The Influence of Cause and Sectional Group Lobbying on Government Responsiveness

• Date: 01 September 2019
• Author: Mark Pickup,Heike Klüver,Vincent Hopkins
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918796326
• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918796326

Political Research Quarterly

2019, Vol. 72(3) 623 –636

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918796326

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Article

Are voters right to be skeptical about who their govern-

ment represents? Public opinion in the United States (Dyck

and Lascher 2009; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001, 2002;

Jacobs and Matthews 2015; Judis 2001), the United

Kingdom (Allen and Birch 2015; Webb 2013), Canada

(Atkinson 2013; Young and Everitt 2011), and other

democracies suggests there is anxiety about the way policy

is made—specifically that powerful interest groups and

hired lobbyists call the shots instead of voters. Part of this

concern relates to the perceived failure of government to

live up to an ideal of policy making that Stimson, MacKuen,

and Erikson (1995) call “dynamic representation”: the

willingness of government to adjust its policy priorities in

response to the changing priorities of the public. The aca-

demic literature emphasizes the responsiveness of policy

making to public opinion. But this optimism is at odds with

popular wisdom, which often holds that interest groups

wield outsize influence in the policy process. Part of the

disjuncture stems from a lack of knowledge: there remain

considerable gaps in our understanding of whether lobby-

ing strengthens or weakens the effect of voter issue atten-

tion on government priorities. This study aims to improve

our knowledge of policy responsiveness through a longitu-

dinal analysis of government spending, public opinion, and

interest group lobbying.

Although some scholars suggest interest groups serve

as a “transmission belt” that strengthens democracy by

relaying the voices of the public to elected representatives

(Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Miller and Stokes 1963;

Presthus 1973; Scott and Hunt 1966), others claim the con-

verse: interest groups are “special pleaders” who weaken

democracy by prevailing on legislators to advance priori-

ties not widely shared by the public (Lowi 1969; Olson

1965, 1982). In reality, generalization is difficult because

interest groups have diverse interests and membership. As

Stewart (1958, 25–27) notes, there are two broad catego-

ries of interest groups: cause and sectional. Cause groups

represent broad segments of society and advocate for poli-

cies that are likely to diffuse benefits beyond the active

membership. Sectional groups represent specific segments

of society and advocate for policies that are likely to restrict

benefits to active members. In recent years, scholars have

incorporated this cause/sectional distinction into studies of

796326PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918796326Political Research QuarterlyHopkins et al.

research-article2018

1Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

2Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany

Corresponding Author:

Vincent Hopkins, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser

University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, Canada V5A 1S6.

Email: vrhopkin@sfu.ca

The Influence of Cause and Sectional

Group Lobbying on Government

Responsiveness

Vincent Hopkins1, Heike Klüver2, and Mark Pickup1

Abstract

Voters are increasingly concerned that special interests control the policy process. Yet, the literature on representation

is more optimistic: elected officials face strong incentives to listen to voters—not just lobby groups—and this makes

for more responsive policies. Building on recent work, we argue a more nuanced point: different types of groups have

different effects on responsiveness. We show empirically that lobbying from “cause” groups—representing diffuse

interests like climate change—strengthens responsiveness, while lobbying from “sectional” groups—representing

industry and professional associations—has no observable effect. Our project uses a novel data set of Canadian

lobbying registrations spanning fifteen policy areas from 1990 to 2009. Using a dynamic panel model, we test how

interest group lobbying moderates the effect of voter issue attention on government spending. Our findings contribute

to contemporary debates over the influence of organized groups, suggesting some interest groups may improve

representation.

Keywords

interest groups, lobbying, responsiveness