The End of the Affair.

• Author: Carpenter, Ted Galen

It would seem self-evident that wise leaders should always seek to maintain the maximum degree of flexibility and choice in foreign policy. Commitments and strategies that may make sense under one set of conditions can become obsolete and even counterproductive when circumstances change. Therefore, it is imprudent and potentially dangerous to lock one's country into a set of rigid, long-term obligations.

Unfortunately, NATO is the premier example of a willingness--indeed eagerness--to violate that important principle, NATO was an institution to deal with the Cold War; it is not only obsolete for the conditions of the twenty-first century, it has become a dangerous albatross around the neck of the American republic. U.S. leaders continue going out of their way to limit America's policy options in order to "reassure" a growing roster of European security dependents that the United States remains willing to incur any risk and pay any price to protect them, no matter how trivial and vulnerable they might be. That policy badly needs to change.

Rigid and/or obsolete commitments have caused problems for great powers throughout history. Perhaps the most tragic example occurred during the years leading up to World War I. Europe's major countries had divided themselves into rival security blocs, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. When tensions soared in 1914 following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, those alliances transformed an emotional, but limited, dispute between Austria and tiny Serbia into a continental crisis. Today's NATO is the potential incubator of a similar catastrophe.

The fear of being locked into unjustified and potentially dangerous security commitments was a key reason why America's founders were so averse to "entangling alliances." In his Farewell Address, George Washington made an important distinction between permanent and temporary alliances. He asserted that the United States should "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Such obligations would tie the republic to partners for unforeseen contingencies far into the future. Conversely, Washington acknowledged that "we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extra-ordinary emergencies." It was an astute distinction that in no way reflected the simplistic notion of "isolationism." Instead, his strategy embodied the principle of selectivity, and it expressed a shrewd note of caution that is even more relevant today than it was in Washington's time, NATO has become the ultimate permanent alliance, with all the defects and perils of such an arrangement.

Later influential American political figures echoed Washington's admonition to preserve the maximum degree of choice and flexibility in U.S. foreign policy. Both in his Senate speeches opposing ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, and in his subsequent book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, Senator Robert A. Taft stressed those points. He dubbed his approach the policy of "the free hand." That standard also should be the core principle of U.S. policy toward Europe in the twenty-first century.

A more limited, flexible approach would not imply U.S. indifference to geostrategic developments in Europe. It certainly would not be based on the silly notions that knee-jerk advocates of the policy status quo habitually trot out--the canard that a more selective strategy amounts to "isolationism," or "turning our backs on the world," or renouncing all aspects of "U.S. leadership." It is long past time to move the NATO policy debate beyond such overwrought, mind-numbing cliches and discuss meaningful policy choices.

Unfortunately, pro-NATO types cling ever more tenaciously to an outdated status quo. Indeed, many of them express a sneering resentment toward the mere suggestion that NATO has outlived its usefulness or that Americans should consider alternative policies. There is a worrisome degree of group-think and a herd mentality in favor of the alliance within both the U.S. foreign policy community and most of the media. Such a phenomenon is unhealthy with respect to any policy debate, but it is especially so regarding the future of U.S. security policy toward Europe. Continuing the blunders that have marked Washington's European policies since the demise of the Soviet Union is not only wasteful but increasingly dangerous. Rote invocations of the alleged need for an endless U.S. commitment to NATO do not change that reality.

It is imperative to overcome the stifling influence of stale thinking and vested interests regarding NATO. Article V is a de facto automatic commitment to go to war if an ally (however minor or strategically irrelevant) becomes embroiled in an armed conflict, and such an obligation is more imprudent than ever before. The costs and risks of Washington's security obligations to its European allies now substantially outweigh any existing or potential benefits. When a great power reaches that point with regard to any policy, the need for drastic change becomes urgent. America's NATO commitment has arrived at that point. U.S. leaders must craft a more nuanced and selective security relationship between the United States and Europe.

A fresh strategy would embody several...