The Global Jihadist Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?

• Published date: 01 February 2018
• Author: Matthew Suppenbach,Jennifer Varriale Carson
• DOI: 10.1177/1088767917733783
• Date: 01 February 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767917733783

Homicide Studies

2018, Vol. 22(1) 8 –44

© 2017 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/1088767917733783

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Article

The Global Jihadist Movement:

The Most Lethal Ideology?

Jennifer Varriale Carson1

and Matthew Suppenbach2

Abstract

Prior research has established a link between ideology and lethality, both within the

homicide and terrorism literatures. We examine this relationship as it pertains to

the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM). Using a series of logit and negative binomial

models with a sample from the Global Terrorism Database, we find that the GJM is

indeed more deadly. However, this relationship does not seem to differentially affect

Americans, despite their role as the GJM’s defined “other.”

Keywords

terrorism, Global Jihadist Movement, ideologically motivated homicide, quantitative,

lethality

Introduction

Executive heads of state and government officials alike have established a unified

discourse that terrorism, defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and

violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion,

or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p. 184), is a significant threat. Although

many forms of terrorism exist, policymakers have been primarily focused on that

which is perpetrated by the Global Jihadist Movement (GJM)1 (Cameron, 2015;

Hollande, 2015; Merkel, 2015; Obama, 2015, 2016). For example, President Obama

(2016) recently stated that his “top priority is to defeat ISIL and to eliminate the

scourge of this barbaric terrorism . . . around the world” (para. 52). Following the Paris

attacks by al Qa’ida, Prime Minister David Cameron declared, “The terrorist aim is

1University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, USA

2U.S. Army, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jennifer Varriale Carson, University of Central Missouri, 300 Humphreys, Warrensburg,

MO 64093-0800, USA.

Email: jcarson@ucmo.edu

733783HSXXXX10.1177/1088767917733783Homicide StudiesCarson and Suppenbach

research-article2017

Carson and Suppenbach 9

clear. It is to divide us and to destroy our way of life” (2015, para. 15). James Clapper

(2016) recently briefed to Congress that since 1970, “Sunni violent extremism has

been on an upward trajectory,” and that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is

“the preeminent terrorist threat” (p. 4).

Perhaps as an artifact of the debate behind what to call this phenomenon, the extant

literature lacks clear and systematic quantification of its manifestation (Freilich &

LaFree, 2016; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006; Schmid, 2011; Young & Findley,

2011). Instead, previous work has taken a more focused approach to understanding the

GJM through the evaluation of specific policies such as targeted killings (Hafez &

Hatfield, 2006; Hepworth, 2014; Wilner, 2010; Zussman & Zussman, 2006), investiga-

tions into complex insurgency–counterinsurgency relationships (Fielding & Shortland,

2010; Linke, Witmer, & Loughlin, 2012), and assessments of both conciliatory and

punitive interventions (Benmelech, Klor, & Berrebi, 2010; Condra & Shapiro, 2012;

Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Lyall, 2009). While incredibly valuable contributions,

these studies are often centered on one country (Linke et al., 2012), one group within

the movement (Forest, 2012; Stenersen, 2010), one time period (Haddad, 2004), and/or

they fail to examine terrorism as the primary outcome (Mousseau, 2011; Torres, Jordán,

& Horsburgh, 2006). Exceptions in the literature (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Barros &

Proença, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2016; Piazza, 2009) assess the GJM’s broader impact

and find collectively that this ideology is, at the very least, unique. However, and given

this work’s similar limitations in scope, we seek to examine the broader question, “Have

GJM-related incidents been more lethal than those perpetrated by other groups?”

Informed by a rational choice framework (Clarke & Neuman, 2006; Cornish &

Clarke, 1986) and with insight from both the ideology–lethality and homicide litera-

tures (Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, & Horgan, 2013; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Enders &

Sandler, 2000; Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012; Parkin & Freilich,

2015; Parkin, Freilich, & Chermak, 2015; Piazza, 2009), the current study hypothe-

sizes that the GJM has indeed been more lethal than that of other ideologically-based

movements. We theorize that the GJM’s ideology, which involves both a supernatural

audience and a defined “other” (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008), has increased the per-

ceived benefits associated with lethality. This investigation, first and foremost, starts

by systematically operationalizing what constitutes the GJM. We then present basic

descriptive trends and patterns of the movement over the last 20 years and then exam-

ine whether ideology predicts a variety of undesirable outcomes. Overall, we find that

incidents follow similar patterns over time regardless of ideology. However, attacks

associated with the GJM are more lethal in a number of ways, although these trends do

not seem to be as pronounced with American casualties.

Literature Review

The Quantification of the GJM

Although much has been written on the GJM’s origins and key actors from a qualita-

tive or philosophical standpoint (Agbiboa, 2013; Bergen, 2001, 2011; Borum &

10 Homicide Studies 22(1)

Gelles, 2005; Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Byman, 2015; Forest, 2012; Hegghammer,

2006; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Moghadam, 2008 Rabasa et al., 2006;

Stenersen, 2010; Zelin, 2014), as noted, considerably less work has examined the

quantitative impact of these groups. Two important exceptions are the contributions of

LaFree and Dugan (2015) and Barros and Proença (2005), which examined the broader

sphere. The former found that 13 of the 20 deadliest terror groups are what they refer

to as “Islamic,” with these same groups much more likely to target people than their

non-Islamic counterparts (LaFree & Dugan, 2015). They also discovered that both

subsets (Islamic and non-Islamic) preferred bombings and armed assaults tactically

(LaFree & Dugan, 2015). The latter, that of Barros and Proença, determined that “radi-

cal Islamic attacks” used explosives more than all other attack types and unduly

employed assassinations when compared with non-Islamic groups.

However, even these important contributions are limited. Specifically, LaFree and

Dugan (2015) employed a small sample of groups (n = 20), with only 13 of them tied

to the GJM. Furthermore, Barros and Proença’s (2005) research focused exclusively

on the Western operational environment. A related trajectory of research, while not

explicitly focused on the GJM, has examined a larger universe (Asal et al., 2013; Asal

& Rethemeyer, 2008; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Gruenewald, 2011; Parkin & Freilich,

2015; Parkin et al., 2015; Piazza, 2009). The next section reviews what is known about

this literature—namely, the ideology–lethality connection—and how these findings

can be viewed from within a rational choice perspective.

The Ideology–Lethality Connection and Rational Choice Theory

Prior work examining ideologically-motivated homicide has established its unique-

ness in a variety of ways (Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012;

Parkin & Freilich, 2015; Parkin et al., 2015). For example, Gruenewald (2011;

Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012) found that although largely similar to “average”

U.S. homicides, those perpetrated by right-wing terrorists were more likely to

involve both multiple offenders and victims, who were also strangers. Follow-up

work centered on victim characteristics (Parkin & Freilich, 2015; Parkin et al.,

2015) has discovered that the far-right is more likely to perpetrate interracial homi-

cide, targeting minorities outside a private residence. Collectively, this line of

research suggests that an ideological motivation can lead to distinctive homicide

characteristics.

Another trajectory within the literature suggests that it is not just ideology, but the

type of ideology, that can produce more detrimental outcomes. As Drake (1998) has

stated, the manner in which a group targets is instructive of their worldviews, which

can both legitimize targets and justify violence. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), in one of

the most rigorous tests of this premise, assessed the role of group characteristics

including ideology, specifically ethnonationalism, religion, and a combination of both

motivations in determining fatalities. This investigation posited that the ideology–

lethality connection could be based on mechanisms similar to Drake’s premise: the

organization’s audience (supernatural vs. earthly) and their ability to dehumanize their