The Illusionary Conflict between Antidumping and Antitrust: A Comment

• Author: Robert P. Rogers
• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X7401900212
• Published date: 01 June 1974
• Date: 01 June 1974

THE

ILLUSIONARY

CONFLICT

BETWEEN

ANTIDUMPING

AND

ANTITRUST:

A

COMMENT

by

ROBERT

P.

ROGERS·

In

a recent article, Dr. Barbara Epstein stated

that

"the

alleged contradiction (between antidumping and antitrust

laws) is an illusion,

that

antidumping regulations act as an

extension of antitrust legislation." 1I contend that the

truth

of thisstatement dependson the situation, and that, in some

circumstances, the Justice Department's assertion that anti-

dumping duties may reduce competition is correct," I

will

proceed by discussing Epstein's definition of competition,and

by presenting two situations in which dumping would increase

competition in a given national market. Finally, the implica-

tions of myanalysis for Epstein's policy recommendations

will be discussed.

Epstein defines competition as follows:"The theory of

competition states

that

in a competitive market, prices reflect

operating efficiencies of the firms and market conditions."·

From

her

subsequent analysis, Iinterpret this statement to

mean

that

in the long

run

price should equalthe marginal

cost of production."However,

if

the

antitrust

authority of

country X considers the optimal solutionforhisown country,

the desired price is not the production cost but

rather

the

•Employee ofthe Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade

Com-

mission, buttheviews expressed herearehisown andtheydonot

representthose oftheCommission.

1Barbara Epstein, "The Illusionary Conflict Between Antidump-

ing and Antitrust," Antitrust Bulletin, Vol.

XVIII,

Spring 1973,

pp. 1·22.

sDumpingis defined asinternational price discrimination.

•Op. cit., p. 5.

4Cost in thiscontext meansnot only thecost ofvarious physical

factors of production

but

also a rateof profitequal totheopportunity

cost of capital and entrepreneurship.

369