The Free Territory of Trieste

• Published date: 01 June 1948
• DOI: 10.1177/106591294800100201
• Author: Josef L. Kunz
• Date: 01 June 1948
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE*
by
JOSEF L. KUNZ
University of Toledo
I.
The creation of the Free Territory of Trieste is a typical political com-
promise arrangement and the success of this creation is, to say the least,
highly doubtful. But as a new experiment in international administration
it offers great interest. Within the framework of this study only a sketch
can be given although an effort will be made to outline, at least, some of
the historical, political and economic issues involved and the legal problems
presented from the point of view of constitutional and international law.
Like Danzig, Trieste looks back on more than a thousand years of
history. Incorporated in 791 into Charlemagne’s Empire, and conquered
in 1202 by the Venetians, Trieste-apart from a few years under Napoleon’s
rule-had been united with the Austrian Empire from 1382 to 1918.
Especially since the extension of the Austrian Southern Railway to Trieste
in 1857, Trieste served as the principal commercial port of the Austrian
Monarchy, and enjoyed great prosperity until 1914. Being mainly inhabited
by an Italian-speaking population, Trieste had long been coveted by Italian
irredentism, had been promised to Italy by the secret London Treaty of
April 26, 1915, and had come under Italian sovereignty through the Peace
Treaties which brought the First World War to an end.
After the First World War the Italo-Yugoslav struggle centered around
Fiume. In the Second World War Fascist Italy annexed also the provinces
of Ljubljana and Dalmatia’ while Marshal Tito, backed by Moscow,
*The manuscript of this study was finished in the first days of May, 1948.
1
Annexed by the Royal Decrees of May 3 and 18, 1941. For the text see Raphael Lemkin, Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe
, (Washington, 1944), pp. 584-85, 587-88.
99

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100
claimed the province of Venezia Giulia and Trieste. On September 3, 1943,
Italy, under Marshal Badoglio, surrendered unconditionally to Anglo-
American forces and an armistice was signed. Later, Italy became a &dquo;co-
belligerent.&dquo; The Venezia Giulia crisis of May-June, 1945, was solved by
the &dquo;Trieste Area Agreement&dquo; of June 9, 1945, by which the &dquo;Morgan-Line&dquo;
was established. In accordance with this Agreement Yugoslav forces were to
withdraw from the territory west of the Morgan Line, leaving the latter
under Anglo-American occupation until final settlement of the dispute.2
2
Drafting the peace treaty with Italy was a long and delicate process.3
3
Many reasons may be cited for the difficulties of the peace makers. In the
first place the problem of Trieste is an Italo-Yugoslav problem. Ethno-
graphically, the city is overwhelmingly Italian, yet it was strongly demanded
by Yugoslavia. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in
London (September 11 to October 2, 1945), Yugoslavia presented her
claims, including Trieste, through vice-premier Kardelj. The controversial
Italo-Yugoslav boundary dispute was not settled. Though strongly pressed,
the Yugoslav demands were opposed in Italy by a passionate Italian nation-
alism, shared even by the Communists under Togliatti. Finally it was agreed
at the London meeting that &dquo;the boundary line should in the main be
governed by ethnic considerations and that regardless of its sovereignty
there should be a Free Port at Trieste under international control.&dquo; The
Italian Communists got an offer from Marshal Tito on November 7, 1947,
proposing that Trieste might remain Italian territory if Yugoslavia, in ex-
change, could obtain Gorizia. This offer was rejected by Italy.4
The question of Trieste is also a Central-European problem; for as a
commercial port Trieste is of greatest importance to the landlocked countries
of Central Europe. This point was taken into consideration by the Council
of Foreign Ministers. But the real controversy is directly connected with the
East-West split. The &dquo;Iron Curtain&dquo; runs from Stettin to Trieste. A Slav
Trieste would be likely to facilitate the bringing of the whole Danube Basin
under Soviet political and economic control. For the Soviet Union, Trieste
would be a starting-point of further expansion, an important key-point for
the Slav &dquo;Drang nach dem Westen&dquo;; for Anglo-America, Trieste is sig-
nificant in the strategy of &dquo;containing&dquo; Soviet and communist expansion.
Here the two worlds &dquo;met and hold each other in equilibrium. In this
contest, Italy and Yugoslavia had almost become secondary factors.&dquo;5
The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris (April 25-
May 16, 1946) did not advance the settlement of the problem. It was during
2
Mary E. Bradshaw, "Military Control of Zone A in Venezia Giulia," in Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. xvi (No. 417; June 29, 1947), pp. 1257-72.
8
See in general: Making the Peace Treaties 1941-1947, Department of State, Publication 2774,
European Series 24 (Washington, 1947).
4
New York Times, November 8, 1947, pp. 1, 3.
5
René Albrecht-Carrié, "Peace with Italy—An Appraisal," in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. Ixii
(December, 1947), p. 492.

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101
the Paris Peace Conference that the French foreign minister Georges
Bidault, in order to break the deadlock, made the suggestion, &dquo;liked by no
one,&dquo; to establish Trieste and its surroundings between Duino and Cittanova
as the &dquo;Free Territory of Trieste.&dquo;6 Even after the creation of the Free
Territory had been agreed upon, the Council was divided as to how the
independence of Trieste should be assured by the Security Council of the
United Nations. The struggle between East and West reappeared in a new
form as the controversy over the Statute of the Free Territory. The United
States wanted a truly international, independent Trieste, protected only by
the United Nations.7 The Soviet Union proposed protection by joint agree-
ment between Italy and Yugoslavia. France suggested protection by the
Principal Allied Powers. The United States was anxious to guard against
an internal coup and incorporation into Yugoslavia and wished, therefore,
to vest the real power in a Governor to be appointed by the United Nations,
whereas the Soviet Union opposed this proposal as &dquo;undemocratic.&dquo;8
8
Vital differences over the Statute proposed for the Free Territory of
Trieste existed still at the time when the Council of Foreign Ministers
met at New York (November 4 to December 12, 1946). These differences
concerned the designation and responsibilities of the Governor, the allegiance
of the police director, the settlement of disputes and the problem of customs.9
However, an arrangement on the basis of the American draft proposals
was finally reached.l° The Council of Foreign Ministers decided also that
a Four-Power-Commission be sent to Trieste to make an on-the-spot in-
vestigation of the financial requirements for operating the government of
Trieste during the initial months of its existence, and of problems in con-
nection with the setting up of the Territory’s currency and customs regime.
This Commission made its report to the Council of Foreign Ministers at
the meeting held in Moscow between March 10 and April 24, 1947.11
6
None of the Foreign Ministers considered ideal this agreement. But Secretary Byrnes said that it
seemed the most reasonable decision which could be reached.
(Making the Peace Treaties
1941-1947, op. cit., p. 27). See also the detailed remarks in Secretary Byrnes’ Report (ibid.,
pp. 103-105), and Documenti della pace italiana (Rome, 1947) ; see also Giuseppe Vedovato,
Il trattato di pace con l’Italia (Rome, 1947).
’See the remarks of Senator Connelly before the Italian Political and Territorial Commission of the
Paris Peace Conference, in Department of State Bulletin, Vol xv (No. 377; September 29, 1946),
pp. 570-71; see also Making the Peace Treaties 1941-1947, op. cit., pp. 114-117.
8
The Soviet proposal "would make a figurehead of the United Nations Governor and would have
given Yugoslavia virtual control of the customs, currency and foreign affairs of the Territory.
It would make the Territory a protectorate of Yugoslavia and would have the United Nations
powerless to prevent it from becoming a battleground between warring groups. There must be
no seizure of power in Trieste after this war as there was in Fiume after the last war."
(Secretary Byrnes’ Report of October 18, 1946, quoted in Making the Peace Treaties
1941-1947, op. cit., p. 126).
9
See the table of opposing views: New York Times, November 18, 1946, p. 3.
10
Making the Peace Treaties 1941-1947, op. cit., pp. 53-56. See also the statement of Secretary of
State Byrnes before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 4, 1947, in Department
of State Bulletin, Vol. xvi (No. 402; March 16, 1947), pp. 487-88.
11
The Report contains proposals as to budget, balance of payments, currency and banking, foreign
exchange and customs system. See New York Times, May 7, 1947, p. 9; Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. xvi (No. 405; April 6, 1947), p. 609. The Report of the Commissioners is of
February 27, 1947. For the decision of the Council of...