The Effects of Private Prison Confinement on Offender Recidivism
Author | Valerie Clark,Grant Duwe |
Published date | 01 September 2013 |
Date | 01 September 2013 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0734016813478823 |
Article
The Effects of Private Prison
Confinement on Offender
Recidivism: Evidence
From Minnesota
Grant Duwe
1
and Valerie Clark
1
Abstract
Evidence has been mixed as to whether private prisons are more effective than state-operated facil-
ities in reducing recidivism. This study analyzes whether private prison confinement in Minnesota has
had an impact on recidivism by examining 3,532 offenders released from prison between 2007 and
2009. Propensity score matching was used to individually match a comparison group of 1,766
inmates who had only been confined in state-run facilities with 1,766 offenders who had served time
in a private prison facility. Using multiple measures of recidivism and private prison confinement, 20
Cox regression models were estimated. The results showed that offenders who had been incarcer-
ated in a private prison had a greater hazard of recidivism in all 20 models, and the recidivism risk
was significantly greater in 8 of the models. The evidence presented in this study suggests that pri-
vate prisons are not more effective in reducing recidivism, which may be attributable to fewer visita-
tion and rehabilitative programming opportunities for offenders incarcerated at private facilities.
Keywords
corrections, institutional corrections, corrections, evaluation research, other
The number of private prisons has risen dramatically over the past three decades. Private corpora-
tions had only a limited role in corrections at the beginning of the 1980s, providing food service and
health care, among other services (Selman & Leighton, 2010). By 2005, private corporations oper-
ated 415 prison facilities in addition to providing other prison services to public facilities (Stephan,
2008). Determinate sentencing practices and the war on drugs led to unprecedented prison popula-
tion growth, which outpaced the capacity of U.S. prisons (Austin & Coventry, 2001; Selman &
Leighton, 2010). Thus, state and federal correctional agencies looked to private facilities for bed
space. Additionally, the political climate during the 1980s fostered a movement toward privatizing
many government functions, including corrections (Austin & Coventry, 2001).
1
Minnesota Department of Corrections, St. Paul, MN, USA
Corresponding Author:
Grant Duwe, Minnesota Department of Corrections, 1450 Energy Park Drive, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA.
Email: grant.duwe@state.mn.us
Criminal Justice Review
38(3) 375-394
ª2013 Georgia State University
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0734016813478823
cjr.sagepub.com
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of adult correctional facilities rose by 9%, and private facil-
ities accounted for nearly all of this increase. Of the 153 new prison facilities built during this time
period, 151 were private (Stephan, 2008). State prisoners have accounted for most of the growth in
the number of offenders housed in private prisons over the past decade (Sabol, Minton, & Harrison,
2007). Despite the rapid increase in the number of private facilities and privately housed offenders
over the past three decades, inmates held in private facilities still make up only a small percentage of
all prisoners. Offenders confined in private facilities account for 8%of all prisoners; more than 16%
of all federal prisoners are held in private facilities, while nearly 7%of all state prisoners are in
private facilities (West, Sabol, & Greenman, 2010).
The debate over whether to privatize more prisons has become a fixture in many state budget
negotiations. The main argument used in favor of prison privatization is that private institutions are
more efficient. More than 30 cash-strapped states have turned to private prisons under the assump-
tion that they provide the same services and produce better recidivism rates for less money than pub-
lic facilities (Oppel, 2011). Proponents of private prisons have claimed as much as 20%in savings
over state-run prisons. The difference in price, they argue, comes from the use of nonunion workers,
which gives them more control over wages and benefits. Further, the desire to maintain high profit
margins gives private prison corporations an incentive to act more efficiently (Cheung, 2004).
Opponents of prison privatization argue that claims made in favor of this movement lack evi-
dence (Cheung, 2004; Government Accounting Office [GAO], 1996; Selman & Leighton, 2010).
Due to data limitations, as well as misleading use of data, few studies have provided convincing
evidence to support the claim that private prisons provide the same or better services for less money
(GAO, 1996). All the while, private prisons generally accept only minimum or medium-security
offenders with few or no health and behavioral problems (Arizona Department of Corrections,
2011; Oppel, 2011).
In addition to the lack of savings, opponents of privatization cite evidence showing that private
prisons are poorly run compared to public prisons (Cheung, 2004). Austin and Coventry (2001)
found a higher rate of inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults at privately run facilities
compared to public facilities. However, other measures of inmate misconduct, including riots and
other inmate-led disturbances, are comparable.
More recently, many states and the federal government have scaled back their reliance on private
facilities (Cook, 2010; Shelden, 2010). Declining incarceration rates across several states has created
less demand for bed space. Further, the Great Recession and budget crises have forced several states
to crowd more prisoners into less space. Private facilities in a handful of states, including Minnesota,
now sit vacant (Cook, 2010; Shelden, 2010).
Present Study
Prior to 2010, when prison population growth created shortages in prison beds at state facilities, the
Minnesota Department of Corrections (MnDOC) frequently housed some of its inmates at the Prairie
Correctional Facility (PCF) in Appleton, Minnesota. The facility, which opened in 1996, once held
as many as 1,200 Minnesota state prisoners (Havens & Giles, 2009). Operated by Corrections Cor-
poration of America, a private prison company, PCF closed in February 2010 due, in part, to slowed
growth in Minnesota’s prison population, which minimized the need to transfer offenders to non-
MnDOC facilities.
This study evaluated whether private prison confinement had an impact on recidivism among
inmates released from Minnesota prisons between 2007 and 2009. Of the 9,535 offenders incarcer-
ated in MnDOC facilities and released to the community during the 2007–2009 period, 1,766 (19%)
spent at least a portion of their confinement at PCF. Due to eligibility criteria offenders had to meet
in order to be transferred to PCF, we used propensity score matching (PSM) to individually match
376 Criminal Justice Review 38(3)
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