The Institutional Case for Judicial Review

• Author: Jonathan R. Siegel
• Position: Professor of Law and Kahan Research Professor, George Washington University Law School
• Pages: 1147-1199

1147

The Institutional Case for Judicial Review

Jonathan R. Siegel

ABSTRACT: The “popular constitutionalism” movement has revived the

debate over judicial review. Popular constitutionalists have attacked

judicial review as being illegitimate in a democracy or inconsistent with

original intent, and they have argued that the Constitution should be

enforced through popular, majoritarian means, such as elections and

legislative agitation. This Article shows in response that the judicial process

has institutional characteristics that make judicial review the superior

method of constitutional enforcement. Prior literature has focused on just

one such institutional characteristic—the political insulation of judges.

This Article, by contrast, shows that the case for judicial review rests on a

whole range of institutional distinctions among the judicial, electoral, and

legislative processes. Most important among these distinctions are that the

judicial process is focused (it resolves issues discretely, without entangling

them with other issues), whereas the electoral process is unfocused; and the

judicial process is mandatory (a complainant can invoke it as of right),

whereas the legislative process is discretionary. The full range of its

distinctive institutional characteristics, not just the political insulation of

judges, normatively justifies judicial review.

I

NTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1149

I. THE REVIVED DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL REVIEW .................................... 1152

A. THE INSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ............................................ 1153

B. ALEXANDER BICKEL’S ATTACK ON, AND DEFENSE OF, JUDICIAL

REVIEW .......................................................................................... 1154

C. THE MODERN REVIVAL OF THE DEBATE ........................................... 1156

1. Historical Claims About Means of Enforcing the

Constitution .......................................................................... 1157

2. Rejecting Judicial Review on Democratic Grounds ........... 1158

D. RECENT DEFENSES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ........................................... 1160

 Professor of Law and Kahan Research Pr ofessor, George Washington University Law

School. J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard College. The author wishes to thank Brad Clark,

Richard Fallon, David Fontana, Amanda Frost, Orin Kerr, Amanda Leiter, Jefferson Powell,

Mark Tushnet, Amanda Tyler, and David Zaring for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1148 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1147

II. A DIFFERENT DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ........................................ 1161

A. ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL

PROCESS ........................................................................................ 1163

1. Practical Difficulties ............................................................. 1165

2. Theoretical Differences ....................................................... 1169

a. Focused vs. Unfocused....................................................... 1169

b. Transparent vs. Inscrutable .............................................. 1171

c. Precedent Based vs. Non-Precedent Based ........................... 1174

d. Majoritarian vs. Rights Based .......................................... 1174

e. Collective vs. Individualized ............................................. 1175

B. ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE POLITICAL

PROCESS ........................................................................................ 1177

1. Focused vs. Unfocused ......................................................... 1178

2. Inscrutable vs. Transparent ................................................. 1180

3. Precedent Based vs. Non-Precedent Based ........................ 1182

4. Mandatory vs. Discretionary ................................................ 1182

5. Majoritarian vs. Rights Based .............................................. 1186

6. Collective vs. Individualized ................................................ 1187

III. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW .......................................................... 1191

IV. IMPROVING JUDICIAL REVIEW .............................................................. 1194

V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1199

2012] THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 1149

INTRODUCTION

The counter-majoritarian difficulty is back. Judicial review, that

hallowed American institution, is once again under attack. After decades of

praising the bold societal reforms achieved via judicial review, scholars—

mostly, liberal scholars faced with a more conservative Supreme Court—

have rediscovered objections to the practice.

Some of these scholars object to judicial review on historical, originalist

grounds. They claim that, contrary to decades of settled understanding, the

Framers never intended courts to enforce the Constitution.1 Other scholars

attack judicial review as inconsistent with democracy. Unelected,

unaccountable judges, these scholars claim, should not have the final word

on the Constitution.2

These critiques of judicial review constitute a movement—the “popular

constitutionalism” movement. The popular constitutionalists suggest that

the Constitution should not be enforced by judges, but by popular

mechanisms. The “people themselves,” some say, should enforce the

Constitution, via elections, public debate, and similar means.3 Others

suggest that the elected legislature, not the undemocratic courts, should

interpret and enforce the Constitution.4

Naturally, judicial review has its defenders. In response to the popular

constitutionalism movement, some scholars defend judicial review on

textual and historical grounds.5 Others defend judicial review normatively.6

The debate continues as the popular constitutionalists offer rebuttals and

further arguments.7

1. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Co urt, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court,

115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).

2. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

(1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).

3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 26–29.

4. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 154–76; Waldron, supra note 2, at 1348–49, 1375–76.

5. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319

(2003); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV.

333 (1998); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.

REV. 887 (2003).

6. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, O n Extrajudicial Constitutional

Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A

Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an

Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1699 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Judicial

Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045 (2004).

7. E.g., Mark Tushnet, How Different Are Waldron’s and Fallon’ s Core Cases for and Against

Judicial Review?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2010); Jeremy Waldron, Judges as Moral

Reasoners, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 2 (2009). For other recent contributions to the discussion, see,

for example, Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People

Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313 (2008); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular

Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular

Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009); Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to th e