The Geopolitics of Major Power Interventions in Civil Wars

• Author: Vesna Danilovic,Joe Clare
• Published date: 01 March 2022
• Date: 01 March 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920976910
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 75(1) 20 –34

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920976910

Political Research Quarterly

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920976910

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There is a long tradition of military interventions in civil

wars despite constituting the de jure interference in

another state’s internal affairs. In fact, these are increas-

ingly sanctioned and carried out by collective security

institutions, principally through the United Nations (UN).

Unsurprisingly then, the research in this area has been

steadily growing, attracting attention to a range of ques-

tions from their principal motivations to the effects on the

duration, outcome, and recurrence. Our study addresses

the issue of when, why, and on which side major powers

choose to intervene in civil wars. Since they have been

more frequent interveners than any other states (Findley

and Teo 2006, 836; Gent 2007; Regan 1996, 345), it is an

important subset of civil war interventions.

If we look at more recent events, there are several puz-

zling trends. Why, for instance, has the United States

taken a strong stance condemning the Russian interven-

tion in Ukraine rather than a firm military position, let

alone preempting it with military action? At the same

time, despite the Russian armed support for the Assad

government in Syria, on more than one occasion the

United States launched strikes against the Assad forces.

Why did the United States, jointly with the European

powers, militarily act in Libya, yet Russia stayed on the

sidelines? In each instance, the official reasons for inter-

ventions were defended on normative grounds, ranging

from the right to self-determination (Russian nationalities

in the eastern Ukraine), supporting the uprising against a

dictator (the U.S. and European coalition in Libya), sus-

pected use of chemical weapons against civilians (U.S.

strikes in Syria) to defending the regime from “radical”

and “terrorist” insurgents (Russian strikes in Syria).

Our argument rests on the premise that, despite their

official justifications, such interventions are driven by

strategic interests rather than humanitarian concerns.1 In

our view, major power incentives for interfering in other

states’ internal affairs are uniquely shaped by geopolitical

considerations. Since they have both the abilities and

ambitions to project their presence beyond their immedi-

ate surroundings, one of their defining policies is to seek

opportunities to consolidate and expand their influence in

different areas around the world. Domestic instability in

another state presents itself as such an opportunity.

976910

PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920976910Political Research QuarterlyClare and Danilovic

research-article2020

1Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA

2University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, USA

Corresponding Author:

Joe Clare, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,

Louisiana State University, 240 Stubbs Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70803,

USA.

Email: jclare@lsu.edu

The Geopolitics of Major Power

Interventions in Civil Wars

Joe Clare1 and Vesna Danilovic2

Abstract

What factors influence third parties to intervene in civil wars? Our focus on major powers, which are disproportionately

more likely than other states to intervene in civil conflicts, directs us to the factors that uniquely shape their interests.

While our study does not rule out humanitarian interventions by collective security international institutions and

individual states, we do not find that humanitarian concerns motivate major powers. We argue and demonstrate that

their decisions to intervene are principally motivated by their drive to establish, consolidate, or expand influence in

different geopolitical regions. Past research with the strategic approach stressed the importance of an intervener’s

prior ties with a civil war state for this decision. Though important, we show the effect of these ties is subordinate to

other factors. In our argument, their role is primarily relevant for determining whether an intervener will be on the

side of the government or opposition. The key issue of whether major powers are likely to intervene in the first place,

however, is contingent on how much the entire region is strategically relevant to warrant intervention. The empirical

analysis of civil war interventions over nearly fifty years lends strong support to our theoretical expectations.

Keywords

civil war, third-party interventions, major powers, geopolitics

Article