The General’s Intuition

• Date: 01 July 2018
• Author: Amanda Huan,Pascal Vennesson
• Published date: 01 July 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17738771
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The General’s Intuition:

Overconfidence,

Pattern Matching, and

the Inchon Landing

Decision

Pascal Vennesson

1

and Amanda Huan

1

Abstract

Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals? The proponents of the over-

confidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of

judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. Generals’ operational intuitions are

likely to be hampered by overconfidence and negatively affect military effectiveness.

However, the successful operational outcome of General Douglas MacArthur’s

decision to land at Inchon (June–September 1950) seemingly contradicts the model.

We seek to complement and refine the overconfidence model by examining the

Inchon landing decision through the analytical lens of the recognition-primed deci-

sion model. This model typically envisions that under specific circumstances—

notably an experienced decision maker, an adequate environment regularity, and an

opportunity to learn—generals are able to make quick and satisfactory decisions.

We show that such a configuration was present in the Inchon landing case and helps

explain both the decision process and its successful outcome.

Keywords

Inchon landing, Korean War, MacArthur (General Douglas), overconfidence,

recognition-primed decision model

1

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Corresponding Author:

Pascal Vennesson, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Block

S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798.

Email: ispvennesson@ntu.edu.sg

Armed Forces & Society

2018, Vol. 44(3) 498-520

ªThe Author(s) 2017

Reprints and permission:

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17738771

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Introduction: Generalship and Cognition

Can we trust the operational intuitions of generals?

1

The proponents of the over-

confidence model, one of the most influential perspectives in the psychology of

judgment, commonly offer a skeptical answer. They acknowledge skill and expertise

but present human cognitive performance as often flawed. As Dominic Johnson and

Dominic Tierney put it, “overconfidence can lead decision-makers to overestimate

the probability of victory and the likely spoils of war, provoking wars that could

otherwise be avoided and risking battlefield defeat against superior opponents”

(Johnson & Tierney, 2011, pp. 8–9). Copious evidence associates overconfidence

with disastrous strategic decisions during the 1914 July crisis, throughout the Viet-

nam War, and in the process leading to the Iraq War (Johnson, 2004; Johnson et al.,

2006. See also: Altman, 2015, Kahneman & Renshon, 2007; Renshon, 2009; Yetiv,

2013). Generals’ operational intuitions are likely to be hampered by overconfidence

and negatively affect military effectiveness.

However, the outcome of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s decision to

land at Inchon (June–September 1950) seemingly contradicts the overconfidence

model. MacArthur was the epitome of the overconfident military leader, always opti-

mistic about his own ability to lead and succeed since he was a cadet (James, 1970,

1975, 1985).Moreover, at the beginningof the Korean War, he was rememberedat the

Joint Chiefsof Staff (JCS) for his unjustified optimism about defending the Philippines

in 1941 and other confident predictions that proved less accurate than expected,

notably regarding the reconquest of Luzon during the 1944–1945 Philippines cam-

paign (James & Wells, 1993, p. 165). During the Inchon landing decision process, he

repeatedly behaved in ways that closely resemble the ideal-typical pattern of the

overconfidence model, a point to which we will return below. Yet, the Inchon landing

was remarkably successful and soon became a classic example of the high-risk, high-

payoff outflanking maneuver (Luttwak, 2001, pp. 116–117, 119). While the strategic

consequences of the Inchon–Seoul campaign, notably the Chinese intervention one

month later,were mixed, even its criticsrecognize its “obvious operational brilliance”

(Millett, 2010, p. 240). It ledto the recapture of Seoul, theU.S. Eighth Army breaking

out of the Pusan Perimeter, and the rapid retreat and collapse of the Korean People’s

Army as an organized force (Collins, 2014, p. 262).

In this article, we examine the Inchon landing decision as a deviant case for the

overconfidence model. We seek to complement and refine this model by identifying

the conditions under which generals’ intuitions can be trusted. To do so, we bring in

the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model which claims that under specific

circumstances—notably experience, an adequate environment regularity and an

opportunity to learn—individuals are able to make quick and satisfactory decisions

(Klein, 1999). By extension, the expert intuition of generals, rooted in a unique

capacity for pattern matching and mental simulation—very similar to what Carl von

Clausewitz called coup d’oeil—is an indispensable source of operational effective-

ness. We argue that these conditions were present in the Inchon landing case and

help explain both General MacArthur’s decision process and its successful outcome.

Vennesson and Huan 499