The Functions of a Minimal Legislature: Role Perceptions of Thai Legislators

• Published date: 01 December 1972
• DOI: 10.1177/106591297202500408
• Date: 01 December 1972
• Author: Michael L. Mezey
• Subject Matter: Articles

686

THE

FUNCTIONS

OF

A

MINIMAL

LEGISLATURE:

ROLE

PERCEPTIONS

OF

THAI

LEGISLATORS

MICHAEL

L.

MEZEY

University

of

Hawaii

HE

STUDY

of

legislative

institutions

recently

has

moved

beyond

the

tradi-

g

tional

preoccupation

with

the

European

and

American

experiences

to

an

examination

of

legislatures

in

developing

political

systems.

Scholars

engaged

in

this

research

have

recognized

the

essential

point

that

simply

because

legislatures

in

these

nations

often

appear

to

be

marginal

to

political

decision-making,

they

are

not

necessarily

insignificant

to

the

political

systems

in

which

they

exist.1

In

the

discussion

that

follows,

the

general

characteristics

of

legislatures

in

developing

sys-

tems

will

be

sketched,

a

methodology

for

analyzing

such

institutions

will

be

sug-

gested,

and

an

analysis

of

one

such

legislature

-

the

National

Assembly

of

the

Kingdom

of

Thailand

-

will

be

attempted.

DEFINITIONS

AND

METHODOLOGY

Legislatures

in

developing

systems

are

generally

&dquo;minimal

legislatures.&dquo;

Al-

though

their

membership

is

popularly

elected

and

their

existence

and

prerogatives

are

formally

guaranteed

by

the

nation’s

constitution,

these

institutions

are,

in

the

final

analysis,

ultimately

subordinate

to

other

elements

in

the

political

system

in

whose

hands

actual

rule-making

power

resides.

In

such

a

system,

the

Government

rarely

loses

an

important

vote

in

the

legislature

and

such

a

defeat,

in

the

event

that

it

does

occur,

can

provoke

a

serious

constitutional

crisis.

The

Government

initiates

all

sigrtifica.nt

proposals

and

the

legislature

is

restricted

to

only

the

most

marginal

amendments.

Minimal

legislatures

are

distinguished

from

those

western

legislatures

that

are

equally

subordinate

in

the

decision-making

process

by

the

additional

characteristic

that

they

command

very

little

respect

or

support

from

the

population

at

large.2

2

There

is

a

persistent

belief

that

the

institution

is

simply

a

front

for

those

who

really

NOTE:

An

earlier

version

of

this

paper

was

presented

under

the

same

title

at

the

66th

Annual

Meeting

of

the

American

Political

Science

Association,

Los

Angeles,

September

1970.

The

research

for

this

study

was

completed

while

I

was

Visiting

Professor

in

the

Faculty

of

Political

Science,

Thammasat

University,

Bangkok.

My

stay

at

Thammasat

was

made

possible

by

a

Rockefeller

Foundation

University

Development

Program

grant

to

the

Uni-

versity

of

Virginia.

I

am

grateful

to

William

1.

Bacchus,

Saneh

Chamarik,

Montri

Chenvidyakam,

Paul

T.

David,

Gerald

Heeger,

Susan

G.

Mezey,

David

E.

Powell,

and

Astri

Surkhe

for

their

comments

on

earlier

drafts

of

this

manuscript.

1

The

best

of

this

research

is

contained

in

three

anthologies.

See,

Allan

Kornberg

and

Lloyd

D.

Musolf,

eds.,

Legislatures

in

Developmental

Perspective

(Durham:

Duke

University

Press,

1970);

Weston

H.

Agor,

ed.,

Latin

American

Legislatures:

Their

Role

and

Influ-

ence

(New

York:

Praeger,

1971) ;

and,

Allan

Kornberg,

ed.,

Legislatures

in

Comparative

Perspective

(New

York:

David

McKay,

forthcoming).

Also,

see

Raymond

Hopkins,

"The

Role

of

the

M.P.

in

Tanzania,"

American

Political

Science

Review,

64

(September

1970),

754-71.

2

My

view

of

what

"support"

means

is

strongly

influenced

by

David

Easton’s

explication

of the

concept.

See,

A

Systems

Analysis

of

Political

Life

(New

York:

Wiley,

1965),

especially

pp.

153-70,

209-11,

and

277,

288.

Also,

see

Gerhard

Loewenberg,

"The

Influence

of

Parliamentary

Behavior

on

Regime

Stability:

Some

Conceptual

Clarifications,"

Compara-

tive

Politics,

3

(January

1971),

177-200,

for

a

good

discussion

relating

legislative

per-

formance

to

system

stability

and

to

support

for

the

legislature.

687

hold

power;

leaders

of

the

legislature

are

not

taken

seriously

by

the

public

and

con-

sequently

when

such

legislatures

are

blatantly

manipulated,

dismantled,

or

circum-

vented,

such

actions

cause

no

general

public

outcry

but

rather

are

considered

part

of

the

usual

and

expected

course

of

political

events.

A

wide

variety

of

legislatures

can

be

described

in

these

terms.

Legislatures

dominated

by

the

Communist

party

fall

into

this

category

(North

Vietnam,

North

Korea)

as

do

legislatures

in

military-dominated

systems

(Burma,

South

Korea,

South

Vietnam,

Indonesia,

Cambodia),

systems

led

by

charismatic

leaders

(Egypt

under

Nasser,

Ghana

under

Nkrumah),

systems

dominated

by

an

inclusive

mass

party

(Tanzania

under

TANU,

Guinea

under

PDG,

Kenya

under

KANU),

or

systems

dominated

by

a

combination

of

professional

bureaucrats

and

military

leaders

(Thailand,

from

1969

to

1971,

and

Pakistan).

The

study

of

these

legislatures

requires

a

functional

approach.

Ironically,

it

was

functionalism

that

led

students

of

comparative

politics

away

from

legislatures

in

developing

systems.

Working

under

the

assumption

that

the

only

function

for

a

legislature

was

rule-making,

observers

of

non-western

systems

were

quick

to

discover

that

&dquo;the

formally

constituted

law-making

bodies

[had]

not

as

yet

become

the

focus

for

the

rule-making

function.

The

usual

practice

[was]

for

the

dominant

group

to

issue

essential

decrees

or

initiate

administrative

regulations.&dquo;

3 Attention

therefore

shifted

toward

the

study

of

these

&dquo;dominant

groups.&dquo;

The

analysis

of

minimal

legis-

latures

calls

for

a

return

to

the

functional

approach

which

assumes

that

sociological

phenomena

(e.g.,

structures,

roles,

institutional

patterns,

norms)

may

be

explained

by

the

part

that

they

play

in

meeting

the

demands

of

the

social

system

in

which

they

exist.4

Thus

it

should

be

assumed

that

legislatures

exist

and

persist

in

political

sys-

tems

because

they

perform

both

manifest

and

latent

functions

for

that

system.

Legislatures

may

then

be

compared

by

delineating

these

functions

for

each

particular

political

system.

A

wide

variety

of

data

may

be

employed

in

this

enterprise.5

The

history

of

legislative

institutions

in

a

nation

may

provide

an

indication

of

the

functions

which

the

legislature

has

traditionally

performed;

an

analysis

of

the

constitutional

struc-

ture

will

provide

a

formal

statement

of

legislative

functions;

direct

observation

of

legislative

behavior

as

well

as

informed

assessments

of

the

political

situation

may

lead

to

perceptive

statements

of

manifest

and

latent

functions.

In

this

analysis,

we

3

Lucian

Pye,

"The

Politics

of

Southeast

Asia,"

in

Gabriel

Almond

and

James

Coleman.

eds.,

The

Politics

of

the

Developing

Areas

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1960),

p.

144.

4

This

view

of

functionalism

should

be

distinguished

from

structural-functional

analysis,

which

emphasizes

the

identification

of

certain

functions

as

necessary

and

sufficient

for

the

per-

sistence

of

all

social

systems.

My

view

of

functionalism

as

a

methodology

closely

follows

the

discussion

of

Robert

Merton,

Social

Theory

and

Social

Structure

(enlarged

ed.;

New

York:

Free

Press,

1968),

pp.

73-138.

A

good

introduction

to

functional

analysis

is

pro-

vided

by

William

Flanigan

and

Edward

Fogelman,

"Functional

Analysis,"

in

James

C.

Charlesworth,

ed.,

Contemporary

Political

Analysis

(New

York :

Free

Press,

1967),

pp.

72-86.

Also,

see

Ely

Chinoy,

Sociological

Perspective

(2nd

ed.;

New

York:

Random

House,

1968),

pp.

158-77.

See

Robert

A.

Packenham,

"Legislatures

and

Political

Devel-

opment,"

in Kornberg

and

Musolf,

op.

cit.,

pp.

523-46,

for

a

functional

analysis

of

the

Brazilian

National

Congress

as

well

as

some

suggestions

of

the

possible

functions

of

legis-

latures

in

some

other

developing

systems.

5

See

Merton,

op.

cit.,

pp.

104-9,

for

a

detailed

description

of

the

functionalist

research

meth-

odology.