The Impact of District Magnitude on the Legislative Behavior of State Representatives

• Published date: 01 June 2018
• Date: 01 June 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917735177
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917735177

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(2) 302 –317

© 2017 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912917735177

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Article

Legislators’ decisions about how to allocate their time

and effort have a major impact on the quality of represen-

tation constituents receive, the policy agenda, and the

bills that become law. These decisions also can influence

lawmakers’ prospects for political advancement, includ-

ing reelection. Such decisions do not take place in a vac-

uum, but are conditioned by political institutions and

processes. For instance, we know the policy issues legis-

lators focus on are influenced by their committee assign-

ments (Hall 1996), the nature of their constituencies

(Mayhew 1974), and many other factors.

While it is well accepted that the rules that structure

elections can have an impact on legislative behavior, the

effects of some American electoral institutions are not

well understood. This is particularly the case for district

magnitude—the number of officials elected in a single

district. Although single-member districts (SMDs) are the

most recognized electoral configuration in the United

States, multimember districts (MMDs) are common. Ten

state legislatures, more than two-thirds of all municipal

governments, and a multitude of county councils, school

boards, and other special governments use MMDs. A sub-

stantial body of research finds that district magnitude

influences electoral competition (Cox and Morgenstern

1995; Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1991), the diversity

of lawmaking bodies (Trounstine and Valdini 2008), the

types of policies pursued (Bagashka and Clark 2016), and

more. However, little is known about the impact of

district magnitude on participation of legislators in basic

policymaking activities.1

While some research suggests MMDs can foster coop-

erative relationships among same-district lawmakers and

improve their collective effectiveness, we argue that

because MMDs foster uniquely competitive electoral

environments and at the same time provide legislators

with unique opportunities to claim credit for the work of

their same-district colleagues, lawmakers elected in dis-

tricts of larger magnitudes focus more of their energies on

relatively low-cost, high-visibility activities that provide

clear electoral payoffs, such as introducing and cospon-

soring legislation. Similarly, compared with their col-

leagues in SMDs, MMD legislators devote less energy to

moving policy proposals through the stages of the legisla-

tive process. These activities require substantial behind-

the-scenes effort, are less visible to constituents, and

provide less immediate electoral payoffs. In other words,

MMD legislators respond to their district dynamics by

acting more like legislative “show horses,” rather than

735177PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917735177Political Research QuarterlyTaylor et al.

research-article2017

1Westat, Rockville, MD, USA

2University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA

3University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

Corresponding Author:

James M. Curry, Department of Political Science, University of Utah,

332 S 1400 E, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.

Email: james.curry@utah.edu

The Impact of District Magnitude

on the Legislative Behavior of State

Representatives

Jeffrey A. Taylor1, Paul S. Herrnson2, and James M. Curry3

Abstract

This study demonstrates that district magnitude (the number of officials elected from an electoral district) affects the

behavioral choices and policymaking contributions of legislators. We theorize that legislators elected from districts of

larger magnitudes focus much of their efforts on relatively low-cost, high-visibility activities that allow for easy credit

claiming, while their colleagues from lower magnitude districts focus more on relatively high-cost, low-visibility work

required to move policy proposals through the legislative process. We test our hypotheses using data recording

the legislative activities of members of the Maryland House of Delegates, which elects its member from districts

of different magnitudes. The results, which are mostly supportive, have implications for the impact of institutional

structures on representation and policymaking.

Keywords

multimember districts, state legislatures, legislative behavior

Taylor et al. 303

“work horses” (e.g., Langbein and Sigelman 1989;

Matthews 1959; Payne 1980).

We test these expectations with an original dataset of

legislative actions taken by members of the Maryland

House of Delegates, a legislative chamber that elects its

members from districts of various magnitudes and pro-

vides several analytical benefits. Specifically, we analyze

bill introductions and cosponsorships, floor amendment

activity, and successes in getting bills reported by a com-

mittee or signed into law. The results have implications

for policymaking and representation, and contribute to a

growing literature on electoral institutions and legislative

behavior.

MMDs and Legislative Behavior

Electoral institutions can meaningfully influence legisla-

tures and the behavior of those who serve in them (e.g.,

Carey and Hix 2011; Carey et al. 2006; Hayes, Hibbing,

and Sulkin 2010). MMDs, in particular, influence various

aspects of politics, including electoral competition (Cox

and Morgenstern 1995; Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky

1991), the diversity of a legislature’s membership

(Trounstine and Valdini 2008), the financing of cam-

paigns (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013), and voter par-

ticipation (Herrnson, Taylor, and Curry 2015). We argue

that district magnitude also influences representatives’

engagement in different legislative activities, which, in

turn, affects their policymaking successes.

The factors influencing a legislator’s activities in

office include those shaping the opportunities and con-

straints lawmakers face in taking action, and those shap-

ing their motivations to try (Hall 1996). Opportunities

and constraints include majority or minority party status

(Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman

2003; Cox and Terry 2008) and institutional position,

including their seniority or serving as a committee chair

(Cox and Terry 2008; Miquel and Snyder 2006). They

also include a legislator’s standing among colleagues,

political alliances, and friendships (Bratton and Rouse

2011; Fowler 2006; Kirkland 2011; Tam Cho and Fowler

2010). Broad institutional and environmental factors help

shape the overall productivity of a legislature and its

members, including the number serving in the chamber

(Kirkland 2014), unified versus divided government

(Binder 1999; Bowling and Ferguson 2001, but see

Mayhew 2005), party polarization (Binder 1999), and

public support for government action (Stimson, Mackuen,

and Erikson 1995).

Motivation refers to a legislator’s willingness to com-

mit to any type of action. There are no formal require-

ments for lawmakers to produce policies, or really do

anything at all. They are instead driven to do so by their

objectives. Fenno’s (1973) trinity of goals—reelection,

good public policy, and influence within the legislature—

continue to be the most frequently ascribed, but legisla-

tors also are driven to support the interests of their party

(Lee 2009), and some are motivated by the pursuit of

higher office (Maestas 2000). Legislators also respond to

unique opportunities to influence policy (Adler and

Wilkerson 2013).

We argue that a district’s magnitude influences both

legislators’ opportunities and motivations to commit time

and resources to different legislative actions. While the

mutual electoral and policy interests of MMD delegations

(members elected from the same MMD) may provide a

foundation for collaboration (see Hamm, Harmel, and

Thompson 1981), and improve legislators’ opportunities

and successes with legislative work (Dauer 1966;

Kirkland 2012; Snyder and Ueda 2007), there are reasons

to suspect MMDs influence legislative behavior in more

nuanced ways. For one, some MMD delegations may

cooperate with each other more than others. Split-party

delegations (consisting of members from more than one

party) are likely to often disagree, and districts with

highly competitive elections may strain relations among

even same-party members of a delegation as they pit leg-

islators against each other in both primary and general

elections.

Even under harmonious circumstances, MMD legisla-

tors may be less motivated than SMD legislators to engage

in more demanding policymaking activities because they

typically face more uncertain electoral environments and

may feel the need to dedicate more time to symbolic show

horse activities that may better position them for reelec-

tion. Indeed, MMD elections are usually more competitive

than SMDs because they feature more candidates (Carey,

Niemi, and Powell 2000; Niemi and Winsky 1987; Squire

2000), with winners receiving relatively small percentages

of the vote and winning by smaller margins (Jewell and

Breaux 1991; but see Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991).

Furthermore, turnover rates are higher and incumbency

advantages are weaker in larger magnitude districts (Carey,

Niemi, and Powell 2000; Hirano and Snyder 2009; but see

Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991).

The nature of electoral competition in MMDs is also

different from that found in SMDs. Unlike most SMD

elections, candidates of the same party, including incum-

bents, must compete against each other for voter support

in both the primary and the general election. Intraparty

competition may exist in some SMD primaries, but rarely

in general elections. Ballot roll-off—wherein a voter

casts a ballot for fewer candidates than allowed—is com-

mon in MMDs (Herrnson, Taylor, and Curry 2015;

Engstrom and McDonald 1993). Consequently, legisla-

tors from the same party in an MMD are often competing

to earn the votes of “single-shot” or “bullet” voters who

could make the difference between winning and losing.