The Evolution of Corporate Cash

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12316
AuthorMark T. Leary,John R. Graham
Date01 December 2018
Published date01 December 2018
IN THIS ISSUE:
Corporate
Governance
and Short-
Termism
8Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some oughts
Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago
19 Who Are the Short-Termists?
Wei Jiang, Columbia University
27 Corporate Short-Termism and How It Happens
Greg Milano, Fortuna Advisors
36 e Evolution of Corporate Cash
John R. Graham, Duke University and NBER, and Mark T. Leary, Washington University
in St. Louis and NBER
61 Do Staggered Boards Matter for Firm Value?
Yakov Amihud, New York University; Markus Schmid, University of St. Gallen;
and Steven Davidoff Solomon, University of California Berkeley
78 e Market Price of Managerial Indiscretions
Brandon N. Cline, Mississippi State University; Ralph A. Walkling, Drexel University;
and Adam S. Yore, University of Missouri
89 How Have Green Companies Fared in Transactions with Banks?
A Stakeholder-Management Perspective
Dawei Jin, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Liuling Liu, Bowling Green State
University; Jun Ma, Tsinghua University; Haizhi Wang, Illinois Institute of Technology;
and Desheng Yin, East China Normal University
VOLUME 30
NUMBER 4
FALL 2018
APPLIED
CORPORATE FINANCE
Journal of
36 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 30 Number 4 Fall 2018
T
While these st udies provide helpful insights, to fully under-
stand what is dierent about today’s cash policies and the
likely causes of cha nges in corporate ca sh over time, it is
important to put the recent trends in historica l perspec-
tive. In a study published recently in e Re view of Financial
Studies, we gathered data on U.S. companies going back to
1920 to provide a perspective that encompasses almost a
century of corporate cash and liquidity management. And
in the pages that follow, we summarize the main  ndings
of this study.
One of our most notable findings has been the
substantial va riation in cash holdings over the past centur y
that can be seen in Figure 1 (on the next page). Today’s
high average cash ba lances were also experienced in the
1940s. These peaks were sandw iched between decade s
when the average cash-to-assets ratio was less t han half
what it is today. At the same time, it’s interesting to note
that the aggregate, or total, cash holdings of U.S. public
companies behaved dierent ly than their average balances.
In particula r, aggregate cash d id not increase as rapidly
as average cash during the 1980s and 1990s. And today’s
aggregate holdings a re not much higher than they were
during the 1920s, though they rose shar ply in the ’30s a nd
’40s before falling during the midd le of the century. is
begs the question of whether these sh ifts in cash holdings are
attributable to deliberate changes in corporate cash polic y
during the last 100 years —or to changes in macroeconomic
conditions or in the kinds of companies going a nd staying
public over that time.
To understand these changing patterns in cash holdings,
we performed separate “cross-sectional” and “time-series”
analyses that led to several new insights. First,cross-sectional
patterns in cash holdings—that is, comparisons among
dierent kinds of companies in a given year—have been very
stable over the past 90 years. e kinds of companies that
have operated with high cash-to-assets ratios in recent years—
riskier companies with growth opportunities and little if any
prots or use of debt—have had large cash holdings in nearly
every decade during the last century. And the same stability
is true among companies holding low amounts of cash. As in
the past, relatively low-growth and low-risk public companies
producing steady income and cash have continued to operate
with lower levels of cash.
But even with these stable cross-sectional relationships,
by John R. Graham, Duke University and NBER, and Mark T. Leary, Washington University in St. Louis and NBER*
he large increase in the cash balances of U.S. public companies in recent years
has garnered much attention in both the academic literature and popular press.
Several explanations have been proposed for this apparent shift in corporate policies.
Some studies have suggested that the riskiness of corporate cash ows has increased over time.1
Others have focused on changes in the nature of corporate assets and in the kinds of compa-
nies that go public.
2
And still others have examined the effect of U.S. repatriation tax law in
trapping foreign cash abroad.3
e Evolution of Corporate Cash
*This is a shorter, less technical version of the ar ticle that was published in The Re-
view of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 8, 2018, pp. 4288-4344.
We thank Alon Brav, Murillo Campello, Ian Dew-Becker, Amy Dittmar, Ran Duchin,
Mike Faulkender, Michelle Hanlon, Andrew Karolyi (editor), Lil Mills, Michael Roberts,
Rene Stulz, and Shawn Thomas; two anonymous referees; and seminar participants at
the AFA annual meeting, Amsterdam, BI Norwegian Business School, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Duke, HBS, LBS, LSE, Maryland, Michigan, Michigan State, Missouri, South
Florida, Temple, Wharton School of Business, and the University of Pennsylvania Law
School for helpful comments. We also thank Song Ma and Steve Sims for excellent re-
search assistance. Send correspondence to John Graham, Fuqua School of Business,
100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, telephone: 919-660-7857. Email: john.gra-
ham@duke.edu.
1 See Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Full citations of all studies are provided in the
References at the end of the article.
2 See Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim (2013); Booth and Zhou (2013); and Begenau
and Palazzo (2017).
3 See Faulkender, Hankins, and Petersen (2018).

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