The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China

• Published date: 01 September 1969
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296902200319
• Author: George P. Jan
• Date: 01 September 1969
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND JAPAN’S POLICY
TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA
GEORGE P. JAN
University of Toledo
HE
EMERGENCE
of postwar Japan as a major power with renewed inter-
est in Asian affairs is of special importance in Asia. Japan is the most
advanced industrial nation in that region. In terms of the level of overall
economic growth and modern technology, Japan is far ahead of Communist China
despite the latter’s recent acquisition of hydrogen bombs. In the future Japan will
undoubtedly play an increasingly important role in Asian international politics.
The relationship between Japan and Communist China, the two most powerful
Asian nations, will have profound impact on the peace and security in that part
of the world.
In a speech in March 1967 at the fifty-fifth Special Session of the Japanese
Diet (Parliament), Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan stated that the policy of
his government in dealing with Communist China was to &dquo;separate politics from
economics.&dquo; During his official visit to Taiwan in September 1967 Sato reiterated
this policy. He told reporters at a press conference in Taipei, capital of Nationalist
China, that his government had no intention of altering its policy toward Peking.
Japan would continue to maintain trade and cultural interchanges with Com-
munist China under the basic policy of separating politics from economics.2 This
&dquo;separation of politics from economics&dquo; in dealing with Communist China is not
a new policy adopted by Sato. It has been the policy of Japan since the Yoshida
administration in the early 1950’s.
Japan’s policy toward Communist China has been influenced both by internal
and external factors. The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the major
internal factors, that is the inputs, which led to the adoption of this policy. Because
of the limits of space, I will not deal with the formal political institutions in the
decision-making process, such as the Cabinet, the Diet, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, etc. I will confine my
study to informal political institutions with special emphasis on the attitude of
political parties, pressure groups, and public opinion, and how these elements influ-
ence Japan’s policy toward Communist China.
In order to understand this policy, one must examine the internal forces which
shape and change public policies in the Japanese political system. Postwar Japan
has been to a great extent democratic in orientation although Japanese political
practice is different from Western democracies in many respects. However, on the
whole, postwar Japanese administrations have been more responsive to the
NOTE : The author is grateful to the Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of
International Studies at the University of Denver for a research grant which made it
possible for him to do his research in Japan in 1967.
1

Japan Times (Tokyo), March 15, 1967.
2

Ibid., September 9, 1967.
605

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606
demands of political parties and groups than their predecessors before World War
II. This is also true in the case of Japan’s formulation of her China policy.
To other major world powers, until the establishment of a communist regime
in Peking on October 1, 1949, China was not of vital political importance except
as a market for trade. However, this was not the case for Japan. Historically,
Japan’s role in Asia was closely linked with her relations with China. Prior to the
modern era, that is, before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan was influenced by
China politically as well as culturally. Japan borrowed heavily from China in
developing her language, religion, political culture and institutions, arts, archi-
tecture, etc. In pre-modern Japan, Japanese leaders traditionally looked toward
China for inspiration and guidance.
After the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century, Japan gradually turned
toward the West in search of knowledge and technology. But at the same time, she
became deeply involved in Chinese affairs because of her ambitions to dominate
or even to conquer China, especially after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.
Thus, the fortunes of modern Japan have been tied to China. In war or in peace,
the two countries were never completely separated in the past century. China was
not only an important issue in Japanese foreign policy but was also a source of
controversy in Japanese domestic politics.
The end of World War II in 1945 marked a turning point in the history of
Sino-Japanese relations. Under Allied occupation, the Japanese people had little
voice in the conduct of foreign affairs. From 1945 to 1950 political parties and
groups did not strongly advocate any concrete policy toward China. After the
communist takeover on the Chinese mainland in 1949, the Japanese Government,
still under Allied occupation, sat on the fence on the question of dealing with
either Peking or Taipei until the latter part of 1951.
THE ATTITUDE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The most effective informal political institution in influencing public policy
in Japan today is the political party. Due to the encouragement of Allied occupa-
tion authorities, postwar Japan witnessed a mushrooming of political parties.
After a period of consolidation, only several parties proved to be viable. The two
major ones are the Japanese Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) 3 and the Japanese
Socialist party (JSP). Minor parties include the Japanese Democratic Socialist
party (DSP), the Komeito, which is the political party of the neo-Buddhist organi-
zation, the Soka Gakkai, and the Japanese Communist party (JCP). The LDP
and its predecessor, the Liberal party, have been in power since the Chinese Com-
munist regime came into existence. Therefore, the attitude of the Liberal party
and the LDP is one of crucial importance in understanding Japan’s policy toward
Communist China.
The first major policy statement by the Japanese Government on the China
issue was the letter of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan, the leader of
3
The Liberal-Democratic party was established in 1955 by merging the Liberal party and the
Democratic party. The Ichiro Hatoyama faction of the Liberal party split from the
Liberal party in 1953 and became the Democratic party in 1954. Hatoyama became the
first president of the LDP in 1956.

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607
the Liberal party, to John Foster Dulles, an adviser to the United States Depart-
ment of State and who was instrumental in preparing the San Francisco Peace
Conference with Japan in 1951. Yoshida’s letter, dated December 24, 1951, was
made public on January 15, 1952~ at a time when the ratification of the San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty was under discussion in the United States Congress. Apparently
the letter was designed to assure the United States that Japan would not recognize
Communist China, and thereby influence American public opinion to favor the
ratification of the peace treaty.
In his letter, Yoshida stated that his Government was prepared to conclude
with the National Government of China a treaty reestablishing normal relations
between the two governments. The terms of such a bilateral treaty should, in
respect of the Republic of China &dquo;be applied to all territories which are now or
which may hereafter be, under the control of the national Government of the
Republic of China....&dquo; Yoshida explained in his letter why he decided to sign a
peace treaty with Taipei. His main reasons were that Taipei had a seat in the
United Nations; it exercised actual governmental control over certain territory and
it maintained diplomatic relations with most of the members of the United
Nations. As to the Chinese Communist regime in Peking, Yoshida assured Dulles
that the Japanese Government had no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty
with Peking in view of the existing conditions which included: ( 1 ) Communist
China was condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor and Japan was and
would be complying with the recommendations of the United Nations against
Peking; (2) the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Military
Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 was virtually a military alliance against
Japan; (3) Communist China was backing the Japanese Communist party in the
latter’s attempt to overthrow by violent means the constitutional system of Japan.4
4
In retrospect, Yoshida’s letter, reflecting the views of the Liberal party, actu-
ally laid down Japan’s basic policy in dealing with the China problem and this has
been followed by later administrations. The policy was simply this: Japan would
recognize the Nationalist Government in Taipei and conclude a peace treaty with
it, but the terms of the Japan-Taiwan treaty would apply only to the territories
under its actual control. In other words, as long as the Nationalist Government
could not recover the Chinese mainland, the treaty terms would not be applied to
mainland China. Moreover, the Yoshida letter implied that Japan would not
recognize the Peking regime because of the existing conditions. The letter did not,
however, guarantee that Japan would not recognize Peking under any circum-
stances. This is actually the origin of Japan’s &dquo;two-China&dquo; policy which has been
denounced by both Peking and Taipei.
The Japanese position with regard to a peace treaty with China and the two
Chinese regimes was made much clearer by Yoshida’s later statements. For exam-
ple, in January 1952, prior to the negotiation of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty,
Yoshida said openly that his Government did not...