The energy-insurgency revolution nexus: an introduction to issues and policy options.

• Author: Sullivan, Paul
• Position: Economics and Energy

Energy systems can be an integral part of the initiation of insurgencies and revolutions. Their quality and reliability may be causative factors in some instances and contributory factors in others. Energy systems are systems within systems nested in other systems, so the effect of an attack on a fuel source or parts of an energy system may have more far-reaching effects than initially expected. This article will look at various energy systems and fuels, as well as some of the systems attached to them, including communications, transportation, water, and food. It will also look at examples of attacks on energy systems and why they may occur and by whom during times of conflict. There is a discussion of how a country could use energy to help reduce the chances of further conflict in the initial post-conflict environment. Energy policy options for a government wishing to stay in power, both pre- and post-conflict, are presented. (1)

ENERGY AS A WEAPON; ENERGY AS LEVERAGE

Energy can be used as a weapon of conflict and war, and can allow parties involved in conflict to gain leverage over their adversaries by controlling parts, or all of, energy systems. To understand modern conflict, including many recent insurgencies and revolutions around the world, an understanding of the integral role of energy is necessary. Energy systems are systems within systems nested in other systems. The electricity network is an example of an energy system. It is connected with the systems that are used to discover, produce, process, and transport oil, gas, coal, and other fuels. The electricity system is also connected to systems in order to produce wind, solar, geothermal, and other energy and generating systems. Importantly, the various stages of the oil, gas, coal, and other fuel industries, need electricity. Gas stations do not work without electricity, for example. Systems related to transportation, communications, water, finance, governance, health, education, and more require that their connected energy systems are working properly and developed sufficiently. A country or an area with a serious problem with electricity production cannot develop as well as one that has a sufficient, reliable, and growing electricity system. Given that energy systems are connected to and nested within other systems, when they are attacked, the results can affect much more than just the targeted energy system. Attacking a major oil refinery in a country that relies heavily on the gasoline, diesel, and petrochemicals feedstock that are produced in that refinery could be a blow to that country's economic security. Because of this, energy systems are a source of both power and weakness for any regime. They are a source of economic and political power when they are working well and the money from them is flowing to those who have clout within the status quo. They are a source of weakness, however, when insurgents or revolutionaries start successfully targeting them or find the means to take them over.

Energy subsidies and other distortions can play into the hands of combatants. (2) Fuel smuggling is often the result of price differences across states, and the revenues from smuggling can finance insurgencies, revolutions, and terrorism. When a country is coming out of a revolution, insurgency, or other conflict, it needs to not only develop energy systems that will increase its citizens' human capacity, but to also focus on creating energy equality within the country. One source of conflict is inequality in access to energy or corruption associated with energy revenues and control over energy systems. Ridding a country of energy corruption and inequality, and developing energy systems and the systems associated with them for human development has the potential to help a country take big steps towards being more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. A systems-within-systems view is required not only during the conflict, but after it. (3)

OIL AND REFINED PRODUCTS

The processes for exploring, extracting, processing, and moving oil are complex, and are open to exploitation and damage by groups with nefarious purposes. (4) In many developing countries where insurgencies have occurred, or may occur, oil and refined products are transported by truck, sometimes in long convoys and over long distances. These convoys carrying volatile and explosive fuels can be an easy target for rebels and combatants in conflict and war. Truck convoys can be hijacked or smuggled as a source of funds. Additionally, the fuels in these trucks and convoys can be used as weapons. Large gasoline transport trucks often carry upwards of 5,000-9,000 gallons of gasoline, representing substantial explosive capacity. (5) Even small amounts of gasoline would be enough to cause significant damage. Consider the damage done by petrol bombs, often referred to as Molotov cocktails, which contain only a small bottle's worth of gasoline or other incendiary liquid, such as alcohol. Gasoline Molotov cocktails have been used in wars and insurrections since the adaptation of gasoline as an energy source. From the Spanish Civil War to the Irish Republican Army, to the Arab Spring and beyond, small amounts of gasoline have been used by revolutionaries and insurgents as a weapon of choice. (6)

It can be quite dangerous to move large amounts of gasoline with insurgents and terrorists nearby. One out of every eight casualties for the U.S. Army in the Afghan and Iraq wars has been incurred moving fuel in convoys. (7) In Afghanistan in 2007 there was one casualty in every twenty-four convoy missions carrying fuel. The governments of Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya are also quite concerned about terror attacks on fuel trucks. (8) Attacks on fuel storage is another weapon extremists can use. (9) Taking out the sources of fuel for an enemy is a strategy as old as war itself, whether it was horse feed, food for troops, or gasoline and diesel.

Pipelines are another common way of transporting these fuels. These pipelines are vulnerable and are attacked regularly in conflict areas. (10) Oil and refined products can also be siphoned off the pipelines by cutting into them and attaching spigots to the pipelines. This is commonly known as "bunkering." Rebel groups and other combatants are able to use siphoning to fuel their transport and products for weapons. (11) Nigerian insurgents are well known for bunkering oil by setting up taps on pipelines, resulting in billions of dollars lost from Nigeria's economy each year. (12)

When combatants hit pipelines, trucks, and ships exporting fuel, a country can lose considerable export revenues. Attacks on pipelines and trucks have occurred many times in Iraq, for example. (13) Export revenues generally go to the central or regional governments, and reducing revenues to these governments can substantially weaken them. Elence, export facilities are appealing targets for control or damage by insurgents and revolutionaries.

The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other insurgent groups in the region have taken over oil fields, tried to take over major refineries, and have set up backyard and makeshift oil refineries to produce diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil. (14) Insurgents in Iraq against the coalition forces in the 2003 war obtained much of their funding from smuggling cheap Iraqi gasoline and diesel to neighboring countries until the prices for the fuels became closer to the regional norms in 2007. It is not difficult to imagine potential high-impact attacks on other major infrastructure in unstable areas, such as the Suez Canal and other pipeline systems, refineries, and more. (15)

Oil pipelines, refineries, oil-gas-water separation systems, and even oil rigs, are heavily dependent on data. Oil pipeline systems and rail systems use Supervisory Control And Data Analysis (SCADA) systems. Even many road transport systems for oil are data driven, and if the data are damaged or unreachable, the transport system can go down. (16) Saudi Aramco, also known as the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, was hit by a computer virus in 2012 directed at its SCADA systems. (17) Oil rigs are also vulnerable. (18) According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, most of their recorded industrial cyber attacks have been on energy systems, including on oil systems. All have been directed at where the information technology connects with the operational technology of the energy systems. (19)

NATURAL GAS

Natural gas is transported either by pipeline in its gaseous form, or by truck or ship as liquefied natural gas (LNG). Gas pipelines, as with oil and refined products pipelines, are vulnerable to attack, especially if they run above ground by truck, train, boat, or ship as liquefied gas, or through conflict areas. For instance, there have been many attacks on natural gas pipelines in Egypt, both during and after the recent revolution. Gas pipeline attacks have also happened in Syria and Algeria. (20) Other examples of attacks on gas pipelines can be found in Baluchistan where Baluchi rebels fight for greater autonomy within the states they inhabit, especially Pakistan. (21) Pipelines that have been attacked are almost always above ground and less protected than they should be. The attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria in 2013 was not onlv a direct attack on the production of natural gas in Algeria by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, but also a direct attack on the economy of Algeria, and on the credibility of the government. (22) The group that attacked this facility seemed to want to show that even the most important energy facilities in Algeria could not be protected by the government. The sense of insecurity in the country surely increased after that. (23)

LNG trucks and train cars are also vulnerable to exploitation as explosive devices, but there needs to be a near exact mix of oxygen and natural gas for LNG to become combustible. If a missile were to...