The Effect of Migration on Political Support for Co-ethnics: Evidence From Turkey

• Author: Oguzhan Turkoglu,Miceal Canavan
• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211065421
• Published date: 01 May 2022
• Date: 01 May 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2022, Vol. 66(4-5) 867–898

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211065421

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The Effect of Migration on

Political Support for

Co-ethnics: Evidence From

Turkey

Miceal Canavan

1

and Oguzhan Turkoglu

2



Abstract

In recent years, a record number of people have been forcibly displaced or mi-

grated due to conflict. Whilst established political science research suggests that

displaced communities are an added risk factor for conflict due to their support for

extreme co-ethnic political parties and movements, this has been challenged by recent

research which shows that migrants can be a moderating force. We offer a potential

reconciliation of these divergent findings by distinguishing between first- and second-

generation migrants. Due to their relative lack of conflict exposure, second-generation

migrants will have significantly less support for co-ethnic political parties than first-

generation migrants and those who remain. We test our argument using granular

survey data comparing Kurds who migrated out of the conflict zone in Turkey with

those who remained. The results support our theoretical framework and have im-

portant implications for our understanding of migrant attitudes and the long-term

effects of conflict exposure.

Keywords

migration, ethnic politics, conflict experience, internal armed conflict

1

Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

2

Hertie School, Berlin, Germany

Corresponding Author:

Miceal Canavan, Trinity College Dublin, 1 College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland.

Email: canavami@tcd.ie

As of 2019, there were an estimated 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide,

of which 45.7 million were internally displaced. This is almost double the same figure

in 2000, and alongside an ever increasing global migrant population, it has catalyzed a

significant interest in the political attitudes of these groups (Ozden et al. 2011,UNHCR

2020). Initial research suggested that migrant communities, particularly those displaced

due to conflict or oppression, were a radicalizing influence, financing co-ethnic rebel

groups, and providing political support to co-ethnics internationally and domestically

(Anderson 1998,Bock-Luna 2007,Collier and Hoeffler 2004,Gleditsch 2007,Roth

2015). Yet, the empirical support for these arguments has been often weak or partial,

rarely capturing representative individual-level variation in the attitudes of migrants

(Hall 2016). In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the peace-building

and moderating influence of migrant communities. Using more granular data, this

research shows that migrants appear to have less extreme views than those who remain,

provide greater support for nonviolent interventions and in countries which are not

suffering from conflict they may even help to strengthen democracy (Cochrane, Baser

and Swain 2009,Hall 2016,Hall 2018,Koinova 2011,P´

erez-Armend´

ariz and Crow

2010). Explanations for these divergent findings highlight the different groups of

migrants studied, the time period in which data was collected and, in particular, the

absence of “micro-level data necessary to validate claims about migrant attitudes”(Hall

2016).

In this paper, we attempt to provide some reconciliation of these competing per-

spectives by differentiating between first- and second-generation migrants. Focusing on

migrants who move away from conflict-afflicted regions and their descendants, we

argue that as a result of growing up away from conflict, second-generation migrants will

have weaker attachments to their ethnic group and thus lower support for co-ethnic

political parties than first-generation migrants and those who remain.

1

Conversely, first-

generation migrants and those who remain, grew up amidst inte rgroup conflict, and thus

will have similarly high levels of support for co-ethnic political parties, which endure

even after migration.

2

This granular comparison of subgroups within migrant pop-

ulations, and between migrant populations and those who remain, is made possible by a

rich and extensive dataset that was not available in previous studies.

The core argument of this paper is that the act of migration and resettlement in a new

community is not the primary determinant of migrant community attitudes towards

politics and conflict in their country of origin. For first-generation migrants, growing up

in an environment where there is ongoing intergroup conflict has hardened their at-

titudes. They maintain relatively strong support for the political objectives of their co-

ethnics, despite migration and resettlement. Conversely, second-generation migrants

have grown up in a relatively peaceful environment away from violent intergroup

conflict and therefore have weaker support for co-ethnic political parties. By taking into

account the differences between migrant generations and their variation in conflict

exposure, we are able to account for studies which claim diaspora communities exhibit

strong political support for co-ethnics and more recent studies that contradict these

findings.

868 Journal of Conflict Resolution 66(4-5)

We test our argument through an analysis of Kurdish migration patterns within

Turkey, comparing people who migrated out of the conflict zone with those who

remained. Using monthly survey data collected over 7 years, we have more than 20,

000 respondents and are therefore able to capture the differential effect of conflict

exposure and migration. We do this by splitting our sample into those who remain, first-

generation migrants, and second-generation migrants, something which has not been

done in any prior research, to our knowledge. We then use this data to analyze variation

in their support for the Kurdish nationalist party. The results indicate that whilst first-

generation migrants maintain similar attitudes to those who remain, second-generation

migrants have significantly less support for the Kurdish nationalist party. The results fit

with recent research which found that the effect of migration on the attitudes of first-

generation migrants towards political institutions in their place of origin is relatively

limited (Careja and Emmenegger 2012).

We also address a number of alternative explanations (particularly with respect to

socialization through education and language, and the level of intergroup contact),

potential issues raised by self-selection into migration, and employed coefficient

stability analysis to ensure our results are robust (Oster 2019). Our main results hold

through all these tests. Finally, in an exploratory analysis section, we show that this

theoretical framework extends to attitudes towards conflict resolution and identity, with

second-generation migrants demonstrating weaker Kurdish identity and greater support

for aggressive military action against co-ethnic rebel groups.

This article provides an important reconciliation of the competing perspectives

regarding the attitudes of migrants towards political conflict in their country of origin.

In doing so, it highlights the problems with treating migrant communities as a ho-

mogeneous block and the importance of integrating the different experiences of mi-

grants, particularly conflict exposure, into the theoretical framework. We also address a

number of methodological shortcomings in prior literature with a rich dataset which

allows us to use matching and a range of statistical models to ensure our results are

robust whilst also isolating the different attitudes of those who remain, first- and

second-generation migrants. Finally, the additional analysis of attitudes towards

identity and conflict resolution highlights the broader implications of our theoretical

framework and provides avenue for future research.

In the following section, we first describe the traditional nostalgia nationalism thesis

which argued that migrants hold extreme political attitudes before discussing more

recent research that challenges these findings. We then outline our theoretical

framework which provides a potential reconciliation by differentiating between first-

and second-generation migrants and integrating conflict exposure.

Understanding the Political Attitudes of Migrants

The scale of migration in the second half the 20

th

century has been unprecedented

(Marsella and Ring 2003). Alongside increased global interconnectedness, this has led

to large and influential migrant communities (Cohen 2008)

3

. Initial academic research

Canavan and Turkoglu 869