The Impact of Electoral Rules and Reforms on Election Outcomes

• Published date: 01 November 2020
• Author: Joel Sievert
• Date: 01 November 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X20914608
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X20914608

American Politics Research

2020, Vol. 48(6) 738 –749

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X20914608

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Article

Electoral reforms during the 19th century profoundly altered

American elections from party-controlled affairs to contests

in which voters had greater control over the selection of

elected officials (Burnham, 1965; Ware, 2002). While a large

literature examines the impact of these different electoral

rules on American election outcomes (Carson & Sievert,

2017; Crook & Hibbing, 1997; Engstrom & Kernell, 2005,

2014; Rogers, 2012; Rusk, 1970; Schiller & Stewart, 2015),

most studies examine a single reform or rule in isolation. By

doing so, scholars may fail to account how other reforms

altered the effect of the electoral rule under study. The poten-

tial challenges to inference arise, at least in part, because of

the sheer number of changes that occurred over a short period

of time (Carson & Sievert, 2015; Ware, 2002). The variation

in the electoral rules during this period, however, provides

unique theoretical and empirical leverage to examine how

electoral institutions structure election outcomes. In particu-

lar, this period provides an ideal setting to examine how

variation in partisan control over the electoral system struc-

tures outcomes.

I examine the impact of electoral rules on election out-

comes in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial contests held during

the same electoral cycle. These elected positions provide an

ideal comparison group because they are chosen to represent

the same geographic constituency, but differ from one another

in important ways (Carsey & Wright, 1998; Sievert & McKee,

2019). In the context of electoral institutions, differences

across time in the method used to select senators and gover-

nors provide leverage to evaluate how electoral rules struc-

ture outcomes. Specifically, variation in the level of partisan

control over elections should condition the likelihood that

the outcome of these two contests mirrors one another. A key

advantage of the research design proposed here is that it allows

for the comparison of alternative institutional arrangements

that were available at the same point in time.

There are two electoral institutions of immediate interest

in this article. First, until the 17th Amendment was ratified,

senators were selected by state legislators, but governors

were chosen via a direct vote of the mass electorate. Second,

the adoption of the secret ballot weakened party control over

direct elections (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014), like gubernato-

rial elections, but should have no impact on the partisan

determinants of Senate election outcomes. As such, there is

variation in the level of partisan control over elections both

within an election year and across time that can help identify

the effect of institutional arrangements.

Based on analysis of more than 350 senate-gubernatorial

election pairs from 1868 to 1912, I find that changes in the

level of partisan control condition the likelihood that the out-

come of these elections mirrors one another. Prior to the elec-

toral reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century, the

partisan outcome of Senate and gubernatorial contests was

closely linked, but this connection weakened with subsequent

reforms. Contrary to some previous accounts, the findings

914608APRXXX10.1177/1532673X20914608American Politics ResearchSievert

research-article2020

1Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA

Corresponding Author:

Joel Sievert, Texas Tech University, 113 Holden Hall, P.O. Box 41015,

Lubbock, TX 79409, USA.

Email: joel.sievert@ttu.edu

The Impact of Electoral Rules and

Reforms on Election Outcomes

Joel Sievert1

Abstract

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American elections underwent a series of reforms that weakened partisan

control over elections. The variation in the electoral rules during this period offers scholars a unique opportunity to examine

how electoral institutions and reforms structure election outcomes. In this article, I examine how electoral rules translated

voter preferences into outcomes for the selection of two prominent positions, governors and U.S. senators. These two elected

positions offer an interesting comparison because while they are chosen to represent the same geographic constituency,

there is notable variation in the rules used to elect each office. Based on analysis of more than 350 senate-gubernatorial

election pairs, I find that varying levels of partisan control over elections throughout time conditioned the likelihood that the

partisan outcome of these elections mirrors one another.

Keywords

elections, senators, governors, institutional development, electoral reforms