The Impact of Angry Versus Sad Victim Impact Statements on Mock Jurors’ Sentencing Decisions in a Capital Trial
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Author | Kimberly Schweitzer,Benjamin M. Wilkowski,Bryan Myers,Narina Nuñez |
| DOI | 10.1177/0093854816689809 |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2017
The ImpacT Of angry Versus sad VIcTIm
ImpacT sTaTemenTs On mOck JurOrs’
senTencIng decIsIOns In a capITal TrIal
NARINA NUñEz
University of Wyoming
BRyAN MyERS
University of North Carolina Wilmington
BENJAMIN M. WILkOWSkI
kIMBERLy SCHWEITzER
University of Wyoming
The present study tested the effects of angry and sad victim impact statements (VIS) on jury eligible participants’ decisions.
Death qualified participants (N = 581) watched the penalty phase of a capital trial that varied the presence and emotional
content of the VIS (angry, sad, or no VIS) along with the strength of mitigating evidence (weak or strong). Results revealed
that Angry VIS led to an increase in death sentences, whereas Sad VIS did not. Furthermore, participants who reported
becoming angry during the trial were more likely to render a death sentence, but participants who became sad during the trial
were not. No interaction was found between VIS and strength of mitigating evidence, but participants exposed to the angry
VIS did rate the mitigating evidence as less important to their decisions. The results indicate that VIS are not inherently bias-
ing, nor are all emotions equally impactful on sentencing decisions.
Keywords: emotions and decision making; juror decision making; victim impact statements
The ImpacT Of angry Versus sad VIcTIm ImpacT sTaTemenTs (VIs) On
senTencIng decIsIOns In a capITal TrIal
VIS are statements, either written or oral, that detail the impact of the defendant’s crime
on the victim or the victim’s surviving family. Typically, these statements indicate financial
losses, physical injuries, and describe changes to the victim’s personal welfare (Booth v.
Maryland, 1987). VIS have become increasingly common since the Supreme Court held
that such statements were constitutional (Payne v. Tennessee, 1991), and recent legislative
changes such as the 2004 Crime Victims’ Rights Act guaranteed crime victims the right to
participate in virtually all public criminal proceedings in federal courts (kyle, Twist, &
auThOrs’ nOTe: This research was supported by an NSF grant (SES-0851004) to the 1st and 3rd author
and by an NSF grant (SES- 0851183) to the 2nd author. Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Narina Nuñez, Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, Department #3415, 1000 E.
University Ave., Laramie, WY 82071; e-mail: narina@uwyo.edu.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 6, June 2017, 862 –886.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854816689809
DOI: 10.1177/0093854816689809
© 2017 International Association for Correctional and Forensic Psychology
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Nuñez et al. / ANGRy VERSUS SAD VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 863
Higgins, 2005). Twenty-six of the 31 states that enforce the death penalty allow for VIS
during the penalty phase of the trial (Death Penalty Information Center, 2015).
Critics of VIS suggest that testimony surrounding the character of the deceased could
lead to sentencing decisions based on qualities of the victim rather than the defendant
(Greene, 1999; Myers & Greene, 2004), and could introduce testimony that would be nearly
impossible for the defense to rebut (Logan, 1999). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
addressed these issues, most of the legal debate surrounding VIS has centered on whether
VIS are relevant in establishing the blameworthiness of the defendant and whether the
inflammatory nature of VIS creates an unreasonable danger that sentencing decisions will
be arbitrary and capricious rather than the product of reasoned judgment (Myers & Greene,
2004).
One of the primary concerns with the legal relevance of VIS is the potential for such
testimony to stir negative emotions that will interfere with the reasoning abilities of jurors.
A long-held belief in the legal system is that an emotional juror is an irrational juror
(Feigenson, 2000; Solomon, 1990). By this logic, decisions arising from emotional states
lack reasoned analysis and are therefore prejudicial. As Blumenthal (2001) has noted, the
U.S. Supreme Court called specific attention to the potential emotional bias arising from
VIS in capital sentencing. In Booth v. Maryland (1987), the Court noted that “the formal
presentation of the information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the
jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and
the defendant” (p. 508). Moreover, numerous instances where VIS have elicited strong
emotional displays in jurors and even judges are frequently depicted in the news (see, for
example, Logan, 1999; Myers & Greene, 2004).
However, scholars from many fields, including philosophy (e.g., DeSousa, 1987) and
neuroscience (e.g., Damasio, 1994), have increasingly argued that emotions are not neces-
sarily antithetical to rational judgment. Damasio (1994) famously proposed that emotion is
actually necessary for rationality, as it provides “gut-level” intuitions that guide us toward
the most advantageous choice. Furthermore, social cognition research indicates that some
negative emotions, like sadness, may actually sustain or even enhance systematic informa-
tion processing (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990). In comparison, it has been
suggested that anger can lead to more blame and punitive judgments and may also under-
mine systematic information processing (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tetlock et al., 2007).
One context in which to examine the effects of emotions on legal decision making is in
capital trials where jurors have been exposed to VIS. Here, jurors are confronted with often
highly emotional testimony just prior to rendering a judgment when the stakes are high-
est—determining whether a defendant will live or die (Logan, 1999). As we argue next, VIS
are perhaps best suited to examine the differential effects of anger and sadness because
these two emotions are routinely aroused as a result of this testimony.
emOTIOns arOused aT TrIal
There is anecdotal evidence from real trials that VIS frequently elicit a great amount of
sadness in jurors. For example, the trial of Timothy McVeigh included testimony by the
mother of a 4-year-old who died in the explosion. She described to the jury a phone conver-
sation she had with a medical examiner who called to say they had uncovered her daugh-
ter’s hand in the debris, and wanted to know if she wished to keep it. She responded, “Of
864 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
course I want it. It’s part of her.” Reportedly, not only did jurors cry upon hearing this story,
but so did courtroom reporters and the judge (Logan, 1999).
In addition to anecdotal evidence of emotional responses at trial, Nuñez, Egan-Wright,
kehn, and Myers (2011) conducted a field study that assessed the emotionality of VIS.
They obtained 195 VIS from 131 capital trials and analyzed the emotionality of the state-
ments using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth,
2001) program. This program produces indexes of anger and sadness expressed by a speaker
(or writer) using empirically validated word count algorithms. They found that the predomi-
nant negative emotion in the VIS was sadness, lending further credence that sadness is a
common emotion experienced when listening to VIS. For example, in one VIS taken from
Commonwealth v. Kennedy (2003), the wife of the deceased tells the court what it is like
living without her spouse:
How do I begin to tell you how this murder has changed my life forever. How do I express the
wave of emotions and feelings I go through each day as I miss being with and growing old with
my one and only true love, my soul mate, Michael. It feels as if I have been cut in half. A big
part of my life is now gone, missing. (p. 22)
In another report from the same VIS field study, Myers, Nuñez, Mitchell, kehn, and
Wilkowski (2017) found that there was wide variation in VIS testimony in different court
jurisdictions. Some courts limit unbridled victim impact testimony by having an attorney
question the VIS witness. However, in some jurisdictions, victims are given wide latitude in
expressing their opinions, and some of that testimony can be quite angry. For example, in
the case of Texas v. Barney Fuller (2004), the victim’s sister said the following during her
VIS testimony:
Mr. Fuller, you killed the wrong bitch. The worst bitch in the family is still alive right here and
you’re looking at her today. I will be in your life for what time you have left on this earth. I will
be here to haunt you until you die like the two that you murdered. When the needle is inserted
in your body to kill you, I will be the one last thing that you will think of as that juice is entering
in your blood system. Then I will attend your funeral to help your family celebrate.
Given that legal decision makers might be exposed to angry family members, it is impor-
tant to understand how angry VIS affect decisions as well.
To summarize, although VIS may elicit a variety of emotions from jurors, two distinct
emotions such as anger and sadness occur with regularity, and there is reason to believe
these two distinct emotions may prompt different judgments on the part of jurors. The pur-
pose of the present article was to examine how the emotions that result from hearing VIS
testimony might affect juror information processing and sentencing decisions in capital
cases. We were specifically...
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