The failure of words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and when a judgment of conviction becomes final for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. s. 2255(1).

AuthorOrye, Benjamin R., III

INTRODUCTION

Originally enacted in 1948, 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255 created a remedy for federal prisoners seeking "to vacate, set aside or correct [a] sentence ...." (1) Section 2255 is "the principal postconviction remedy for federal convicts." (2) Congress "intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus." (3) Until 1996, motions filed under [section] 2255 were subject to no statute of limitations (4) and could be filed at any time. (5) The lack of a statue of limitations in [section] 2255 reflected the history of federal habeas corpus. (6)

On April 24, 1996, the 104th Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). (7) The purpose of the AEDPA is "[t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death penalty...." (8) Title I of the AEDPA, "Habeas Corpus Reform," provides for a one year statute of limitations in [section] 105. (9) This section thus amends 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255. Section 105 provides in pertinent part: "A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final...." (10)

Soon after the passage of the AEDPA, several circuit courts of appeals had to decide when a judgment of conviction becomes "final" for purposes of the new limitation in the case of the prisoner who does not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (11) Specifically, the courts were asked to decide whether the statute of limitations for [section] 2255 motions begins to run when the court of appeals affirms the district court's conviction and sentence, or when the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expires. A minority of courts have held the former, (12) a majority the latter. (13)

In arriving at their different outcomes, both sides of the argument relied heavily upon different constructions (14) of the relevant statutory language. (15) Among the factors the courts measured were the intent of the legislature when enacting the AEDPA, (16) the purpose of the AEDPA, (17) the dictionary definitions of "final" and "judgment of conviction," (18) and, to a much lesser extent, practical (19) and policy considerations. (20) As this Note will illustrate, however, careful analysis of the arguments on each side reveal that the textual, intrinsic arguments fail, leaving only extrinsic factors, policy considerations, and the historical purpose of the writ of habeas corpus to accurately guide courts to the correct conclusion. The conclusion of this Note is that both sides' methods of analysis were faulty and internally inconsistent, and that extrinsic, policy, and historical considerations prove that the conclusion of the Kapral court and the other courts in the majority is, in fact, the correct one. For the purposes of 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255(1), a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing a petition of certiorari expires, not when the court of appeals affirms the conviction and sentence of the defendant.

Part I of this Note briefly sketches the history of habeas corpus, the purposes and historical context of the passage of [section] 2255 in 1948, and the purposes and context of the 1996 AEDPA amendments to [section] 2255. Part II analyzes the arguments behind the conclusions of both the majority and minority of courts, pointing out flaws and weaknesses on each side, focusing principally on the presumptions that each side makes. Part III discusses one of the most relevant and recent Supreme Court decisions, Duncan v. Walker. (21) The analysis of Duncan reveals that although a majority of the Court may be considered textualists, their own reasoning will lead them to conclude that a textualist approach is inappropriate in this case. The Note concludes that it is impossible to interpret the language of the [section] 2255 amendments in the AEDPA without resorting to extrinsic policy considerations, and explains how these outside considerations firmly support the holdings of the majority of circuit courts that have considered the issue.

  1. HISTORY & CONTEXT

    1. Habeas Corpus (22)

      1. England

        The first seeds that would eventually evolve into the writ of habeas corpus are said to have been sown in the Magna Carta in 1215. (23) As first used, habeas corpus was much more narrow in scope than it is today. (24) The scope of habeas corpus expanded because of jurisdictional disagreements between English superior courts and English local courts. (25) The form of habeas corpus the courts used, habeas corpus cum causa, (26) compelled the sheriff to produce the prisoner who was the subject of the courts' jurisdictional dispute. (27) Through a series of important cases, beginning with the Case of the Five Knights (28) and culminating with the Chamber's Case, (29) "[t]he questioning of the validity of commitments, previously an incidental effect of the writ, now became the major object." (30)

        Courts generally limited the use of the writ to challenge "commitment in criminal cases before conviction." (31) Habeas corpus relief was not available to prisoners "held by a valid warrant or pursuant to the execution or judgment of a proper court." (32) Essentially, "a convicted person was not entitled to the privilege of the writ because appeal was the remedy for a conviction contrary to law." (33)

      2. America

        Although they did not do so immediately, (34) the British colonies in America had adopted habeas corpus by the late 1600s. (35) By the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, three of the twelve state constitutions of the original thirteen colonies had a habeas corpus provision. (36) At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the Framers viewed habeas corpus as so fundamental that they did not expressly provide for the writ, but instead, because they assumed that people enjoyed the privilege, (37) simply prohibited its abolishment except in certain extraordinary circumstances. (38)

        The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts the power to grant the writ. (39) The writ, however, only applied to federal prisoners (40) and could only be used to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing body. (41) It was not until 1867 that the writ's application was expanded to include state prisoners, and still the inquiry remained limited to the jurisdiction of the sentencing body. (42) This was the state of affairs until the mid-twentieth century. (43)

        In 1942, the United States Supreme Court expanded habeas corpus to include attacks based on other constitutional grounds. (44) Since 1942, habeas corpus provides relief if:

        (1) the conviction is void for lack o f personal or subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the statute defining the offense is unconstitutional, or the conviction was obtained in violation of a federal constitutional right; (3) the statute authorizing the sentence is unconstitutional, or the sentence was obtained in violation of a federal constitutional right; (4) the sentence is contrary to the applicable statute, in excess of the statutory maximum, or otherwise unauthorized by law; or (5) the conviction or the sentence is otherwise deemed subject to collateral attack. (45) B. 28 U.S.C. [section] 2255

      3. Original Purpose

        Section 2255 derived from a bill by the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure. (46) The Committee intended to address "serious administrative problems associated with habeas corpus." (47) The idea was to provide "federal prisoners with a post conviction remedy equivalent in scope to habeas corpus," (48) but eliminate many of the "administrative problems associated with habeas corpus." (49) First, the number of habeas petitions had increased significantly. (50) Second, habeas corpus was subject to abuse by federal prisoners. (51) Many of the petitions prisoners filed were repetitious and "patently frivolous." (52) This was all the more difficult for the courts because habeas applications were filed in the district where the prisoner was confined and not the court where the prisoner was sentenced. (53) The courts in districts where federal prisons were located therefore had to "handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions," (54) and did not have easy access to witnesses or the records of the case, (55) which caused further delays and backlog.

        After approving the Committee's recommendations, the Judicial Conference submitted them to Congress. (56) Congress did not pass the two bills, but did incorporate them into its revision of the entire Judicial Code. (57)

        The purpose of [section] 2255 "was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient form" (58) without suppressing "prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions." (59)

      4. Nature of [section] 2255 Proceedings

        Historically, the nature of [section] 2255 has been the subject of much disagreement. Congress intended the [section] 2255 remedy to be similar to the writ of error coram nobis, (60) but much broader--"`as broad as habeas corpus.'" (61) Subsequent judicial interpretation, however, has underscored the point that it is more a substitute for habeas corpus than similar in nature to coram nobis. (62) Additionally, later legal commentators have concluded that the principles of habeas corpus, and not coram nobis, control [section] 2255 remedies. (63) In Hill v. United States, (64) the Supreme Court announced:

        [I]t conclusively appears from the historic context in which [section] 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined. (65) The language of the section itself, however, indicates that it is separate and distinct from habeas corpus. (66)...

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