The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

• Author: Adrián Lucardi,Juan Pablo Micozzi
• Published date: 01 November 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12137
• Date: 01 November 2016

ADRI

AN LUCARDI

Instituto Tecnol

ogico Aut

onomo de M

exico

JUAN PABLO MICOZZI

Instituto Tecnol

ogico Aut

onomo de M

exico

The Effect of the Electoral

Calendar on Politicians’ Selection

into Legislative Cohorts and

Legislative Behavior in Argentina,

1983–2007

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians’ career strategies? Do politicians

behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar?

We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered elec-

toral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards

running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previ-

ous executive experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in

order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should

opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine

Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians’ career strategies?

Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities pro-

vided by the electoral calendar? In this article, we explore how a scattered

electoral calendar affects politicians’ career choices in a setting in which

legislators show little interest in re-election. Employing a simple

decision-theoretic model, we show that the combination of (1) politicians

with little interest in pursuing a legislative career—nonstatic ambition—

and (2) staggered membership renewal (SMR)—the fact that legislators

belonging to the same body are elected at different points in time (Goetz

et al. 2014)—can induce a self-selection process among ambitious politi-

cians who differ in their underlying quality. Specif‌ically, politicians with

previous executive experience have strong incentives to run for legislative

off‌ice in concurrent elections, while their less experienced peers are better

off by self-selecting into midterm elections. The electoral calendar should

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 41, 4, November 2016 811

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12137

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C2016 Washington University in St. Louis

also introduce systematic differences in behavior between different legis-

lative cohorts: legislators elected in midterm elections should submit

fewer bills—they have to spend more time campaigning—and be more

likely to seek re-election upon failing to win an executive position.

By studying the interplay between the electoral calendar and politi-

cians’ career strategies, we contribute to two different literatures. First,

political careers are important in their own right because ambition lies

“at the heart of politics” (Schlesinger 1966), and therefore politicians’

career choices can affect a variety of outcomes, including the delivery of

local goods (Ames 2001; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974), party discipline

(Cox and McCubbins 2005; Treul 2009), bill drafting (Crisp, Kanthak,

and Leijonhufvud 2004; Micozzi 2013; Schiller 1995; Van der Silk and

Pernacciaro 1979), cosponsorship decisions (Crisp et al. 2004; Micozzi

2014a), and how frequently legislators visit their home districts (Crisp

and Desposato 2004). Moreover, politicians’ decisions to seek re-

election or retire also affect voters’ chances of rewarding or punishing

incumbents in the voting booth (Powell 2000), and legislators are more

likely to create professionalized legislatures and invest in policy-making

skills if they have long time horizons (Squire 1988, 1998; Weingast and

Marshall 1988).

Second, we extend the existing literature on the effect of the stag-

gered electoral calendar on political outcomes. Recent studies have

shown that the electoral calendar can be used to detect electoral fraud

(Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011), shapes legislators’ time horizons (Dal

B

o and Rossi 2011; Fukumoto and Matsuo 2015; Goetz et al. 2014;

Titiunik 2016) and inf‌luences the allocation of funds between states

(Shepsle et al. 2009) as well as the cohesiveness of state delegations in

the national legislature (Rosas and Langston 2011). These contributions

trace the path of a growing research agenda, as SMR is a feature of more

than 15 upper houses around the world,

1

as well as the Argentine Cham-

ber of Deputies and several subnational legislatures in Argentina and the

United States. However, existing research has focused on the effect of the

electoral calendar on legislators’ behavior; the possibility that SMR might

also affect politicians’ career strategies has received little consideration.

2

This article f‌ills this gap by presenting a novel theoretical argument that

links the electoral calendar to career decisions and legislative behavior

and providing systematic evidence in favor of its implications.

In this respect, it is worth noting that the Argentine electoral calen-

dar can be treated as exogenous. Thus, our article joins a growing

literature that studies the impact of exogenous institutional rules on polit-

ical decisions. In a landmark contribution, Cox and Katz (2002) explain

how the reapportionment revolution changed incumbents’ decisions

812 Adri

an Lucardi and Juan Pablo Micozzi