The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

• Published date: 01 December 2014
• Date: 01 December 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12109

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on

Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Alicia Uribe

James F. Spriggs II

Thomas G. Hansford

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court

decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports

this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override

legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legis-

lative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anti-

cipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when

the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that

Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an

incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless

of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court

decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court

decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override

when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on

preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically

substantiate a core part of separation-of-powers models of Court–Congress

relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on

the ultimate content of policy.

The separation of powers (SOP)—how the different branches of

government collaborate in the making and implementing of public

policy—represents a vital aspect of American politics. One SOP

relationship garnering substantial attention concerns the interac-

tions between the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court. Scholars

have examined the dealings between these institutions in multiple

ways, including the extent to which Congress influences Supreme

We presented a previous version of this paper at the 2013 Midwest Political Science

Association Meeting, April 11–14, 2013, Chicago, IL. We thank Eve Ringquist and Nate

Monroe for helpful comments. Research assistance was provided by Ben Goodhue, Adam

Kook, Chris Nanamura, Coell Simmons, Madison Simmons, and Anthony Valenti.

Hansford recognizes funding from a UC Merced Academic Senate Faculty Research Grant.

Spriggs recognizes funding from the National Science Foundation (Law and Social Science,

SES-0550451).

Please direct all correspondence to James F. Spriggs II, Political Science, Washington

University, One Brookings Dr., St Louis, MO 63119; e-mail: jspriggs@wustl.edu.

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Law & Society Review, Volume 48, Number 4 (2014)

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Court decisions (e.g., Clark 2011; Gely and Spiller 1990; Hansford

and Damore 2000; Harvey and Friedman 2009; Owens 2010; Sala

and Spriggs 2004; Segal 1997; Spiller and Gely 1992), whether the

Court constrains congressional decisionmaking (e.g., Martin 2001),

and the circumstances under which Congress legislatively overrides

Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Blackstone 2013; Eskridge 1991a;

Hausegger and Baum 1999; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Ignagni

and Meernik 1994; Ignagni, Meernik, and King 1998). Collectively,

the literature uncovers a rich and complex interdependency

between these two important American political institutions.

A core element of SOP studies is a spatial model of the policy

process, in which political actors make decisions as a function of their

preferences over the existing status quo and alternatives to it, as well

as the preferences of other relevant politicians. Researchers thus

assume that preferences over outcomes are a fundamental part of

the policy-making process. Of particular interest to us, previous

studies either (1) apply theoretical models that assume legislators

respond to Court decisions based on their preferences over them

(e.g., Gely and Spiller 1990; Segal 1997) or (2) explicitly hypothesize

that ideological disagreement with Court decisions causes Con-

gress to pass legislation overriding them (Eskridge 1991a, 1991b;

Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Ignagni, Meernik, and King 1998; Staudt,

Lindstadt, and O’Connor 2007). This perspective seems reasonable

in light of the centrality of policy preferences in contemporary

explanations of congressional decisionmaking (Aldrich and Rohde

2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007; Krehbiel 1991, 1998).

Indeed, the congressional literature offers convincing empirical

evidence that ideology plays a key role in explaining Members’ votes

on bills and the passage of legislation (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal

2007). Yet, the literature examining federal legislation overriding

Court decisions uncovers no systematic evidence they result from

Congress’ preferences regarding them.

To be fair, existing studies illustrate that preferences play a role

in explaining some of Congress’ interactions with the Court. One

area in which policy preferences matter is in sponsorship (but not

passage) of court-curbing bills, or bills aimed at limiting judicial power

(Clark 2011; Curry 2007). Similarly, policy preferences influence the

budget allocated to the Supreme Court, with Congress using the

budget to signal its approval or disapproval of the Court’s decisions

(Toma 1991). Additionally, Martin (2001) shows that the House and

Senate consider the political preferences of both the other chamber

and the Supreme Court when voting on civil rights legislation.

However, research has not uncovered a link between legislative pref-

erences and the passage of court-curbing bills (Chutkow 2008; Curry

2007). Most relevant for this study, there is only anecdotal (Eskridge

1991a, 1991b) and quantitative case study (Clark and McGuire

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