The Effectiveness of Coethnic Contact on Latino Political Recruitment

• Author: Stephen A. Nuño,Matt A. Barreto
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912909352774
• Published date: 01 June 2011
• Date: 01 June 2011
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly
64(2) 448 –459
The Effectiveness of Coethnic Contact
© 2011 University of Utah
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on Latino Political Recruitment
DOI: 10.1177/1065912909352774
http://prq.sagepub.com
Matt A. Barreto1 and Stephen A. Nuño2
Abstract
Since the 2000 presidential election, voter education and mobilization have witnessed a renaissance in targeted
contact and segmented messaging. Candidates, political parties, and interest groups have taken advantage of advances
in electronic databases to divide and subdivide the electorate into different groups and have different messages and
messengers for each subgroup of voters. This article takes up the question of whether or not personalized or segmented
contact during a campaign is more successful at convincing voters than “generic” contact or no contact at all. Using
data from a national survey of Latino registered voters in 2004, the authors examine the impact of being contacted
by a coethnic messenger on support for the Republican and Democratic Parties. While some previous studies have
examined voter turnout or vote choice, this article examines the deeper implications of coethnic contact, including
support for public policy and candidate favorability. The authors find that when Latinos were contacted by non-Latino
Republicans, they were significantly less likely to support Bush and Republican issues, but when Latinos were contacted
by Latino Republicans, they were significantly more likely to support Bush and Republican issues. Democratic contact
did not have a significant effect on support for Democratic policy, which remained very high among Latino voters.
Keywords
Latinos, partisanship, recruitment, Republicans, Democrats
Since the 2000 presidential election, voter education and
While some previous studies have examined the effect of
mobilization have witnessed a renaissance in targeted
mobilization on voter turnout (Michelson 2003; Ramírez
contact and segmented messaging. Candidates, political
2005, 2007) and to a lesser extent vote choice (Nuño
parties, and interest groups have taken advantage of
2007), this article is the first to examine the deeper impli-
advances in electronic databases to divide and subdivide
cations of coethnic contact, including support for public
the electorate into different groups and have different
policy and candidate affect.
messages for each subgroup of voters. For decades,
A significant advancement in targeted voter mobiliza-
scholars and practitioners have known that personalized
tion was marked in 2004. Steve Lombardo, a Republican
campaign appeals are more effective (e.g., Wolfinger
pollster who assisted the Bush–Cheney effort in 2004,
1965; Uhlaner 1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).
notes that “we’re going to a form of electronic retail poli-
Labor unions, religious leaders, military veterans, and
tics that’s more individualized than ever before. We see
racial and ethnic community leaders have typically been
companies doing that with relationship marketing. This is
used by campaigns to make a stronger, more personal-
about having an ongoing relationship and a conversation
ized, and perhaps more trusting connection with voters.
with my customer. And my customer is a voter” (Barnes
While nationwide and one-size-fits-all campaigns can be
2004, 3038). Despite these new efforts, little is known
cheaper and easier to implement, smaller, targeted cam-
about the effectiveness of targeted voter campaigns,
paigns might be more effective in winning the hearts and
especially among Latinos.
minds of voters. This article takes up the question of
whether or not personalized or segmented contact during
a campaign is more successful at convincing voters than
1University of Washington, Seattle
“generic” contact or no contact at all.
2Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff
Using data from a national survey of Latino registered
voters in 2004, we examine the impact of being contacted
Corresponding Author:
Matt A. Barreto, University of Washington, Department of Political
by a coethnic partisan messenger on support for presiden-
Science, Box 353530, Gowen 101, Seattle, WA 98115
tial candidate affect and support for public policy issues.
Email: mbarreto@washington.edu

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Barreto and Nuño
449
In short, we find that the Democratic Party continues
House of Representatives voted against the act. As a
to receive broad-based support from Latinos, and among
response, Latino leaders and Democrats helped push state
Democratic recruitment, neither Latino nor non-Latino
legislation in California restoring aid to those families
contact provided an additional effect in favor of the party.
who were no longer eligible for federal benefits. Because
Among Republicans, who have somewhat of an image
of the divisiveness of these issues, Latinos have been con-
problem with Latinos (see Segura, Falcon, and Pachon
sistent in their belief that the Democratic Party serves
1997; Fraga, Ramírez, and Segura 2004), coethnic out-
Latino interests better than the Republican Party (Leal
reach had a significant mobilizing effect on Latinos,
et al. 2005), and this has been reflected in their historical
while non-Latino (presumably Anglo) outreach had a sig-
voting patterns (DeSipio, de la Garza, and Leal 2009).
nificant negative effect on Latinos.
Many were hopeful of finally witnessing the emergence
of the sleeping giant, but while there was some increase in
Our Argument
voter registration and turnout in the late 1990s, Latino
participation continued to lag behind that of non-Latinos.
Underlying our argument is the importance of trust—trust
Why did Latinos not come out to vote in the numbers
between Latinos and the political system. The discussion
Latino leaders had hoped? One answer may be compla-
about Latino political behavior has focused primarily on
cency on the part of the political parties. The cost of
turnout. The 1990s brought to the forefront a particularly
recruiting new voters is prohibitive, and both parties may
viral dialogue about issues that disproportionately affected
have had different incentives for not reaching out to
Latinos, such as bilingual education, affirmative action,
Latino voters. While the raw number of Hispanics voting
and immigration. While politicians, such as California
increased from 1980 to 2004, from 2.5 million to 7.6 mil-
governor Pete Wilson, sought to use these issues to mobi-
lion, this is largely attributable to population and
lize the moderate to conservative white constituency, they
naturalization growth, not a deeper incorporation of Lati-
also succeeded in casting a shroud of intolerance over the
nos into the political system by the Democratic and
Republican Party. Several years after Wilson was out of
Republican Parties.1 For the Democrats, outreach may
office, Latinos still associated those negative attacks with
have been viewed as an inefficient use of funds since
Pete Wilson and Republicans (Fraga and Ramírez 2003;
(non-Cuban) Latinos who would come out to vote would
Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 2000). Not surprisingly,
pull the lever for Democrats regardless (DeSipio, de La
Michelson (2001) found that Latinos become increas-
Garza, and Leal 2009). Poor mobilization and incorpora-
ingly distrustful of the political system the longer they
tion of African Americans by the Democratic Party
are here and exposed to American politics. In a follow-up
follow similar arguments (Dawson 1994). On the other
study on political trust, Michelson (2003, 926) notes, “If
hand, the Republican Party saw little promise in convinc-
respondents have experienced discrimination or feel that
ing Latinos to vote for their candidate because they had
individuals of Mexican origin are targets of discrimina-
spent the better part of the last decade campaigning on
tion, then they are more likely to be cynical.” Further,
the backs of Latino issues. This is consistent with previ-
Pedraza (2009) has found that when Latinos perceive
ous findings by Leighley (2001) and de la Garza,
hostility toward their group, their political integration is
Menchaca, and DeSipio (1994), who find that traditional
slowed, even as acculturation increases.
campaigns ignored Latino voters. Without clear evidence
Wilson and the Republican Party eventually lost hold
that a strategy existed for winning over the hearts and
of power in California, but they retained the image of
minds of Latino voters, campaign strategists in both par-
intolerance in the eyes of many Latinos. At the same
ties focused on turning out their trusted constituency,
time, the national debate turned anti-immigrant with the
whites.
passage of the 1996 National Welfare Reform Act. Cham-
However, we believe focusing only on voter turnout
pioned by Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich,
confounds the answer to why Latinos have evidenced lower
the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, known as the Personal
levels of participation. Lower participation levels by
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA),
Latinos may be a function of their unique characteristics
disqualified many Latino immigrants from public benefits
in education, religion, language, and age, in which they
and portrayed Latinos as a drain on the American social
disproportionately represent the lower strata of the job
welfare system. Although President Bill Clinton signed
markets. These factors...