The Federal Disaster: The Failed Logic of Disaster Prevention in New Orleans

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/S1521-6136(2012)0000017011
• Published date: 29 October 2012
• Pages: 155-174
• Date: 29 October 2012
• Author: Min Hee Go

THE FEDERAL DISASTER: THE

FAILED LOGIC OF DISASTER

PREVENTION IN NEW ORLEANS

Min Hee Go

ABSTRACT

Purpose This study seeks to identify the factors that made Hurricane

Katrina the worst disaster in American history. Although the inefficiency

of the centralized government is often cited as the primary reason for

failure in disaster mitigation and recovery, more fundamental reasons

are left unexplored.

Design/methodology/approach This study points out that compara-

tive case analysis is inadequate to substantiate the claim that private

actors are better responders to disaster than public agents. Instead, it

takes a single case study approach of hurricane response in New

Orleans. This method allows for two things: first, extending the tempo-

ral scope helps to understand that disaster management is not a single

event but a cumulative result of the past responses. Second, one can

trace the interplay between public and private agents rather than their

separate reactions.

Disasters, Hazards and Law

Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Volume 17, 155174

Copyright r2012 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1521-6136/doi:10.1108/S1521-6136(2012)0000017011

155

Findings A series of legal conditions within the federalist framework

have discouraged effective disaster management by the federal govern-

ment. Using both legal and extralegal means, local actors tried to avoid

the federal government’s involvement in land use and building control

that may prohibit local economic activities. Instead, the federal govern-

ment was pressured into providing structural protection such as levee

construction, which is costly yet ineffective in preventing a mega-disaster

like Hurricane Katrina.

Originality/value of paper This study warrants caution in conducting

a comparative case analysis in evaluating the role of the federal govern-

ment in disaster response and recovery. By conducting an in-depth case

study of New Orleans hurricane response over the past 50 years, it

reveals that the current government failure stems from structural and

legal conditions rather than bureaucratic inefficiency.

INTRODUCTION

Perception of disaster as a national event generates an impression that the

federal government is the primary bearer of responsibility. In dealing with

Katrina’s aftermath, President Bush and bureaucrats at the Federal Emer-

gency Management Agency (FEMA) were heavily criticized as the culprit

of failed response. As Birkland and Waterman show, the public places a

greater blame to the federal government than state and local government,

although disaster response is in fact a shared intergovernmental responsi-

bility (2008). Especially as people live farther from the disaster scene,

they often incorrectly place heavier blame on the federal government

than its state and local counterparts.

To a certain extent, this perception is not totally unfounded. The federal

government indeed took an inadequate action to a mega-disaster like Hur-

ricane Katrina. However, the reasons for such an inappropriate response

have deeper structural roots than what the public may assume. Although

in public minds the Katrina aftermath was a failure of the federal bureau-

cracy, a careful examination shall reveal that institutions at various levels

have contributed to escalating the price of disaster.

In this chapter, I show that the federalist structure and a series of legal

actions have shaped the city of New Orleans to become more susceptible

to disaster over time. In particular, the federalist framework has directed

the focus of disaster prevention and management on building physical

156 MIN HEE GO