The income elasticity of mortgage loan demand

AuthorManthos D. Delis,Chris Tsoumas,Iftekhar Hasan
Published date01 May 2019
Date01 May 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12108
DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12108
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The income elasticity of mortgage loan demand
Manthos D. Delis1Iftekhar Hasan2Chris Tsoumas3
1Montpellier Business School, 2300 Avenuedes
Moulins, 34080 Montpellier, France
2FordhamUniversity and Bank of Finland,
5 Columbus Circle, New York,NY 10019
3School of Social Sciences, Hellenic Open
University, 18 ParodosAristotelous, 26335
Patra,Greece
Correspondence
ChrisTsoumas, School of Social Sciences, Hellenic
OpenUniversity, 18 Parodos Aristotelous, 26335
Patra,Greece.
Email:ctsoum@eap.gr
Abstract
One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble
and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to
higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, espe-
cially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase
in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007.
Using applicant-level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the
income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the
years before 2007, especially for the mid- and lower-middle income
groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not
matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.
KEYWORDS
distribution of income, income elasticity, mortgage loan demand,
subprime crisis
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G21, G01, D12, E44, R21
1INTRODUCTION
Is there a role for the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in the shaping of the bubble that led to the subprime
crisis? Is this elasticity stable overtime or was it different in the pre-crisis period? The answers to these questions have
fundamental implications for the way we think about the origination of banking and financial crises, as well as the way
policy should respond to fluctuations in loan demand. The main demand-side explanation of the crisis is that credit
expansion in the market for mortgages came, inter alia, from political incentivesin the form of lax fiscal and monetary
policy, credit-promotion policies, and deregulation of the financial system, that increasingly induced the middle class
to own their own houses and raising loan demand (e.g., Rajan,2010).
This explanation translates to three main, non-mutually exclusive mechanisms, reinforcing the formation of the
housing bubble from the demand side. The first is that mortgage prices decreased (holding income and income elas-
ticity constant) and this yielded a surge in the quantity of loans demanded. A simple look at the yearly number of loan
applications (data are obtained from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act-HMDA), especially between 2002 and 2006,
confirms these developments (see Panel A of Table 1). The second mechanism comes from an increase in individuals’
c
2019 New YorkUniversity Salomon Center and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Financial Markets,Inst. &Inst. 2019;28:115–139. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/fmii 115
116 DELIS ET AL.
TABL E 1 Summary statistics for the mortgage applications
Panel A: Number of applications byyear Panel B: Summary statistics for income and loan amount byyear
log(income) log(loan amount)
All
Conventionalloans for
home purchase
Conventionalloans for
home purchase with no
missing data
%oforiginated
conventionalloans for
home purchase with no
missing data Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev.
1992 12,006,230 3,347,873 1,215,554 70.83 1,215,554 3.94 3.95 0.68 4.39 4.51 0.86
1993 15,380,827 3,773,883 1,244,150 72.33 1,244,150 3.97 3.97 0.71 4.50 4.61 0.80
1994 12,194,357 4,686,721 2,080,713 68.73 2,080,713 3.89 3.89 0.69 4.35 4.47 0.85
1995 11,234,064 5,007,230 2,811,449 66.27 2,811,449 3.90 3.89 0.67 4.32 4.44 0.86
1996 8,571,193 3,561,029 1,611,305 64.89 1,611,305 3.88 3.87 0.68 4.27 4.38 0.85
1997 16,155,418 6,211,933 1,695,618 68.16 1,695,618 4.11 4.09 0.68 4.60 4.72 0.83
1998 24,661,738 7,746,152 3,812,334 61.97 3,812,334 4.00 4.01 0.69 4.45 4.56 0.85
1999 22,911,779 8,181,955 4,073,249 60.55 4,073,249 4.05 4.04 0.70 4.50 4.61 0.87
2000 19,233,174 8,079,906 2,184,819 60.79 2,184,819 4.19 4.17 0.69 4.61 4.74 0.92
2001 27,578,487 4,250,118 1,359,592 63.29 1,359,592 4.31 4.29 0.66 4.81 4.97 0.92
2002 31,236,040 4,455,971 1,560,352 63.30 1,560,352 4.34 4.32 0.66 4.92 5.06 0.88
2003 41,556,864 8,831,184 1,886,185 60.93 1,886,185 4.36 4.33 0.64 5.01 5.14 0.87
2004 33,607,736 11,448,747 7,008,954 61.97 7,008,954 4.30 4.28 0.66 4.86 4.94 0.87
2005 36,439,157 14,247,608 9,000,639 58.05 9,000,639 4.37 4.34 0.67 4.85 4.94 0.92
2006 34,105,441 13,819,614 8,143,137 57.34 8,143,137 4.45 4.42 0.68 4.86 4.95 0.93
2007 26,276,463 9,394,399 5,795,093 53.89 5,795,093 4.45 4.42 0.71 5.01 5.10 0.88
2008 17,391,570 4,625,621 2,806,395 56.86 2,806,395 4.45 4.42 0.74 5.12 5.20 0.84
2009 19,493,491 3,244,697 1,809,530 60.26 1,809,530 4.43 4.39 0.75 5.08 5.15 0.83
2010 16,348,557 2,753,491 1,754,707 59.20 1,754,707 4.46 4.44 0.76 5.06 5.15 0.88
2011 14,873,415 2,830,345 1,773,290 59.48 1,773,290 4.47 4.45 0.76 5.03 5.11 0.91
2012 18,691,551 13,613,630 2,102,655 61.84 2,102,655 4.49 4.48 0.75 5.09 5.18 0.87
Note: Panel A reports the number of mortgage applications byyear. Panel B reports summary statistics for the income and loan amount by year.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT