The Energy Transition and Support for the Radical Right: Evidence from the Netherlands

• Published date: 01 February 2025
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237468
• Author: Erik Voeten
• Date: 01 February 2025

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2025, Vol. 58(2) 394–428

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140241237468

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The Energy Transition

and Support for the

Radical Right: Evidence

from the Netherlands

Erik Voeten

1



Abstract

Energy transition policies often have distributional effects that could have

electoral consequences. I study this issue in the context of a Dutch policy

change that increased taxes on household natural gas consumption and re-

distributed the revenues as subsidies for renewables. Radical right parties

were the only source of political opposition. A Differences-in-Differences

(DiD) analysis with panel data from 2007-2020 shows that after the policy

change renters with individualized utility bills became 5–6 percentage points

more likely to vote for the radical right compared to renters with utilities

included in their rents. Renters with individualized utility bills also became

relatively less sympathetic towards the Green party and more concerned

about price increases but they did not alter their left-right self-placements nor

their views on immigration or the European Union. A secondary analysis finds

similar effects for individuals (including home-owners) who are energy poor.

This suggests an emerging economically rooted political cleavage over energy

transition policies.

Keywords

energy transition, climate change, radical right

1

Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Erik Voeten, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government,

Georgetown University, 3600 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20057-0004, USA.

Email: ev42@georgetown.edu

Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article

Introduction

Radical right

1

politicians in advanced democracies frequently deride climate

policies for unjustly rewarding elites at the expense of those struggling to

make ends meet. Long-time Brexiteer Nigel Farage launched his “Vote Power,

Not Poverty”campaign toeliminate theVAT on household energy billsand

renewable energy subsidies that “are shoveled straight into the bank accounts

of rich landowners, wealthy investors and foreign-owned conglomerates.”

2

Former U.S. President Donald Trump accused his successor of ”letting the

radical climate extremists run our country”and driving up energy prices.

3

The

radical right AfD in Germany longstanding opposition to climate policies

appears to have led to substantial gains in opinion polls and local elections

after controversy over a law mandating a transition to electric heatpumps.

4

During her 2022 Presidential run, Marine LePen promised to radically reduce

VAT taxes on fuel and electricity and end wind and solar subsidies.

5

Despite ample anecdotal evidence that opposition to the economic effects

of climate policies has become a core component of many radical right party

platforms we know relatively little about whether energy transition policies

that impose costs on subgroups of voters have electoral consequences. The

literature has primarily focused on immigration, xenophobia, anti-elitism, and

anti-globalization sentiments as drivers for the radical right’s electoral support

in advanced industrial democracies. While radical right politicians sometimes

frame climate issues in terms of their general distrust in science, elites, and

globalism, their platforms prominently highlight the distributive conse-

quences of energy transition policies. This could attract new voters who are

especially sensitive to energy costs, thus potentially allowing radical right

parties to expand their support coalitions. However, opposition to climate

change policies could also backfire in countries where the public over-

whelmingly favors strong climate change action.

This article evaluates the electoral consequences of a Dutch policy change

that increased taxes on household natural gas consumption and redistributed

the revenues as subsidies for renewable energy and efficiency improvements.

As a result, household natural gas prices increased by 46% and around 20% of

Dutch home owners installed rooftop solar panels. Yet the policy also had

clear and predictable redistributive consequences: Household energy taxes are

regressive whereas subsidies primarily went to homeowners who could fi-

nance solar panel installations and energy saving measures. All mainstream

parties supported the policy; leaving the radical right parties as the only vocal

opponents.

I use a Differences-in-Differences (DiD) design with the LISS panel data

from 2007–2020 to examine whether voters who were more affected by

household energy price changes became more likely to switch allegiances

towards the radical right. Economic voting is most likely when voters see a

Voeten 395

clear link between policies, platforms, and their own economic circumstances.

Renters whose monthly rent includes gas, water, and electricity (GWE) are

less likely to be aware of household electricity prices, may be less affected by

price changes if landlords do not fully pass on price increases, and are less

likely to make uncomfortable and potentially stressful changes to their lives in

order to save on energy expenses. Moreover, these renters are unlikely to

benefit from solar subsidies as their landlords have few incentives to invest in

energy savings. The radical right’s arguments should thus most appeal to this

group.

Before the policy change, renters whose rent included and excluded

utilities did not differ in their proclivities to favor the radical right. After the

policy change, renters with individualized utilities bills became about six

percentage points more likely to vote for the radical right; a substantively

important effect in the context of a proportional representation system. This

effect is only significant among renters with household incomes below the

median. Renters with separate utilities bills also became relatively less

sympathetic towards the Green party and more concerned about price in-

creases but they did not alter their left-right self-placements nor their views on

immigration or the European Union. An extended analysis finds smaller but

significant effects for all individuals (including home-owners) who classify as

“energy poor,”namely people who spend at least 10% of their disposable

household income on household energy or who have struggled to pay their

utility bills or heat their homes.

These findings suggest that politicizing the energy transition may be an

effective tool for expanding electoral appeal beyond anti-immigration and

anti-globalization sentiments. Yet, in the Netherlands and much of Europe,

opposition to climate policies has become a fringe position. It is plausible that

the radical right also lost support from less energy-sensitive voters and this

study presents some suggestive evidence for this. There is a fundamental

tension in many European countries between overwhelming popular support

for government action on climate change and the unpopularity of policies that

increase energy prices. The redistributive consequences of some energy

transition policies may result in economically rooted political cleavages over

climate policies. The conclusion returns to this broader issue and examines the

scope conditions that may have exacerbated the electoral effects of the Dutch

policy change.

The next section reviews what we know about popular support for energy

transition policies and the radical right. The article then derives hypotheses

and provides background on the Dutch case. The next sections introduce the

empirical strategy and the data before discussing the results from descriptive

analyses and DiD regressions. The conclusion speculates on the general-

izeability of the findings and the potential implications for designing energy

transition policies.

396 Comparative Political Studies 58(2)