The Impact of Changing the Racial Composition of Congressional Districts on Legislators' Roll Call Behavior

• Author: Charles S. Bullock
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9502300202
• Published date: 01 April 1995
• Date: 01 April 1995
• Subject Matter: Articles

141

THE

IMPACT

OF

CHANGING THE

RACIAL

COMPOSITION

OF

CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICTS

ON

LEGISLATORS’

ROLL

CALL

BEHAVIOR

CHARLES

S.

BULLOCK,

III

University

of

Georgia

The

1991-1992

redrawing

of

congressional

districts

produced

the

greatest

changes

of

any

remapping

since

the

mid-1960s.

In

many

states,

particularly

in

the

South,

the

driving

force

was

the

Justice

Department

demand

that

majority-minority

districts

be

drawn

wherever

possible.

In

this

article

the

author

explores

the

consequences

of

changing

the

racial

composition

of

districts

on

legislative

behavior.

A

measure

of

conservatism

and

a

measure

of

support

for

civil

rights

concerns

serve

as

the

dependent

variables.

Comparing

voting

records

of

southern

legislators

in

1993

with

those

from

the

102nd

Congress

shows

that

freshman

Republicans

were

particularly

conservative

and

more

senior

representatives

were

often

more

conservative.

Some

evidence

suggests

that first-term

Democrats

were

more

liberal

than

their

predecessors.

At

first

it

appeared

that

legislators

modified

their

voting

records

in

response

to

changes

in

the

racial

composition

of

their

districts.

Once

further

controls

were

imposed,

it

became

clear

that

the

relationship

between

constituency

change

and

roll

call

voting

was

limited

to

Black

legislators

who

replaced

Whites.

The

round

of

redistricting

completed

in

the

wake

of

the

1990

census

was

the

most

revolutionary

since

the

initial

efforts

to

achieve

one-person,

one-vote

equality

in

the

mid-1960s.

Goaded

by

the

U.S.

Department

of

Justice,

states

with

substantial

minority

populations

were

forced

to

ignore

old

precepts

of

compactness

and

contiguity

to

maximize

the

number

of

districts

in

which

racial

minorities

constituted

a

majority

of

the

population.

Of

course,

as

some

districts

were

made

Blacker,

adjoining

districts

became

Whiter.

This

article

examines

the

policy

consequences

of

the

creation

of

12

additional

majority

Black

districts

in

the

11-state

South.

Author’s

Note:

I

appreciate

the

research

assistance

of

Richard

Dunn.

An

earlier

version

of

this

article

was

presented

at

the

Hendricks

Symposium

on

Legislative

Redistricting

in

the

1990s,

University

of

Nebraska,

Lincoln,

April

8-9,

1994.

AMERICAN

POLITICS

QUARTERLY,

Vol

23

No

2,

Apnl

1995

141-158

©

1995

Sage

Publications,

Inc

142

BACKGROUND

Redistricting

carried

out

to

adjust

population

inequalities

uncov-

ered

in

the

1980

census

produced

majority

Black

districts

in

areas

where

the

African

American

population

was

concentrated,

such

as

Atlanta

and

the

Mississippi

Delta.

After

reviewing

the

incidence

of

African

American

members

of

Congress

in

the

1980s,

Grofman

and

Handley

(1989)

explained

that

whereas

the

nation’s

Black

population

continued

to

be

disproportionately

southern,

that

region

less

often

elected

African

Americans

to

Congress

because

the

South’s

Black

population

was

less

concentrated than

in

the

North

and

West

where

Blacks

are

found

almost

exclusively

in

urban

areas.

As

the

Voting

Rights

Act

was

understood

in

the

early

1980s,

maximization

of

the

number

of

majority

Black

districts

had

been

largely

realized

(Swain

1993).

It

was

only

with

the

Justice

Department

interpretation

of

the

1982

revision

of

Section

2

of

the

Voting

Rights

Act

that

the

potential

for

crafting

additional

majority

Black

districts

was

realized.

The

1982

amendments

to

the

Voting

Rights

Act

discarded

the

intent

test

that

the

Supreme

Court

had

applied

when

evaluating

the

legality

of

the

absence

of

Black

commissioners

from

the

three-person

govern-

ing

body

elected

at

large

in

Mobile,

Alabama

(City

of Mobile

v.

Bolden

1980).

The

court

had

required

that

plaintiffs

show

an

intent

to

discrimi-

nate

for

at-large

electoral

systems

to

be

invalidated.

Civil

rights

activists

used

the

occasion

of

renewing

Section 5

of

the

Voting

Rights

Act

to

rewrite

Section

2

so

that

plaintiffs

would

need

only

show

that

an

electoral

system

had

the

effect

or

result

of

diluting

minority

group

influence

to

prevail.

Despite

a

disclaimer

imposed

by

Senator

Robert

Dole

(R-KS)

noting

that

the

statute

did

not

require

that

minorities

be

represented

on

collegial

bodies

at

about

the

same

rate

as

their

share

of

the

population,

proportionality

became

the

benchmark

against

which

plaintiffs,

Justice

Department

lawyers,

and

some

judges

assessed

the

equity

of

electoral

systems.

Going

into

the

1991-1992

round

of

redistricting,

the

Justice

Depart-

ment

assumed

the

lead

in

pushing

for

the

creation

of

additional

districts

in

which

racial

minorities

would

constitute

a

majority

of

the

population.

This

endeavor

was

facilitated

by

the

availability

of

sophis-

ticated

computer

software

that

rapidly

reconfigures

census

blocks

to