
neglect. Yet, the petitioner, be it parent, relative, or other party,
actually eventuates in the role of prosecuting witness acting in
concert with the court which, in practice, assumes the several
roles of prosecution, defense, and administrator of service or
treatment..
The problem with the arraignment procedure, as the late Pro-
fessor Tappan pointed out is that:
&dquo;the extent of the child’s rights and the degree to which they are made real
and understandable to the child varies greatly in different jurisdictions. An
almost universal handicap of the child is his ignorance of the meaning of the
charge and of his rights in court; rarely is he appraised fully and intelligibly
so as to remove his childish misunderstanding and...