The Influences of Strategic Management on Antitrust Discourse

AuthorHillary Greene,Dennis A. Yao
Published date01 December 2014
DOI10.1177/0003603X1405900405
Date01 December 2014
Subject MatterArticle
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN:Vol. 59, No. 4/Winter 2014 :789
The influences of strategic
management on antitrust discourse
BYHILLARY GREENE*& DENNIS A. YAO**
This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit from
ideas developed in the academic strategy field. Because accurate
assessment and prediction of the effects of firm conduct depend in
part on understanding individual firm capabilities, knowledge from
the strategy field and other business fields complements the
contributions from industrial organization economics (IO). These
business fields also offer theoretical and empirical challenges to the
IO paradigm, which dominates antitrust analysis. The article begins
with a comparison between strategy and IO and then illustrates how
the strategy field can contribute to antitrust merger analysis. The
article then assesses the influence of the strategy field on antitru st
law and scholarship based on a citation analysis, which reveals little
evidence of influence. It concludes with an examination of the likely
impediments to the diffusion of strategy field ideas into antitrust.
KEY WORDS:antitrust, mergers, industrial organization, business strategy,
diffusion of ideas, merger guidelines
© 2014by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, Senior Vis-
iting Scholar, UC Berkeley School of Law and Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley
College of Engineering (Fung Institute).
** Lawrence E. Fouraker Professor of Business Administration, Harvard
Business School and Visiting Scholar, Haas School, UC Berkeley and UC
Berkeley College of Engineering (Fung Institute). I served as a commissioner
of the Federal Trade Commission from 1991–94.
AUTHORS’NOTE: A preliminary version of this article was presented at the American
Antitrust Institute’s symposium “Antitrust as an Interdisciplinary Field: Insights from
Business Strategy andResearch” (Washington,DC 2013). We thankGreg Gundlachand
an anonymous referee for helpful comments, Lydia Kim for research assistance, and Erin
McDonagh for editorialassistance.The views expressed hereare solely ours.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of antitrust law is to “protect economic freedom and
opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the market-
place.”1Determining whether a firm has engaged in anticompetitive
conduct depends on whether the activity impairs, or would impair,
the functioning of the marketplace resulting in harm to welfare. Over
time, antitrust law has relied increasingly on teachings from indus-
trial organization economics (IO) to provide theory regarding how
markets work and to provide tools for either measuring or predicting
the competitive effects at issue.
While antitrust has integrated IO into its policy and legal determi-
nations, we argue that antitrust has not sufficiently relied upon com-
parable teachings from the academic business fields despite their
relevance to the actions being scrutinized.2Business fields such as
marketing, operations, organizational behavior, and strategy examine
diverse subjects including the decision making, performance, and
organizational processes of firms. All of these fields contribute to sub-
jects that are critical to making antitrust determinations. In practice,
however, those contributions have arguably received less attention
from the antitrust community than is deserved, in part because the
fields do not prioritize research that seeks to further antitrust goals.
While many contributions from strategy (as well as from other
business fields) complement those of IO, sometimes its contributions
790 :THE AN T IT R US T BULLETIN:Vol. 59, No. 4/Winter 2014
1See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Mission Statement, avail-
able at www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.
2Dennis A. Yao, C ommi ssioner, Fed eral Trade Co mm’n, Prep ared
Remarks Before the Illinois State Bar Association and Chicago Bar Ass’n (Dec.
2, 1992) (on file with author); Michael E. Porter, Competition an d Antitrust:
Towards a Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures,
46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and
the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2001); Norman
W. Hawker The Public Policy of Antitrust and Strategy: An Overview, 21 J. PUB.
POLY& MARKETING 257 (2002); Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust
Stool: What the Business Schools Have to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
21, 49 (2003); Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students of Business and
Students of Antitrust: A Keynote Address, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003); Felix
Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust—What Role for Strategic Manage-
ment Expertise?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2010).
offer theoretical and empirical challenges to IO and, by extension, to
IO-based antitrust analysis. The divergence between IO and the strat-
egy field reflects, in part, the latter’s heavy reliance on disciplines
other than economics. We believe that the business fields provide
valuable frameworks and insights that would assist in improving
antitrust theory, making key factual determinations, including those
undergirding competitive effects analysis, and predicting the effects
of various proposed antitrust remedies.
This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit
from ideas developed in the academic strategy field, which has as its
focus how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage over their
rivals. While surveying the entire range of business fields and their
respective capacities to contribute to antitrust analysis is beyond the
scope of this article, many of the arguments framed with regard to
strategy would apply to other business fields as well.3
Part II begins with a brief description of strategy scholarship and
how it compares to IO scholarship. In comparing economics, and par-
ticularly IO, to the strategy field, we use mainstream IO as our point of
reference and focus on the first-order differences that characterize each
field. We recognize that research in IO, and for that matter in strategy,
is heterogeneous and that exceptions to our characterization are
inevitable. Part III illustrates how strategy insights can prove valuable
in the context of antitrust merger review. Part IV offers some prelimi-
nary evidence concerning the direct influence of strategy on antitrust
law and scholarship. The statistics show that the influence of strategy
is quite limited, though some weak evidence suggests that strategy’s
influence may be increasing. Part V assesses how ideas from the strat-
egy field can influence antitrust law and suggests which types of ideas
and analyses are more likely to be adopted. Part VI concludes.
II. THE STRATEGY FIELD AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
ANTITRUST
Part II describes the focus of the strategy field and summarizes its
relationship to IO with a particular emphasis upon key differences
ST R AT E G Y FI E L D SIN F L U E N C E :791
3See Gregory T. Gundlach, Joan M. Phillips & Debra M. Desrochers,
Antitrust and Marketing: A Primer and Call to Research, 21 J. PUB. POLY& MAR-
KETING 232 (2002).

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT