The Far East and United States Policy: a Re-Examination

• Author: Wesley R. Fishel
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295000300101
• Published date: 01 March 1950
• Date: 01 March 1950
• Subject Matter: Articles

The Western
Political Quarterly
VoL. III
MARCH, 1950
No. 1
THE FAR EAST AND UNITED STATES POLICY:
A RE-EXAMINATION*
WESLEY R. FISHEL
University of California at Los Angeles
HE
ORIGINS of the Far Eastern problem far antedate the discovery
t of America; they may be traced directly to the memoirs of Marco
Polo, written during the latter years of the thirteenth century. From
that time to the present, nations of the West have found political, eco-
nomic, and strategic attractions in this distant section of Asia, attractions
engendered by the weakness of its political organizations. From the res-
toration of the Emperor Meiji ( 1852-1912) to the end of the late war,
Japan was the important Asiatic state on the periphery of the region, pri-
marily because it was the only Asiatic state with a strong and vigorous in-
ternal structure. However, as long as there has been a Far Eastern prob-
lem, China has been its point of focus. The external control or inflluenc-
ing of China has always been the principal integrant in international poli-
tics in the Far East. The control of such secondary areas as Japan, Korea,
Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines has
been a lesser element in the situation. Realization of this fact has been
basic in the evolution of American policy toward the Far East. Grounded
in geographic and cultural reality, it must continue to serve as a pilot
factor.
It has frequently been asserted that the United States has no foreign
policy, and more specifically, no Far Eastern policy. This erroneous view
has been caused by a failure on the part of its holders to distinguish be-
tween policy and courses of action. Insofar as policy relates to principles,
we had, until the formation of the United Nations and the conclusion
of the North Atlantic Treaty, a clear and consistent foreign policy, and
an equally clear and consistent Far Eastern policy. In general, American
* This paper was presented during the third annual meeting of the Western Political Science Asso-
citation at Albuquerque, New Mexico, November 25-26, 1949.
1

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foreign policy was based on an application of four principles: (1) respect
for the legal and moral rights of other states and peoples; (2) equality
of commercial opportunity and treatment; (3) abstention from political
alliances and aggression; (4) persuasive, rather than coercive, diplomatic
approaches and measures. As the third principle indicates, the United
States was isolationist in its attitude toward cooperative dealings gener-
ally. With respect to the Far East, and specifically with regard to China,
its policy was marked by a slightly different set of principles: (1) equality
of commercial and political opportunity (the Open Door); (2) pres-
ervation of China’s territorial and administrative integrity; (3) cooperation
with other powers, at first collectively, later by parallel action.’
The policy of cooperative action vis-a-vis China received a major set-
back when German, Austrian, and Russian extraterritorial rights in China
were terminated following World War I. A further shock was received
when the Soviet Union elevated its minister in Peking to the rank of
ambassador in 1924, thus causing him to become, by virtue of custom,
the doyen of the diplomatic corps. Since the other Powers, represented
by ministers, were unwilling to accept the formal leadership of a senior
envoy of a government as yet a pariah in international life, the unity of
the group was, to all outward intent, shattered. A semblance of co-
operation, however, remained in the behind-the-scenes maneuverings
which invariably precede public negotiations. Particularly did the United
States continue to act in conjunction with the British government.
The United States and Great Britain have come, for the time being,
to a parting of the ways, largely as a consequence of the difference in the
nature and quantity of British and American interests in China. Spurred
on by pressure from British merchants, who have the largest foreign com-
mercial and financial stake in China, Great Britain recognized the Com-
munist regime on January 5, 1950,2 in order to restore trade with that
country to &dquo;normal.&dquo; The American government, on the other hand,
wants to withhold recognition until the Communists evidence willingness
to meet its criteria.3 This divergence has threatened to weaken both the
British and American positions in the situation, in addition to disposing
of effective cooperaton. Considerations of political expediency have in-
1
Compare T. A. Bisson, American Policy in the Far East: 1931-1940 (New York, 1939), pp. 3-7; A.
Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 4-8,
439-473; U. S. Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, 1949
[Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30]), pp. 1-37 (hereinafter cited by
title only); Stanley K. Hornbeck, The United States and the Far East: Certain Fundamentals
of Policy (Boston, 1942), pp. 1-26.
2
New York Times, January 6, 1950.
8
On October 12, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson stated three tests for recognition of the Chinese
Communist government:
1. Control of the arca which it claims to represent;
2. Recognition and fulfillment of its international obligation;
3. Rule with the acquiescence of the ruled. (New York Times, October 13, 1949.)

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duced some of the British Commonwealth nations to reconsider their
plans for early recognition.4 The incarceration of Consul General Angus
Ward dramatically illustrates the complete absence of American prestige
in regions under Communist control. It also demonstrates what appears
to be a basically ruthless intent on the part of the Communists in their
relations with individual foreigners regardless of their official station.
The Open Door, meaning equal opportunity for Americans to re-
side and engage in business in the Far East, was an appropriate policy to
employ in an area in which the United States’ political interest was sec-
ondary and which was too distant for an attempt at domination. With
its related principle of preserving China’s territorial and administrative in-
tegrity, the Open Door was a public affirmation of the democratic ideal
and an admirable guidon of American diplomacy in the Far East. But
it succeeded neither in keeping the door open at all times, nor in pre-
serving China’s territorial integrity from serious violation. It was, in short,
valid only as a principle, not as a practice.
From the standpoint of the current situation in China, the policy of
the Open Door has two major shortcomings. First, it was directed against
undue encroachment on the China market or the Chinese political entity
by another non-Chinese power. However, since the Chinese Communists
are not foreigners but Chinese, the policy is invalid from that basic stand-
point. Further, the keeper of the Open Door must be either friendly or
impressionable if the policy is to operate. The new doorman is not im-
pressed by Americans; he is, in fact, unfriendly to the extent that he has
repeatedly called the United States his &dquo;No. 1 Enemy.&dquo;5 The door is
is now closed. It is extremely unlikely that it will be opened again in the
foreseeable future. Whatever may be said in justification of these policies
for the era in which they were applied, their continuation would be an
anachronism; it would be as Harold Laski put it in another context, &dquo;an
exercise in logic, not in lifer
4
India recognized the Chinese Communist government on December 30, 1949; Pakistan recognized it
on January 4, 1950.
(New York Times, December 31, 1949; January 5, 1950.)
5
A carefully documented analysis of Chinese Communist enmity toward the United States may be
found in H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," 44

Ameri-
can Journal of International Law (January, 1950). Steiner identifies six major theses of Chinese
Communist foreign policy, the second being that the United States, "the most advanced cap-
italist country and the ’necessary’ leader of the ’world imperialist camp,’ is by nature the
major enemy among the nations of the world." See also memorandum entitled "Explanation of
Several Basic Questions Concerning the Postwar International Situation," by Lu Ting-yi, Yenan
Emancipation Daily, reprinted in United States Relations with China, pp. 710-719; and Ko Pai-
nien, "New China’s Foreign Policy," China Digest, Vol. VII (November 2, 1949), pp. 7-9.
6
If one may assume that policy statements to the United Nations General Assembly by the United
States delegate represent the official view of his government, then the draft resolution on China
offered to the Political Committee of that body on November 28, 1949, by Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
connotes a failure on the part of the Department of State to recognize this fact.
The American
resolution simply urged members of the General Assembly (1) to respect the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity, and political independence of China; (2) to respect the right of the people
of China to choose their own form of government without external interference; (3) to respect
existing treaties relating to China; (4) to refrain from acquiring spheres of influence or estab-
lishing puppet regimes in China; (5) to refrain from seeking to obtain special rights or priv-
ileges within the territory of China (U. N. Doc. A/C. 1/552).

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I
The famous statement of La Bruyere: &dquo;Everything has been said;
and it is too late ...&dquo; is...