The Individual-Level Origins of Congressional Corruption Scandals

• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X19850093
• Author: Michael D. Cobb,Andrew J. Taylor
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Date: 01 July 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X19850093

American Politics Research

2020, Vol. 48(4) 442 –454

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X19850093

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Article

It is somewhat of an understatement that Congress is dis-

liked. Public approval of the institution continues to bump

along at an exceedingly low altitude. It seems reasonable to

believe that a series of important and highly publicized cor-

ruption scandals is at least somewhat to blame. Since 2000,

about a dozen members of Congress have been convicted of

crimes for what we generally think of as corruption.

Numerous federal legislators have been the subject of intense

media coverage and scrutiny from colleagues for their prom-

inent roles in episodes where there exist convincing claims

of malfeasance. A Gallup survey in September 2015 revealed

52% of respondents believed “most members” of Congress

are “corrupt.”

Political scientists are naturally drawn to explanations of

corruption and the scandals that surround it. The focus has

been mainly on effects, specifically electoral consequences.

Research finds that legislators caught in corruption are more

likely to retire voluntarily than those who are not (Brown,

2001; Groseclose & Krehbiel, 1994; Jacobson & Dimock,

1994) and those who seek reelection lose a substantial per-

centage of their expected vote share and are more likely to be

defeated than their peers (Basinger, 2013; Brown, 2006;

Hirano & Snyder, 2012; Peters & Welch, 1980; Welch &

Hibbing, 1997), even if the electoral costs of scandal have

been reduced in recent years (Hamel & Miller, 2019). These

members also find their congressional careers and legislative

effectiveness prematurely curtailed (Paschall, Sulkin, &

Bernhard, 2019).

The work on the causes of corruption is found largely in

the comparative politics and political economy literatures.

The findings point to a variety of antecedents, such as eco-

nomic inequality and poverty (Goel & Ram, 2013; Serra,

2006; Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012; Uslaner, 2008), the lack

of a free press and general transparency in politics (Brunetti

& Weder, 2003; Sandholtz & Gray, 2003), the scope and

form of government (Bergh, Fink, & Ohrvall, 2017; Gerring

& Thacker, 2004; Goel & Nelson, 1998; Rose-Ackerman,

1999), certain types of electoral systems (Chang, 2005), reli-

gion and the lack of a colonial heritage (Paldam, 2001; Serra,

2006), and even the proportion of women holding office

(Esarey & Chirillo, 2013).

There is also a small but growing related literature on the

causes of corruption in the American states (Alt & Lassen,

2014; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2011). For the

most part, these studies confirm those conducted about other

countries. States with strong democratic institutions, greater

economic equality, smaller governments, significant invest-

ment in enforcement, high levels of education, capitals close

to population centers, and more residents in nonmetropolitan

areas are generally less corrupt (Alt & Lassen, 2003, 2014;

Apergis, Dincer, & Payne, 2012; Campante & Do, 2014;

Dincer & Johnston, 2017; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Goel &

Nelson, 1998, 2011).

850093APRXXX10.1177/1532673X19850093American Politics ResearchTaylor and Cobb

research-article2019

1North Carolina State University, Raleigh, USA

Corresponding Author:

Andrew J. Taylor, Department of Political Science, School of Public and

International Affairs, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-

8102, USA.

Email: ataylor@ncsu.edu

The Individual-Level Origins of

Congressional Corruption Scandals

Andrew J. Taylor1 and Michael D. Cobb1

Abstract

To date, the literature on corruption scandals in Congress focuses exclusively on their consequences. Using theory that

directs analyses of the causes of corruption scandals at the jurisdictional level in the American states and other countries,

we test a variety of hypotheses about which kinds of members of the House are more likely to be caught in these episodes.

We derive our hypotheses from three basic propositions about individual-level corruption—opportunity, culture, and target.

There is evidence to support them all. Members with cultivated relationships, in positions of power, and elected from

districts with traditions of or perceived tolerance for corruption are disproportionately scandalous. So, interestingly, are

some potentially marginalized legislators, particularly racial minorities. We explore the finding that Black members are

frequently associated with corruption scandals.

Keywords

corruption, scandal, U.S. House