The Impact of Citizens United on Large Corporations and Their Employees
| Author | Michael S. Rocca,Wendy L. Hansen |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912918793230 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2019, Vol. 72(2) 403 –419
The Impact of Citizens United on Large
© 2018 University of Utah
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Corporations and Their Employees
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918793230
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918793230
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Wendy L. Hansen1 and Michael S. Rocca1
Abstract
The goal of this research is to determine whether the Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United ruling changed
the contribution strategies of employees of major corporations. Using an original dataset of campaign contributions by
employees of Fortune 500 companies, we analyze the contribution strategies of these individuals in the 2008 and 2012
presidential election cycles. Overall, our results suggest three important conclusions. First, Citizens United did not alter
Fortune 500 employees’ contribution patterns to traditional political committees. However, the emergence of Super
political action committees (PAC) in 2012 may have pulled employees’ contributions from 527 groups, at least in the
short term. Second, we find large differences in contributions across resources, and the differences become even
more dramatic after Citizens United when CEOs contributed millions to Super PACs. Finally, Fortune 500 employee
contributions to traditional political committees still outweigh Super PAC contributions in both numbers and amount.
And, importantly, employees of the world’s largest corporations were not the driving force behind the increase in
spending after Citizens United.
Keywords
Citizens United, political spending, corporate political activity, Fortune 500
The Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United rul-
the effect of the 2010 Citizens United decision on the
ing created some concern about the impact that the deci-
behavior of individuals and patterns of spending.1
sion would have on the campaign spending of corporations,
The Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision
the main subject of the ruling. Among the ruling’s most
had two main impacts on campaign spending. First, it
vocal critics was President Barack Obama, who called
allowed outside groups, most notably corporations and
Citizens a major victory for “big oil, Wall Street banks,
labor unions, to spend money out of their general treasur-
health insurance companies and the other powerful inter-
ies on “express advocacy” and “electioneering communi-
ests” (Liptak 2010). While there was a 426 percent
cations,” without limits. Prior to the ruling, corporations
increase in independent expenditures from the 2008 to the
and unions were restricted under the Taft-Hartley Act of
2012 presidential election, evidence suggests that large
1947 (PL 80-101) from making IEs in support of or in
corporations have not been a major source of the increase
opposition to federal candidates. Second, it opened the
in campaign spending (e.g., Hamm et al. 2014; Hansen,
door for the creation of “Super PACs,” political commit-
Rocca, and Ortiz 2015) and that Citizens, in fact, had little
tees registered with the Federal Elections Commission
noticeable impact on how corporations spend on politics
(FEC) that make IEs to expressly support or oppose can-
(Bonica 2016). Rather, dramatic increases in independent
didates to federal office, but cannot contribute directly to
expenditures (IE) following the Citizens United ruling
federal candidates. Because they only make IEs, Super
have come from individuals, some of whom may be
PACs can accept unlimited contributions from individu-
employed by wealthy businesses and corporations.
als, corporations, and unions.
The goal of this research is to determine whether
Thus, Citizens United significantly altered the spend-
Citizens United changed the contribution strategies of
ing options available to corporations and their employees,
employees of major corporations. Using an original data-
set of political activity and campaign contributions to
1The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, USA
candidate committees, party committees, political action
committees (PAC), 527 groups, and Super PACs by the
Corresponding Author:
employees of Fortune 500 companies, we analyze the
Michael S. Rocca, Department of Political Science, The University
of New Mexico, MSC 05 3070, 1 University of New Mexico,
contribution strategies of these individuals in the 2008
Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001, USA.
and 2012 presidential election cycles to better understand
Email: msrocca@unm.edu
404
Political Research Quarterly 72(2)
particularly wealthy corporate managers. Prior to this rul-
those with higher resources are more likely to partici-
ing, any campaign contributions from employees were
pate in the electoral process (e.g., Rosenstone and
sent to a traditional PAC (perhaps working on behalf of
Hansen 1993), which, in turn, biases policy outputs in
the corporation), or directly to a campaign or party com-
their favor (e.g., Hill and Leighley 1992). This is par-
mittee. A traditional PAC can make donations to candi-
ticularly true with campaign contributions, which have
dates and can engage in express advocacy through IEs to
been shown to affect electoral outcomes (e.g.,
elect or defeat a clearly identified candidate for federal
Abramowitz 1991; Abramowitz, Alexander, and
office. Importantly, however, individual contributions to
Gunning 2006) as well as the distribution of legislative
these PACs are capped, and corporations cannot donate
services (e.g., Denzau and Munger 1986; Hall and
funds from their treasuries to a PAC. The creation of Super
Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Rocca and
PACs following Citizen United and its progeny (particu-
Gordon 2013) at all levels of government (e.g.,
larly Speechnow.org v. FEC) opened up an unprecedented
Gierzynski and Breaux 1991; Powell 2012). The rela-
option for donors. Unlike traditional PACs, whose contri-
tionship between resources and representation has taken
butions from individuals are limited to $5,000 per PAC,
on added importance in recent years, as prominent and
per year, Super PACs can accept unlimited amounts from
wealthy business leaders—including CEOs of major
individuals, corporations, and unions (see Briffault 2012).
companies—have assumed some of the United States’
Our questions, then, are these: how have these new
most important political positions, including President
spending options in the post-Citizens environment been
of the United States (Donald Trump, chairman and pres-
exploited by the employees of large corporations? To
ident of The Trump Organization), Secretary of State
what extent are these individuals responsible for the dra-
(Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon), Secretary of Commerce
matic increase in overall spending? And has Citizens
(Wilbur Ross, a billionaire investor), Secretary of Labor
United altered the behavior of individuals for the benefit
(Andrew Puzker, CEO of CKE Restaurants), Secretary
of corporations or the ideological goals of the wealthy
of Treasury (Steven Mnuchin, hedge fund chief and for-
individuals in those corporations? The answers to these
mer Goldman Sachs banker), and Administrator of
questions have important implications for the issue of
Small Business (Linda McMahon, former CEO of World
resources and representation (Baumgartner et al. 2009;
Wrestling Entertainment).
Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Kimball et al. 2012;
Simply stated, the relationship between contributions
Lowery and Gray 2004; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman
and political outcomes suggests that representation is
and Tierney 1986).
skewed toward those with resources. And few individuals
Overall, our results suggest three important conclu-
in the American political landscape, who desire to affect
sions. First, Citizens United did not alter Fortune 500
elections and public policy, have greater resources than
employees’ contribution patterns to traditional political
large corporations and their executives. The vast majority
committees (e.g., corporate and industry PACs, or party
of studies on corporate political activity operate at the
and candidate committees). However, our findings sug-
firm or industry level of analysis (see Hillman, Keim, and
gest that the emergence of Super PACs in 2012 may have
Schuler 2004). Two key assumptions underlie much of
pulled employees’ contributions from 527 groups, at least
the research on firm and industry behavior. First, and
in the short term. Second, consistent with research on par-
most prominent in political science and economics, is the
ticipation, we find large differences in contributions
assumption that profit-maximizing firms engage in politi-
across resources, which we measure as employee rank.
cal activities to increase revenues and decrease costs
The differences become even more dramatic after Citizens
(Baysinger 1984; Boies 1989; Grier, Munger, and Roberts
when CEOs contributed millions to Super PACs. Finally,
1994; Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Hillman and Hitt 1999;
we find that despite the rise of Super PACs in 2012,
Keim and Baysinger 1988; Masters and Keim 1985). On
Fortune 500 employee contributions to traditional politi-
the revenue side, firms might seek government contracts
cal committees still outweigh Super PAC contributions in
or other financial gains, while on the cost side,...
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