The Fate of Neo-Federalism in Western Europe

• Date: 01 September 1952
• Published date: 01 September 1952
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295200500302
• Author: Clarence C. Walton
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE FATE OF NEO-FEDERALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE
CLARENCE C. WALTON
University of Scranton
HE
POLITICAL METEOR that was federalism traced a dazzling
t trajectory across Europe’s troubled firmament. Yet even at its spec-
’&dquo;
tacular zenith many continental observers appeared convinced that
the meteor was destined to plummet earthward and burn itself out among
the charred remains of other unrealized dreams for a better world. Would
nationalism, vested interests, inertia, and, as in some cases, a fear of the
unknown exert such gravitational pull that the ideal of federal union must
perforce disappear beyond lost horizons? Would these elements sustain
the rather gloomy estimates of European &dquo;realists&dquo; who insisted that
federalism was a doomed cause? The zigzag course it has followed, the
peculiar amalgam of strength and weakness it has displayed, and the
erratic pace at which it has alternately spurted and limped towards its
objectives render impossible a simple &dquo;yes-or-no&dquo; response. Indeed, the
entirety of its brief history has been wrapped in paradox and dilemma.
The paradox consists in the simple proposition that an ideal which appears
logical, sound, and necessary writhes agonizingly at death’s door at one
moment and shows amazing vitality the next. The dilemma is born
of an indecision whether to succor the unpredictable patient or to abandon
it completely in the hope that a time more propitious for the conception
of a new ideal is in the offing. The metaphors take on specific meaning
when the evolution of postwar federalism is examined in detail.
STRENGTH THROUGH WEAKNESS
Federalism is simply a means, among others, for achieving closer unity
among existing political organisms and peoples. The decided reluctance
on the part of many professed European federalists to define the precise
nature of the ideal to which they are committed is perfectly understand-
able. Each age attaches its own peculiarities and its own nuances. Ameri-
cans, apart from power considerations, think of federalism primarily as
an instrument which protects individual rights through a strong central
government; the Swiss place their faith in a weak central organ held in
check by strong cantonal rights.’ German federalists recall the ideals of
1
On this point see the works by the eminent Swiss authority, William E. Rappard, particularly La
Suisse et l’organisation de l’Europe (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1950), and La Constitution fédérale
de la Suisse (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1948). Summations of his views are given in several
short articles among which may be highly recommended "The Political Experiences of the Swiss
Confederation," UNESCO International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. IV (Spring, 1952), pp. 89-103,
and "Federalism in Switzerland," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. IV (Spring, 1951), pp. 236-44. See
also Charlotte Muret, "The Swiss Pattern for a Federated Europe," in Edward Mead Earle (ed.),
Nationalism and Internationalism: Essays Inscribed to Carlton J. H. Hayes (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950), pp. 261-84.
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Constantin Frantz who envisioned a federation in which member states
were intended to subserve the interests of its most powerful member.2
2
France, with no tradition of federalism, is inclined to talk in terms of
&dquo;supra-national&dquo; authorities.
There are, however, two common areas for agreement. One is the
recognition that the new federalist government must come into being
as a result of a voluntary surrender of certain sovereign powers by member
states. The second point of accord is acceptance of the fact that this new
central government must be able to act directly upon the subjects.3
3
The
voluntary division of sovereignty between the central government and
the member states is presumed to result in a union and not a unity-a
distinction insisted upon by the continental theoreticians but one the
Anglo-Saxon mind has trouble in accepting.’ Despite shades of meaning
and the different degrees of emphasis there is an almost universal agree-
ment that federalism will bring new strength to its constituent parts.
It should be observed at the outset, therefore, that federalism is always
conceived as being a unifying factor.
If the impulse to unity is strong in a given time-space milieu it
follows that federalism takes on added vigor and attracts new devotees
to its cause. The present situation makes Europe a perfect seeding ground
for the federalist germ since all postwar facts proclaim the imperative
for sustained and intensified community of effort. Weakness is the spur
to action. Largely because of American aid Europe today is able to stand,
2
E. Sieber, "Europäische Föderation: K. F. Gedanken iiber ein neues Europa," Neue Schweizer
Rundschau, January, 1944, and László Ledermann, Fédération Internationale: idées d’hier et
possibilités de demain (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1950), especially ch. 4.
3 The bibliography on federalism is tremendous and the subsequent citations, by no means exhaustive,
are designed to focus attention on the most recent European thinking in regard to the problem.
With this caveat in mind the following might be mentioned as very useful: (French) Robert
Aron and Alexandre Marc, Principes du fédéralisme (Paris: Le Portulan, 1948); Michel Mouskhely
and Gaston Stefani, L’Europe face au fédéralisme (Strasbourg and Paris: Editions F-X le Roux,
1949); Olivier Philip, Le problème de l’union européene (Paris and Neuchâtel: La Baconnière,
1950); Raymond Silva, Au service de la paix: l’idée fédéraliste (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1943);
Georges Scelle, Manuel de droit international public (Paris: Editions Domat-Montchrestien, 1948),
especially ch. 4; Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique (4 vols.; Paris: Librairie générale
de droit et de jurisprudence, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 540-55; Noël Henry, Vers une Europe fédérée
(Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1951); Alexandre Marc, A hauteur d’homme: la révolution fédéraliste
(Paris: Editions "Je Sers," 1948). Among the Italian works the following are noteworthy:
Federazione Europea (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1948); Umberto Campagnolo, Republica
Federale Europea (Milan: Europa Unita, 1945); Carlo Sforza, O federazione Europea O Nuove
Guerre (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1948). English titles include: Owen Roberts, John F. Schmidt
and Clarence K. Streit, The New Federalist (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1950); Robert Mackay,
Western Union in Crisis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell &
Mott, 1950); Robert Boothby, What Do
You Think About Western Union (London: Allen Wingate, 1949); Lord Walter Layton, United
Europe (London: News Chronicle Publications, 1948); Barbara Ward, The West At Bay (New
York: Harper &
Bros., 1948); John Strachey, Federation or Socialism (London: Victor Gollancz,
1948); M. Chaning-Pearce (ed.), Federal Union: A Symposium (London: J. Jonathan Cape, 1948);
Quincy Wright (ed.), The World Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948);
Philip C. Jessup, The International Problem of the Government of Mankind (Claremont,
California: Claremont College Press, 1947); and Foundations for World Order (Denver: University
of Denver Press, 1949). Several magazines recently have devoted either the entire issue, or
substantial portions thereof, to the problem. See UNESCO’s International Social Science Bulletin,
Vol. IV (Spring, 1952), pp. 1-103, and Common Cause, Vol. IV (April, 1951), especially pp. 460
ff. for bibliography.
4 "Le fédéralisme, parce qu’il est union et non pas unité, commande une association volontaire de
groupements divers et autonomes, au sein de laquelle l’équilibre est établi par un partage de la
souveraineté entre la fédération et ses membres." Mouskhely and Stefani, op. cit., p. 256. See also
Louis Le Fur, Eléments de droit international (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1941), especially pp. 81-100.

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but she stands painfully on economic and military legs which have under-
gone a continual atrophy. Yet on these withered limbs she must bear
a heavier load than ever before in her history. Consider for a moment
the economic structure. Two wars have imposed staggering costs in
human and material resources, have left her saddled with enormous
debt,5 and have plagued her with shortages of food and raw materials
at the very time when her capacity to make finished goods in return for
these commodities was badly shaken.6 This is not to suggest by a sort of
post hoc ergo propter hoc logic that war alone caused Europe’s present
plight.7 The feeble &dquo;recovery&dquo; from the great crash of 1929, the abandon-
ment of the gold standard in 1931, the introduction of exchange controls,
the changing patterns of trade, and the decline of European industrial
production relative to America’s suggest that the malaise was of longer
duration and of more intricate causal design than the &dquo;war-alone&dquo; thesis
admits.8 Whether the long or short-term causes are stressed, the fact
remains that Europe is in uncertain economic straits.
’
If the Continent winced painfully under its economic burden it
groaned aloud at the military weight it had to sustain. Military weakness
would have counted for little if the premise upon which the United
Nations was built, viz., peaceful cooperation between the Great Powers,
had proved sound. Even when Soviet-American tension indicated that a
reappraisal would have to be made there was a tendency for the West
to let its pious wish for peace father the thought of appeasement. The
Communist coup at Prague in February, 1948, and the outbreak of the
Korean...