The Genesis of the “Dutch Approach” to Asymmetric Conflicts

• Author: René Moelker
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X13501269
• Published date: 01 January 2014
• Date: 01 January 2014
• Subject Matter: Forum: Revisiting Small Wars

Forum: Revisiting Small Wars

The Genesis of the

‘‘Dutch Approach’’ to

Asymmetric Conflicts:

Operations in Uruzgan

and the ‘‘Softly, Softly’’

Manner of Approaching

the Taleban

Rene

´Moelker

1

Abstract

From a theory on occupying regimes and from traditional concepts of counter-

insurgency theory, the author traces back the development of the Dutch discourse

regarding presentday missions. The genesis of the so-calledDutch approach is studied,

and the case of Uruzgan is reviewed by scrutinizing political, security, economic, and

governanceaspects of the use of the militaryin the aforementioned provinceof Afgha-

nistan. The case is studied to determine whether there really is something Dutch

about this approach. We learn that the ‘‘Dutchapproach’’ is predominantlya narrative

whose main objectiveis the appeasement of Dutch public opinionand the legitimation

of Dutch policy making. At the same time and even though more comparative case

studies are necessary, it seems plausible that the Dutch approach is different. But the

differenceis not typical Dutch; it lies in the manner of collaborating with and co-opting

indigenouselites. Studying the genesis of the‘‘Dutch approach’’ is thereforean analysis

of a discourse and a study in operational effectiveness at the same time.

Keywords

occupying regimes, Dutch approach, 3D, counterinsurgency, cultural awareness,

indigenous versus loyal elites, inclusion and exclusion

1

Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Rene

´Moelker, Netherlands Defense Academy, P.O. Box 90.002, 4800 PA, Breda, Netherlands.

Email: r.moelker@nlda.nl

Armed Forces & Society

2014, Vol 40(1) 96-117

ªThe Author(s) 2013

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X13501269

afs.sagepub.com

Introduction: Inviting the Taleban Round to Tea

The Netherlands’ philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the local population

and thus contributing to security was from 2006 on termed the Dutch approach

while, as will be discussed later, later on it caused discussion. In contrast to forceful

coercion, this approach refrained from using an excess of violence. The approach

was designed to win over hearts and minds by reconstructing society, by method

of ‘‘smile and wave,’’ and by enabling local authorities to take over public order

issues themselves. Using as little force as possible in order to gain trust is risky to

the Dutch soldiers themselves for they are often more exposed to danger than they

would be otherwise. They did not wear mirrored sunglasses in order not to remind

the Afghan population of the Russians. They preferred to patrol on foot if possible.

The soldiers wore the minimum of protective clothing and when driving, the soldiers

used open roofed vehicles or lightly armoured cars that allowed them to show them-

selves. The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail

1

stated:

The Canadians and Americans establish Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in unstable

areas, often building them into fortresses of giant sandbags and razor wire, and using

them as a launching point for operations. The Dutch prefer to build mud-walled com-

pounds they call ‘‘multi-functional qalas’’, using the Pashto name for house, designed

with a traditional-style guest room for visitors.

The British newspaper The Times

2

stated that the Dutch ‘‘aim to beat Taleban by

inviting them round to tea’’ and the ‘‘Military Head Quarter is run as open house.’’In

contrast to the British who hid in fortresses, the Dutch were building clay huts in

which they invited Afghan guests and hosted them with tea, nuts, and dried fruits.

A quote from the news clipping reads as follows:

‘‘You don’t want it to look like a fortress—there has to be a balance between accessi-

bility and defensibility’’, Colonel Vleugels [the commander of the Dutch Task Force

Uruzgan] said. ‘‘You have to be among the people to influence them. By offering them

help and work, they can make a choice. If they then decide to fight, we’ll fight back, but

that should be a last resort.’’

This ‘‘Dutch approach’’ met criticism, among others from British and Canadian

3

troops who had lost many soldiers and who would have welcomed a more robust

approach by the Dutch.

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Whereas the Dutch at that moment in time suffered only

a few deaths (one suicide, one casualty of fire) and some heavily wounded, they

therefore did not see any reason to change their approach. At the end of the mission

in 2010, the number of casualties numbered twenty-five. The Brits and Canadians

were right to point at other factors determining the number of casualties, but the

‘‘Dutch approach’’ was in line with what the Dutch were training for from the start

on. In preparation of the deployment, the troops had switched to an experimental and

relatively extensive cultural awareness training program.

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The effectiveness of the

Moelker 97