The Executive Veto in American States

• Author: Frank W. Prescott
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295000300108
• Published date: 01 March 1950
• Date: 01 March 1950
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE EXECUTIVE VETO IN AMERICAN STATES*
FRANK W. PRESCOTT
University of Chattanooga
ECENT
OBSERVERS have offered convincing evidence of the rela-
tive neglect of the state legislative process by American political
scientists. In 1947, a committee of specialists called &dquo;special atten-
tion&dquo; to the governor’s veto as an integral part of the legislative process
in the states and lamented the inadequacy of printed materials on the
subject.’ Although the veto has been rather thoroughly explored in a few
states, virtually nothing has been done on a nation-wide scale since the
pioneer studies by Holcombe were made more than a quarter century
ago.2 The following study of the evolving veto mechanism of all forty-
seven &dquo;veto states&dquo; and the two territories attempts to measure and evalu-
ate the exercise of the veto in recent years.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Before 1789 only two states provided for the veto power over legisla-
tion.3
3
Distrust of the governor’s prerogatives had diminished by 1812 so
that nearly one-half of the states had adopted the veto, and since then
no new state except West Virginia has entered the union without some
form of executive disallowance. Adoption of this device in the new
states is partly attributable to the fact that Congress granted this power
to territorial governors,4 and also that the new constitutions often reflected
a preference for the federal veto formula used by the President of the
United States. By 1860 the veto power had become firmly established.
*This article was made possible in part through a grant-in-aid allocated from funds made available by
the Carnegie Foundation and the University of Chattanooga. The author is solely responsible for
statements made herein.
1
O. Douglas Weeks, Research in the American State Legislative Process (Ann Arbor: Edwards and Co.,
1947), pp. 4-6, 28, 37, 41-42.
2
Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (New York, 1916), pp. 327 ff. For 1923
figures see also 2nd and 3d editions. Unfortunately Holcombe’s data for 44 states have been
destroyed so that only a few state-by-state comparisons can be made from the text. For other
studies see John A. Fairlie, "The Veto Power of the State Governor," in The American Political
Science Review, Vol. XI (August, 1917), pp. 473-493; Niels H. Debel, The Development of the
Veto Power of the Governor of Illinois (University of Illinois, 1917); Glenn R. Negley, "The Ex-
ecutive Veto in Illinois," in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol. XXXIII (December, 1939), pp. 1049-1057;
Illinois Legislative Council, The Veto Power in Illinois with Especial Relation to Adjournment of
the Legislature, Publication No. 56 (Springfield, 1943); Knute E. Carlson, "The Exercise of the Veto
Power in Nebraska," in Nebraska History and Political Science Series, Bull. No. 12 (Lincoln 1917);
Jacob A. Swisher, "The Executive Veto in Iowa," in The Iowa Journal of History and Politics,
Vol. XV (April, 1917), pp. 155-213; Harold M. Dorr, "The Executive Veto in Michigan," in
Michigan Historical Magazine, Vol. XX (1936), pp. 91-110; John A. Perkins, "The Role of the
Governor in the Enactment of Appropriations," Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 11, (1943),
pp. 51-77; R. H. Wells, "The Item Veto and State Budget Reform," in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.,
Vol. XVIII (November, 1924), pp. 782-791; and M. N. McGeary, "The Governor’s Veto in
Pennsylvania," in ibid., Vol. XLI (October, 1947), pp. 941-946.
3
South Carolina adopted the veto in 1776 but abandoned it two years later.
4 Fairlie, op. cit., p. 477. Bitter contests between assembly and territorial governors before statehood was
the reason for its omission in the state constitutions. See Ohio Constitutional Convention Debates
and Proceedings (2 vols.; Columbus, 1851), Vol. I, pp. 111-113.
98

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99
Subsequent years recorded the steady advance of adoptions and the addi-
tion of ancillary features and refinements of procedural techniques in all
states but North Carolina which continues to persist in her ancient prac-
tices.
Table I shows a combination of features in the evolutionary process
of the executive veto from 1776 to the present day.5 First, the states are
listed in the chronological order of adoption of the various forms of guber-
natorial veto powers. Second, they have been classified into three main
categories: &dquo;Strong,&dquo; &dquo;Medium,&dquo; and &dquo;Weak,&dquo; according to the presence
or absence of the vital parts of the constitutional veto. From the view-
point of formal provisions, the effectiveness of the veto power as a means
of control over legislation mainly depends upon the time allowed for
consideration of bills by the governor, the number of votes required to
override the governor’s objections to a measure, the rules governing the
&dquo;pocket veto,&dquo; and the power to veto specific items in appropriation bills.
The key factor in the determination of whether the governor has &dquo;strong&dquo;
veto powers is existence of the requirement of &dquo;two-thirds of the elected
members&dquo; of the legislature to override a veto. The presence of any two
other factors in the list of &dquo;strong&dquo; provisions is a necessary prerequisite
to the inclusion of states in this category. Qualifications for the other two
categories are explained in detail in Table 1.6
Assignment of the states to their respective classes is made on the basis
of their contemporaneous relationships. It should be noted that unless
other provisions were materially weakened or omitted by later amend-
ments, the adoption of the item veto is usually sufficient reason for
promotion of a state to a higher class. An example is New Hampshire
which has failed to adopt this device and, consequently, was assigned
to a secondary position even though its constitution provided the other
essential f actors.7
Although the pocket veto, or the cognate requirement of the gov-
ernor’s signature of a bill within the time allowed after adjournment may
have been abandoned in some states, the inclusion of other features is
considered sufficient to qualify a state for a &dquo;strong,&dquo; or at least a
&dquo;medium&dquo; position.8
8
Massachusetts, for example, is classified in the
5
Analysis in Table I is based on Ben. Perley Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters and Other Organic Laws of the United States (2 vols.; Washington, 1878); New York
Constitutional Convention Committee, Constitutions of the States and United States (Albany,
1938), Vol. III; current pamphlet editions of state constitutions.
6
Details relating to the procedure of exercising the veto power are in F. W. Prescott, "Constitutional
Provisions on the Governor’s Veto Power," in The Universitys of Tennessee Record, Extension
Series, Vol. XXIII (1946), pp. 64-71, 86-88, and in Council of State Governments, The Book of
the States, 1948-1949 (Chicago, 1948), p. 112.
7 The other "veto states" which do not permit the governor to veto distinct items in appropriations
are Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Vermont.
8
Fairlie, op. cit., p. 479, citing twenty-two states which at one time had the pocket veto. Abandonments
include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, and South
Carolina.

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100
TABLE I
CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE VETO POWER, 1776-1949
Number of States and Relative Strength of Constitutional Provisions
States listed by columns in the order of their adoption of veto provisions:
(1) I
Ga., N.H.
II
N.Y., Mass., Pa., La.
III
Ky., Vt.
(2) I
Ga., N.H., Mich.
II
N.Y., Mass., Pa., La., Miss., Me., Calif., Iowa, Ore., Minn., Tex., Wis.
III
Ky., Vt., Ind., Conn., Ala., Ill., Mo., Ark., N.J., Fla.
(3) I
Ga., Mich., Ill., Pa., N.Y., Mo., La., Minn., Colo., Tex., Calif., Mont., N.D., S.D.,
Idaho, Wash., Wyo., Utah, Del.
II
N.H., Vt., Mass., Miss., Me., Wis., Iowa, Ore., Kan., Nev., Neb., Md., Va., Ark.,
Ala., N.J., Fla., Ky., S.C.
III
Ind., Conn., Tenn., W.Va.
(4) I
Ga., Mich., Ill., Pa., N.Y., Mo., La., Minn., Colo., Tex., Calif., Mont., N.D., S.D.,
Idaho, Wash., Wyo., Utah, Del., Ala., Va., Kan., Ore., Okla., Ariz., N.M., Mass.,
Wis., N.J.
II
N.H., Vt., Miss., Me., Iowa, Nev., Neb., Md., Ark., Fla., Ky., S.C., Ohio, Conn.
III
Ind., Tenn., W.Va., R.I.
Italics indicate that a state has more than the minimum number of qualify
cations.
Three or more of the following elements are necessary for states to be assigned to their
respective class:
Strong veto provisions:
1
Five or more days for governor’s consideration of bills during sessions.
2
Ten or more days for consideration of bills after adjournment.
3
Two,thirds of the elected members to override a veto.
4
Pocket veto, or bills die after adjournment unless signed.
5
Power to veto items of appropriation bills, or parts of all bills.
6
Power to reduce items of appropriation bills.
7
Governor may submit amendments to bills and return them to legislature.
Medium veto provisions:
1
Less than five days for consideration of bills during sessions.
2
Five days or less to consider bills after adjournment.
3
Three-fifths of the elected members; or two-thirds present to override veto.
4
Bills passed in one session become law unless returned at next session.
Weak veto provisions:
1
Less than five days to consider bills during sessions.
2
Less than five days to consider bills after adjournment.
3
Majority of elected or present members; or three-fifths present to override veto.
4
Vetoed bills...