The “Ironic Impact” of Pro-Democracy Activists: How Pro-Democratic Frames Undermine Support for Local Policy-Based Protests in Authoritarian Regimes

• Published date: 01 June 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231193015
• Author: Mai Truong
• Date: 01 June 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2024, Vol. 57(7) 1107–1138

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140231193015

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The “Ironic Impact”of

Pro-Democracy

Activists: How

Pro-Democratic Frames

Undermine Support for

Local Policy-Based

Protests in Authoritarian

Regimes

Mai Truong

1



Abstract

Many protesters under authoritarian rule are “narrow in scope, involving only

one or a few neighborhoods, villages, or groups of laid-off workers”and focus

on demands that “have to do only with material interests and local grievances”

(Lorentzen, 2013, p. 131). These protests typically blame local authorities and

express loyalty to the political system. However, in the internet age, pro-

democracy advocates often endorse and co-opt these local policy protests for

their own ends. Does being endorsed by pro-democracy activists undermine

support for these local policy protesters? Building on research suggesting that

non-activists often perceive activists as extreme, I theorize that associating

with pro-democratic frames can undermine support for local policy pro-

testers by making the protesters seem more extreme and their protests less

legal. Using an internet survey experiment in Vietnam, I f‌ind support for my

1

Marquette University, WI, USA

Corresponding Author:

Mai Truong, Political Science, Marquette University, 1250 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI

53233.

Email: mai.truong@marquette.edu

Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article

argument. These f‌indings highlight a challenge to building pro-democracy

coalitions under authoritarian rule.

Keywords

protests, prodemocracy movements, authoritarian regimes, Vietnamese

politics, rightful resistance

Although a large research agenda on protests under authoritarian rule focuses

on how movements evolve into large-scale, democracy movements (e.g.,

Beissinger, 2002;Brancati, 2016;Kim, 2000;Tufekci, 2017;Zuo & Benford,

1995), many protesters in these contexts do not promote regime change

(Lorentzen, 2013). Indeed, while protests have become increasingly common

in a wide range of authoritarian regimes since the early 2000s,

1

many of these

protests are “narrow in scope, involving only one or a few neighborhoods,

villages, or groups of laid-off workers”and focus on demands that “have to do

only with material interests and local grievances”(Lorentzen, 2013, p. 131).

Given the limited nature of their demands, these local policy-based protests

frequently frame their contention in a rightful manner where protesters de-

nounce local off‌icials while expressing loyalty to the regime (O’Brien & Li,

2006;O’Brien, 2013;Lorentzen, 2013).

2

For instance, land protesters in

Vietnam, China, and Cambodia have attributed their grievances to corrupt

local off‌icials or ambitious business tycoons while aiming to receive attention

from the central government to address their grievances (O’Brien & Li, 2006;

Kerkvliet, 2019;Park, 2019;Harms, 2012;Chau, 2019). Similarly, Russian

citizens who were involved in protests against the government’s decision to

clear a large swath of Khimki Forest for a highway construction project in

2012 (Evans Jr., 2012) and those in numerous labor strikes in 2015 explicitly

expressed loyalty to and sought for intervention from President Vladimir Putin

to address their grievances.

3

While these local policy-based protests are typically loyal in rhetoric in

advancing their claims, they are frequently endorsed by pro-democracy

dissidents to advocate for signif‌icant regime reforms. This is particularly

important in the internet age, where social media outlets allow pro-democracy

activists to easily co-opt rightful resistance for their own ends (Morozov,

2011). For example, in 2019, when villagers in Dong Tam commune in rural

Hanoi, Vietnam protested against the local government’s decision to claim

their land, independent journalists, lawyers, and human rights activists

traveled to the protest sites, live-broadcasted the incident, and wrote critical

comments on social media (Le, 2017). Across the border, Chinese pro-

democracy activists have increasingly seized on protests to criticize the

central government’s policies regarding land demolition and eviction on the

1108 Comparative Political Studies 57(7)

internet (Human Rights Watch, 2004). When workers in Egypt went on strike

against the entrepreneurs and local governments in 2010, pro-democracy

activists in Cairo used the issues to mobilize pro-democracy protests through

social media (Dobson, 2012, pp. 176–177). In each case, protesters blamed

their grievances on local authorities and/or enterprises while appearing loyal

to the regime. In contrast, dissidents used the protests to blame the central

government and advocate for the expansion of democratic institutions such as

a freer press, free and fair elections, and respect for human rights as solutions

to the policy issues.

Despite evidence that dissidents have used social media and the internet to

endorse local policy protests to advance their agenda, little research has

examined how pro-democracy endorsement affects public opinion towards

the protests. Extensive evidence shows that violent tactics or a violent frame

can undermine public support for protests (e.g., Edwards & Arnon, 2019;

Feinberg et al., 2020;Lupu & Wallace, 2019;McLeod & Detenber, 1999;

Myers & Caniglia, 2004;Schock, 2005;Tertytchnaya & Lankina, 2019;

Wouters, 2013). Nonviolence is certainly an important component of loyal

protests. However, when they are endorsed by pro-democracy advocates, the

frame of the endorsement and the identity of the endorsers are also crucial

pillars. Furthermore, loss of public support may have adverse consequences

for these local policy protests and the prospect of democratization (Ketchley &

El-Rayyes, 2020).

In this paper, I propose that being endorsed by pro-democracy activists

undermines public support for local policy-based protests, especially in

contexts where pro-democracy movements are relatively weak, and the au-

thoritarian regime enjoys high trust through two preregistered channels.

4

The f‌irst channel is the frame of protest in the endorsement. Contrary to a

rightful frame that blames local authorities and expresses loyalty to the re-

gime, a frame by pro-democracy advocates typically blames the central

government and seeks democracy as a solution to resolve the policy issue. I

contend that a pro-democratic frame could reduce support for the protests. I

propose three mechanisms. First, the pro-democratic frame could make the

protests seem less legal, thus undermining support. The pro-democratic frame

could also make respondents feel the endorser is too extreme and different

from them, thus undermining support for the protest. Finally, a pro-democratic

frame asking for installing democratic institutions could make the public think

the protest is more likely to be repressed and thus could lead to greater in-

stability and a greater potential for violence.

The second channel is the identity of the endorser. Research shows that

public support for protests is conditioned by whether or not that group is

perceived as a social “outgroup”(Edwards & Arnon, 2019;Maoz &

McCauley, 2008). In authoritarian contexts, where pro-democracy advo-

cates are likely to be urban, intellectual, anti-regime, or perceived to be

Truong 1109