The Elastic Ceiling: Gender and Professional Career in Chinese Courts

Published date01 March 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12249
Date01 March 2017
The Elastic Ceiling: Gender and Professional
Career in Chinese Courts
Chunyan Zheng
Jiahui Ai
Sida Liu
Since the 1990s, the number of women in Chinese courts has been increasing
steadily. Many women judges have risen to mid-level leadership positions,
such as division chiefs and vice-chiefs, in the judicial bureaucracy. However, it
remains difficult for women to be promoted to high-level leadership positions,
such as vice-presidents and presidents. What explains the stratified patterns
of career mobility for women in Chinese courts? In this article, we argue that
two social processes are at work in shaping the structural patterns of gender
inequality: dual-track promotion and reverse attrition. Dual-track promotion
is dominated by a masculine and corrupt judicial culture on the political track
that prevents women from obtaining high-level promotions, but still allows
them to rise to mid-level leadership positions on the professional track based
on their expertise and work performance. Reverse attrition enables women to
take vacant mid-level positions left by men who exit the judiciary to pursue
other careers. Takentogether, the vertical and horizontal mobility of judges in
their career development presents a processual logic to gender inequality and
shapes women’s structural positions in Chinese courts, a phenomenon that we
term the “elastic ceiling.”
Gender inequality is a highly stable social structure, but it is
produced and reproduced in dynamic social processes. In the
early twenty-first century, the feminization of the legal profession
has become a worldwide phenomenon (Kay and Gorman 2008;
Michelson 2013; Schultz and Shaw 2003). It is happening not
only in law schools and law firms (Epstein 1981; Hagan and Kay
1995; Mertz 2007; Reichman and Sterling 2004) but also in
The authors thank Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Ira Belkin, Hae Yeon Choo, Jerome A.
Cohen, Thomas Kellogg, Ji Li, Ling Li, Benjamin L. Liebman, Neysun Mahboubi, Marga-
ret K. Lewis, Carl Minzner, Xiaolong Peng, Debra Schleef, Gay W. Seidman, Hilary Som-
merlad, Lillian Hsiao-Ling Su, Juan Wang, Chi Yin, and anonymous reviewers of the Law
&Society Review for their helpful comments, as well as our students, especially Wei Xing,
for their excellent research assistance during fieldwork.
The three authors contributed equally to the article.
Please direct all correspondence to Sida Liu, Department of Sociology, University
of Toronto, 725 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2J4, Canada; e-mail:
sd.liu@utoronto.ca
Law &Society Review,Volume 51, Number 1 (2017)
V
C2017 Law and Society Association. All rights reserved.
168
courts (Schultz and Shaw 2013). The Anglo-American literature
on women judges, however, mostly focuses on judicial appoint-
ments and “feminist judging” (Beiner 2005; Kenney 2013;
Schultz and Shaw 2012; Solimine and Wheatley 1995). How
women navigate the hierarchical and bureaucratic judicial systems
of civil law jurisdictions remains a new territory in sociolegal
scholarship.
Chinese courts are no exception to the global trend of femini-
zation, though it is still at an early stage. Since the 1990s, the
numbers of women in law school classrooms and on the bench,
as well as in law firms, have been increasing steadily. In 2010,
there were approximately 45,000 female judges in China,
accounting for about a quarter of all judges in the country (Song
and Liu, forthcoming). By 2013, the number of female judges
had increased to about 57,200, or 28.8 percent of all Chinese
judges (National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Republic of China
2015). In younger cohorts of judges, the proportion of women is
even higher, exceeding half of assistant judges in many courts.
More importantly, many women judges have risen to mid-level
leadership positions in Chinese courts, such as division chiefs and
vice-chiefs, who are in charge of specialized divisions in the judi-
cial bureaucracy. However, it remains difficult for women to be
promoted to top leadership positions, such as vice-presidents and
presidents. In other words, despite the structural barriers and
workplace challenges that they face, women have at least weak-
ened the glass ceiling in the Chinese judicial system.
What explains the stratified patterns of career mobility for
women in Chinese courts? We argue that two social processes are
at work: (1) dual-track promotion, or vertical mobility in the judicial
and civil service bureaucracies; and, (2) reverse attrition, or hori-
zontal mobility between the judiciary and other professional
careers. First, personnel decisions in Chinese courts are subject to
close Party and administrative control, which creates two different
tracks of leadership promotion for mid-level and high-level posi-
tions. Women are not disadvantaged in the professional track of
promotion within the court, but they lack social and cultural capi-
tal in the political track that is dominated by local Party-state
leaders and a masculine and corrupt culture. Second, female
judges often assume mid-level leadership positions after male
judges in such positions resign to pursue other professional
careers, such as lawyers, in-house counsel, or other Party and
administrative positions. Taken together, the vertical and horizon-
tal mobility of judges in their professional career presents a proc-
essual logic to gender inequality and shapes women’s structural
positions in Chinese courts, a phenomenon that we term the
“elastic ceiling.” That is to say, the glass ceiling for women in the
Zheng, Ai, &Liu 169
judicial bureaucracy is not broken; instead, it is stretched to
become thicker, more elastic and hierarchical, and less visible.
Gendered Mobility in Professional Career: A Processual
Approach to Inequality
Since Epstein’s (1981) pioneering study Wome n in L aw,
research on gender inequality in the legal profession has docu-
mented extensively the structural and cultural barriers that wom-
en face in law firms and law school classrooms (e.g., Hagan and
Kay 1995; Mertz 2007; Reichman and Sterling 2004; see Kay
and Gorman [2008] for a review). These barriers include not
only income gaps between male and female lawyers (Dinovizer
and Hagan 2014; Dinovitzer, Reichman, and Sterling 2009; Dix-
on and Seron 1995) and sexual harassment in the workplace
(Rosenberg, Perlstadt, and Philips 1993; Sommerlad 2016) but
also their different chances of employment, promotion, and attri-
tion in career development (Epstein et al. 1995; Gorman 2005;
Hull and Nelson 2000; Kay 1997; Kay and Hagan 1998). By con-
trast, the existing scholarship on women judges has focused on
judicial appointments and “feminist judging” in Anglo-American
countries (Beiner 2005; Kenney 2013; Solimine and Wheatley
1995). Few studies have closely examined the social processes by
which women’s judicial careers are structured, particularly in
terms of promotion and attrition (but see Schultz and Shaw
[2013]).
To some extent, this research gap is owing to the fact that
judges in Anglo-American countries do not have a separate
career path from other legal professionals. Most judges, men or
women, began their legal careers as attorneys, prosecutors, or
legal academics. Then they were appointed to the bench only
after a long period of law practice. However, in civil law jurisdic-
tions ranging from Continental Europe to Latin America to East
Asia, judges and lawyers are separate career paths and the judi-
cial system is a highly sophisticated bureaucracy, closely con-
nected with but structurally distinct from the private bar (Abel
and Lewis 1989; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). Accordingly, the
career of women judges in these jurisdictions is not only a longer
path than legal careers in Anglo-American contexts but also a
more complicated one with many structural barriers, traps, and
glass ceilings.
How to study gender and professional career in such bureau-
cratic contexts? More specifically, for this study, how to explain
women’s limited success in getting promotion in Chinese courts?
The social science literature on gender provides at least four
170 The Elastic Ceiling

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