The evolution of support for democratic regime principles and its alternatives

• Published date: 01 February 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1644
• Date: 01 February 2017
• Author: Cindy Steenekamp,Pierre Toit

SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER

The evolution of support for democratic regime principles and

its alternatives*

Cindy Steenekamp

1

|Pierre du Toit

2

1

Stellenbosch University, Centre for

International and Comparative Politics,

Matieland, South Africa

2

Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch

University, Matieland, South Africa

Correspondence

Cindy Steenekamp, Centre for International

and Comparative Politics, Stellenbosch

University, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602

South Africa.

Email: cindylee@sun.ac.za

The aim of this paper is to examine the claim that “most people in almost every country world-

wide prefer democracy over other types of regimes”against new data, so as to add to the global

map of popular perceptions about their support for various regime types. We describe measured

changes in levels of public support in 49 countries over four waves of the World Values Survey on

three levels: country specific, regional–continental, and global. We found that levels of support

for democracy are high and stable across most parts of the world; however, support for various

alternate (authoritarian) regime types is steadily increasing and could threaten the extent to

which democratic values are entrenched, especially in younger democracies. We conclude with

an overview of some of the factors that could plausibly shape such perceptions at the level of

the general citizenry.

1|INTRODUCTION

Confidence in the virtues of democracy and about its popular endorse-

ment as a regime type in competition with its alternatives is wavering

among some opinion leaders (Plattner, 2015, pp. 5–10), and possibly

also among the general citizenry of democracies and non‐democracies

alike. This is not the first time that concerns about this regime type

have gained expression, and the contemporary mood bears resem-

blance to some of the earliest doubts about the inherent resilience of

democratic regimes.

It is generally understood that in democratic regimes, the final,

decisive decision‐making power in public affairs is vested not with

the rulers but with the ruled. This defining structural arrangement is

legitimized mostly from any combination of either tradition, rational

deliberation, and/or ideology. This structural distribution of power also

gives rise to another defining feature of the process of democracy:

support is acquired by persuading and not by commanding (Finer,

1997, pp. 46–47).

Whether institutional rules could be found to provide a stable

basis for democratic regimes has been in doubt from its early appli-

cation in the Greek polis, with the first and primary set of weak-

nesses were seen to derive from inherent structural design

features. In the classic typology of regimes presented by Aristotle,

every regime type, including that of democracy, was presented in

both its virtuous form, where rule was to the benefit of all, and in

its degenerate form, where rulers exercised power to their own ben-

efit. In the case of democracy, degeneration was associated with

anarchy and chaos.

The second weakness was identified within the democratic pro-

cess. Democratic rulers are to proceed with popular support gained

through persuasion. This, in turn, is a function of the effective commu-

nication of arguments for or against certain policy choices over others.

Constructing telling arguments from given facts that are interwoven

into popular beliefs and convictions, and skillfully presented as being

the most beneficial and most attractive choice, is the practice and art

of rhetoric. Democratic pessimists held the view from early on that

those citizens over whom democrats rule are peculiarly vulnerable to

exploitation through devious rhetoric, which undermines the original

structural distribution of power between rulers and those over whom

they rule.

Taken together, the viability of democratic regimes was consid-

ered with some apprehension, given that many such poleis had

succumbed to their degenerate form (Finer, 1997, pp. 382–383). In

the words of S.E. Finer (1997, p. 46, 47), the following assessment

prevailed until about two centuries ago: “For rhetoric read demagogy,

for persuasion read corruption, pressure, intimidation, and falsification

of the vote. For meetings and assemblies, read tumult and riot. For

mature deliberation through a set of revising institutions, read self‐

division, inconstancy, slowness, and legislative and administrative stul-

tification. And for elections read factional plots and intrigues. These

features…were what gave the term ‘Republic’a bad name, but made

‘Democracy’an object of sheer horror.”

*This joint research project was supported by the Marianne and Marcus

Wallenberg Foundation in Sweden. The authors gratefully acknowledge their

financial support (MMW2012.0215).

Received: 12 December 2016 Accepted: 30 December 2016

DOI 10.1002/pa.1644

J Public Affairs. 2017;17:e1644.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1644

Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of12