The Exploitative Abuse Prohibition

Date01 December 2017
Published date01 December 2017
DOI10.1177/0003603X17733358
Article
The Exploitative Abuse Prohibition:
Activated by Modern Issues
Tadashi Shiraishi*
Abstract
The prohibition of exploitative abuse has attracted increasing attention in recent years, activated by
many modern issues, also involving intellectual property rights. This article takes a bird’s-eye view of
the policy distance between the United States, a core supporter of nonintervention, and the European
Union, a core supporter of modest intervention. The article also examines the response of Japanese
law, which includes the prevention of abuse of a superior bargaining position, a functional equivalent to
the prohibition of exploitative abuse in this context. The provision against abuses of a superior bar-
gaining position in Japan has been recently enforced in the context of private lawsuits as well. Such a
holistic research framework will enable us to explore the potential responses of competition law to
the challenges raised by data protection, the sharing economy, and other modern issues.
Keywords
abuse of a dominant position, exploitative abuse, abuse of a superior bargaining position
I. Introduction
This article aims to explore the situations in which the exploitative abuse prohibition has been
activated by modern issues, also involving intellectual property rights. “Exploitative abuse” can be
defined as any firm’s conduct that directly imposes an excessive disadvantage on customers; this can
be done without colluding with or excluding competitors. The concept of customers, as employed in
this article, includes sellers, in particular when we are interested in an exploitative abuse by a
purchaser.
Collusion and exclusion are the two main fields that are of interest for competition law. In contrast,
exploitative abuse has been almost entirely excluded from consideration, mostly because it has not
been regarded as an antitrust issue in the United States (U.S.), the home of one of the world’s first
competition laws.
However, competition law in the European Union (EU) has solidly maintained this antitrust cate-
gory, even more recently, and there seems to be an emerging recognition of the importance, even in the
*Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Corresponding Author:
Tadashi Shiraishi, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.
Email: tsx@j.u-tokyo.ac.jp
The Antitrust Bulletin
2017, Vol. 62(4) 737-751
ªThe Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0003603X17733358
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