The Impact of Electoral Rules and Reforms on Election Outcomes

AuthorJoel Sievert
DOI10.1177/1532673X20914608
Published date01 November 2020
Date01 November 2020
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X20914608
American Politics Research
2020, Vol. 48(6) 738 –749
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X20914608
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Article
Electoral reforms during the 19th century profoundly altered
American elections from party-controlled affairs to contests
in which voters had greater control over the selection of
elected officials (Burnham, 1965; Ware, 2002). While a large
literature examines the impact of these different electoral
rules on American election outcomes (Carson & Sievert,
2017; Crook & Hibbing, 1997; Engstrom & Kernell, 2005,
2014; Rogers, 2012; Rusk, 1970; Schiller & Stewart, 2015),
most studies examine a single reform or rule in isolation. By
doing so, scholars may fail to account how other reforms
altered the effect of the electoral rule under study. The poten-
tial challenges to inference arise, at least in part, because of
the sheer number of changes that occurred over a short period
of time (Carson & Sievert, 2015; Ware, 2002). The variation
in the electoral rules during this period, however, provides
unique theoretical and empirical leverage to examine how
electoral institutions structure election outcomes. In particu-
lar, this period provides an ideal setting to examine how
variation in partisan control over the electoral system struc-
tures outcomes.
I examine the impact of electoral rules on election out-
comes in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial contests held during
the same electoral cycle. These elected positions provide an
ideal comparison group because they are chosen to represent
the same geographic constituency, but differ from one another
in important ways (Carsey & Wright, 1998; Sievert & McKee,
2019). In the context of electoral institutions, differences
across time in the method used to select senators and gover-
nors provide leverage to evaluate how electoral rules struc-
ture outcomes. Specifically, variation in the level of partisan
control over elections should condition the likelihood that
the outcome of these two contests mirrors one another. A key
advantage of the research design proposed here is that it allows
for the comparison of alternative institutional arrangements
that were available at the same point in time.
There are two electoral institutions of immediate interest
in this article. First, until the 17th Amendment was ratified,
senators were selected by state legislators, but governors
were chosen via a direct vote of the mass electorate. Second,
the adoption of the secret ballot weakened party control over
direct elections (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014), like gubernato-
rial elections, but should have no impact on the partisan
determinants of Senate election outcomes. As such, there is
variation in the level of partisan control over elections both
within an election year and across time that can help identify
the effect of institutional arrangements.
Based on analysis of more than 350 senate-gubernatorial
election pairs from 1868 to 1912, I find that changes in the
level of partisan control condition the likelihood that the out-
come of these elections mirrors one another. Prior to the elec-
toral reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century, the
partisan outcome of Senate and gubernatorial contests was
closely linked, but this connection weakened with subsequent
reforms. Contrary to some previous accounts, the findings
914608APRXXX10.1177/1532673X20914608American Politics ResearchSievert
research-article2020
1Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA
Corresponding Author:
Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University, 113 Holden Hall, P.O. Box 41015,
Lubbock, TX 79409, USA.
Email: joel.sievert@ttu.edu
The Impact of Electoral Rules and
Reforms on Election Outcomes
Joel Sievert1
Abstract
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American elections underwent a series of reforms that weakened partisan
control over elections. The variation in the electoral rules during this period offers scholars a unique opportunity to examine
how electoral institutions and reforms structure election outcomes. In this article, I examine how electoral rules translated
voter preferences into outcomes for the selection of two prominent positions, governors and U.S. senators. These two elected
positions offer an interesting comparison because while they are chosen to represent the same geographic constituency,
there is notable variation in the rules used to elect each office. Based on analysis of more than 350 senate-gubernatorial
election pairs, I find that varying levels of partisan control over elections throughout time conditioned the likelihood that the
partisan outcome of these elections mirrors one another.
Keywords
elections, senators, governors, institutional development, electoral reforms

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