The Impact of Nonpartisan Fiscal Institutions on Budgetary Delay

• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X21990731
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Author: Colin Emrich
• Date: 01 September 2020
• Subject Matter: General Interests

General Interest

The Impact of Nonpartisan

Fiscal Institutions on

Budgetary Delay

Colin Emrich

1

Abstract

Can the design of governmental institutions promote timely governance? This article investigates

this question by examining the relationship between the design of fiscal institutions and budgetary

delays across the fifty states. These budgetary offices are created by lawmakers to advance sound

fiscal policy and sustainable public finance. This article argues that the unbiased information provided

by nonpartisan budget offices minimize the likelihood of budgetary delay as well as lessen how long

budgetary stalemate persists when a delay occurs. The findings suggest that nonpartisan fiscal

institutions do not prevent budgetary delay but substantially reduce the duration of budgetary

gridlock.

Keywords

budgetary delay, legislative institutions, state politics

Introduction

From fiscal years 1961 to 2019, the state of

New York has missed its budget deadline

nearly two-thirds of the time (thirty-eight of

fifty-nine budgets). Indeed, betw een 1985 and

2004, New York’s legislature delivered its state

budget late, forcing the state government to rely

on interim budgets. Such delays are not costless

(e.g., Pulsipher 2004), and lawmakers and

observers criticize the process (e.g., DeWitt

2019; Williams 2019; McMahon 2020) since

timely budgets are viewed as a measure of good

governance (Putnam 1993). New York is not

the only state to struggle with its budget: Five

states on average have been late in passing their

budget each year since 1961, with at least one

state late every year.

Budgeting can lead to contentious negotia-

tions since they determine the levels of spend-

ing and revenues and thus a state’s priorities

(Rosenthal 1990). Consequently, compromise

frequently falters when executive and legisla-

tive actors end up in in budgetary standoffs

(National Conference of State Legislatures

1995; Kousser and Phillips 2009, 2012).

In recent years, partisan budgetary deadlocks

have resulted in late budgets becoming com-

monplace (Farmer 2017), with proposed causes

including divided government (Andersen,

Lassen, and Nielsen 2012; Cummins 2012;

Kirkland and Phillips 2018), partisan polariza-

tion (Birkhead 2016), institutional conditions

(Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012; Fowler

1

George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Colin Emrich, George Washington University, Monroe

Hall, Suite 409, Washington, DC 20052, USA.

Email: cemrich51@gwu.edu

State and Local GovernmentReview

2020, Vol. 52(3) 173-183

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X21990731

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