The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General

• Date: 01 January 2019
• Author: Robin J. Kempf,Jessica C. Cabrera
• DOI: 10.1177/0275074018783012
• Published date: 01 January 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

783012ARPXXX10.1177/0275074018783012The American Review of Public AdministrationKempf and Cabrera
research-article2018
Article
American Review of Public Administration
2019, Vol. 49(1) 65 –78
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices
© The Author(s) 2018
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of Inspector General
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074018783012
DOI: 10.1177/0275074018783012
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Robin J. Kempf1 and Jessica C. Cabrera1
Abstract
The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered
affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such
control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of
inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and objective monitors of the agencies they oversee, and
are reflected in their de facto independence from political pressures in the OIGs’ environments, operationalized as changes in
the majority party in Congress, the presidency, and executive leadership. This research tests the self-reported outputs of 54
federal OIGs over a 10-and-a-half-year period to see if there are correlations between differences in inspector general (IG)
appointment processes, OIGs’ environmental changes, and fluctuations in OIG outputs. Furthermore, it examines whether
these results vary depending on whether the OIGs are performing pre factum audits or post factum investigations. Analyses
show that OIGs with IGs appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate are more productive than those appointed
by agency heads. Furthermore, federal OIGs’ productivity varies depending on who is president and with the OIGs’ proximity
to the president, although pre factum audits and post factum investigations do not demonstrate similar patterns. This article
sheds light on issues of institutional design and suggests an implicit political nature of pre factum oversight. Implications for
policy and practice in the area of government accountability are discussed.
Keywords
government accountability, institutions, offices of inspector general
The federal offices of inspector general (OIGs) were designed
operationalized as changes in the majority party in Congress,
by Congress to be independent monitors of the agencies they
the presidency, and executive leadership.
oversee (Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5
Examining whether a public agency can be structured to
U.S.C. Appendix). They pursue this monitoring through
be insulated from their political environment is a novel ques-
audits and investigations of the activities of agency employ-
tion in public management research. Instead, research on the
ees, contractors, and beneficiaries. Independence here refers
political control of bureaucracies typically examines whether
to the OIGs’ ability to produce objective conclusions about
and how political actors may actively influence executive
the monitored agencies’ activities, according to the demands
agencies to ensure that legislative intent is properly carried
of the complexity of their work and the extent of their avail-
out (see, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989; Scholz &
able human capital, without interference from any external
Wood, 1998; Wood & Waterman, 1991 and progeny). The
sources (Hanretty & Koop, 2012; Maggetti, 2007). This
underlying assumption is that bureaucrats, who are not sub-
independence helps ensure OIGs’ audit and investigative
ject to periodic elections, are unlikely to be accountable to
findings and recommendations are unbiased and reliable
the public, and thus, elected officials, as principals, must take
(Association of Inspectors General, 2014). This research
steps to control agent-bureaucrat actions. Through quantita-
examines the de jure, or legal, structures Congress put into
tive examinations of bureaucratic outputs,1 this literature has
place with the intent of safeguarding OIG independence
confirmed political control is possible (Wood & Waterman,
from external influence to see whether these mechanisms
1991). Scholars continue to explore possible determinants of
have de facto, in fact, insulated OIGs from external political
influence and control. To be clear, no untoward external influ-
1John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA
ence on OIG activities is suggested. In fact, there is no evi-
dence that OIGs’ activities are directed from Congress, the
Corresponding Author:
President, or the head of the agencies they oversee. Rather,
Robin J. Kempf, Public Management Department, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, 524 W. 59th Street, Haaren Hall, Room 533.12, New
this research examines whether OIGs demonstrate indepen-
York, NY 10019, USA.
dence from political pressures in the OIGs’ environments,
Email: rkempf@jjay.cuny.edu

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American Review of Public Administration 49(1)
political control (see, e.g., Lewis, 2011; McGrath, 2013;
depending on who is president and with the OIGs’ proximity
Yackee, 2006) and limitations thereto (see, e.g., Carpenter,
to the president, although pre factum audits and post factum
2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; and Balla, 1998).
investigations do not demonstrate similar patterns.
Yet, by focusing on how legislatures control executive
Acknowledging that these findings must be considered
agencies, the issue of whether institutional design can buffer
within the context of the fact that federal OIGs’ collective
political influence and promote bureaucratic independence
priorities have evolved over time (Newcomer & Grob, 2004),
has been overlooked. Some scholars have identified this research has several implications for our federal govern-
instances, such as in the context of British independent regu-
ment’s accountability system and other jurisdictions estab-
latory agencies, where bureaucratic autonomy is to be
lishing independent OIG oversight.
desired, not feared (Majone, 1997, 2001; Pollack, 2002 ).
These studies have examined why political actors delegate
Background and Theory
authority to agencies that are institutionally independent of
their control (Gilardi, 2002), how comparative political and
OIGs are organizational units established to oversee assigned
historical culture impacts the creation of such independent
governmental agencies, or specific governmental projects, in
regulatory agencies (Yesilkagit & Christensen, 2009), and
order to improve the accountability of those agencies or pro-
what explains variations in levels of independence (Elgie &
grams.2 To do so, OIGs conduct audits, investigations,
McMenamin, 2005). Nevertheless, these studies do not
inspections, and/or evaluations of agencies, agency staff,
empirically test whether, or the extent to which, institutional
government contractors, and beneficiaries, to examine the
mechanisms that are intended to promote bureaucratic inde-
effectiveness and efficiency of programs and to identify
pendence actually support such independence.
instances of fraud, waste, and abuse. An OIG’s role is to pro-
The present research directly examines whether legisla-
duce information for others with political and administrative
tive approaches to agency design can help protect OIGs from
power to act upon OIG reports. Their findings and recom-
external political influences. Like the research on indepen-
mendations are provided to agency heads and executive
dent regulatory agencies, it presumes that that bureaucratic
managers; executive branch leaders, such as the president or
independence may be desired and encouraged via institu-
a governor, legislators, and the public. According to the fed-
tional design. Like the political control literature, it uses a
eral Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
quantitative methodological approach, examining agency
Efficiency (CIGIE) directory, there are 73 OIGs in the fed-
outputs, in this case numbers of investigations and audits, to
eral government. Many states, cities, and counties in the
explore whether de jure independence crafted for federal
United States have created OIGs as well.
OIGs in their authorizing legislation has real-world effects.
OIG activities are most useful in the pursuit of account-
Do OIGs’ levels of productivity vary along with varying
ability if they are independent from external influences.
pressures in the OIGs’ environment?
Independence has been defined as the ability “to translate
This research compares 54 federal OIGs on two types of
one’s own preferences into authoritative actions without
outputs produced over a 10-and-a-half-year period, from
external constraints” (Maggetti, 2007). In the case of OIGs,
April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2015. Specifically, the out-
the goal is not so much for the OIGs to be able to take author-
puts are counts of audits completed and numbers of investi-
itative actions, but rather to reach authoritative conclusions
gations closed, drawn from semiannual reports published by
that agency heads, the president, Congress, the judicial
these OIGs during this period. In total, 21 semiannual reports
branch, and the public can rely upon to take actions. The
from 54 OIGs that were in continuous existence during this
Association of Inspectors General, in its Principles and
entire period were examined. Any OIGs that...