The Free Speech Doctrine: Some Doubts Resolved?

• Author: J. Roland Pennock
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295000300405
• Date: 01 December 1950
• Published date: 01 December 1950
• Subject Matter: Articles

566

THE

FREE

SPEECH

DOCTRINE:

SOME

DOUBTS

RESOLVED?

J.

ROLAND

PENNOCK

Swarthmore

College

1

John

Stuart

Mill,

Dissertations

and

Discussions,

Political,

Philosophical,

and

Historical,

five

volumes

(New

York:

Henry

Holt

and

Company,

1882),

Vol.

I,

p.

409.

VER

SINCE

men

began

to

speculate

about

the

ultimate

nature

of

things,

their

thinking

has

given

rise

to

sharply

divergent

views.

Meta-

―

physicians

appear

to

be

as

sharply

divided

among

themselves

today

as

ever

they

were.

Even

in

that

most

practical

branch

of

philosophy

that

deals

with

norms

of

human

conduct,

theories

of

ethics

remain

numerous

and

sharply

opposed

one

to

another.

It

is

important

and

encouraging

to

note,

however,

that

there

is

far

less

variation

among

ethical

principles

than

there

is

among

the

theories.

Moral

philosophers

who

are

poles

apart

as

to

the

&dquo;whys&dquo;

of

morality

usually

find

themselves

largely

in

agreement

as

to

its

contents.

Relativists

and

absolutists,

naturalists

and

apriorists,

hedonists

and

self-realizationists,

may

all

agree

as

to

what

things

are

good

and

what

conduct

is

right,

even

though

they

reach

their

respective

con-

clusions

by

quite

different

paths.

The

same

situation

is

to

be

found

in

the

realm

of

political

philosophy:

theorists

are

more

divided

as

to

their

fundamental

assumptions

than

as

to

their

ultimate

conclusions.

This

fact

is

doubtless

the

consequence

of

the

happy

truth,

long

ago

observed

by

Mill,

that

&dquo;mankind

are

more

nearly

of

one

nature

than

of

one

opinion

about

their

own

nature.&dquo;

1

That

is

to

say,

the

agreement

as

to

conclusions,

despite

the

opposing

premises,

is

by

no

means

accidental

but

flows

directly

from

the

most

fundamental

agree-

ment

of

all,

the

agreeing

natures

of

men.

Without

this

substratum

there

would

be

no

hope

for

society;

with

it

we

have

society

and

there

is

hope,

at

least,

for

&dquo;one

world&dquo;-far

more

hope

for

one

world

than

for

one

philosophy.

In

view

of

this

situation,

it

should

be

apparent

that

political

liberalism

owes

its

vitality

in

no

small

measure

to

the

fact

that

it

can

be

subscribed

to

by

men

of

quite

different

philosophical

positions.

Skeptic

and

believer

can

lie

down

together

under

the

broad

shelter

it

provides.

Relativists

and

absolutists

may

make

common

cause

for

its

institutions.

So

it

has

been

historically.

The

atheist

Tom

Paine

supported

&dquo;natural

rights&dquo;

just

as

vigorously

as

did

the

most

religiously

devout

democrats

of

Cromwell’s

army.

Nor

did

Bentham’s

denunciation

of

&dquo;natural

rights&dquo;

as

&dquo;nonsense

on

stilts&dquo;

prevent

him

from

giving

his

powerful

support

to

the

principle

of

&dquo;one

man,

one

vote.&dquo;

Similarly

today,

the

nature

of

the

defense

of