The Effect of Migration on Political Support for Co-ethnics: Evidence From Turkey
Author | Miceal Canavan,Oguzhan Turkoglu |
DOI | 10.1177/00220027211065421 |
Published date | 01 May 2022 |
Date | 01 May 2022 |
Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2022, Vol. 66(4-5) 867–898
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211065421
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The Effect of Migration on
Political Support for
Co-ethnics: Evidence From
Turkey
Miceal Canavan
1
and Oguzhan Turkoglu
2
Abstract
In recent years, a record number of people have been forcibly displaced or mi-
grated due to conflict. Whilst established political science research suggests that
displaced communities are an added risk factor for conflict due to their support for
extreme co-ethnic political parties and movements, this has been challenged by recent
research which shows that migrants can be a moderating force. We offer a potential
reconciliation of these divergent findings by distinguishing between first- and second-
generation migrants. Due to their relative lack of conflict exposure, second-generation
migrants will have significantly less support for co-ethnic political parties than first-
generation migrants and those who remain. We test our argument using granular
survey data comparing Kurds who migrated out of the conflict zone in Turkey with
those who remained. The results support our theoretical framework and have im-
portant implications for our understanding of migrant attitudes and the long-term
effects of conflict exposure.
Keywords
migration, ethnic politics, conflict experience, internal armed conflict
1
Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
2
Hertie School, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Miceal Canavan, Trinity College Dublin, 1 College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Email: canavami@tcd.ie
As of 2019, there were an estimated 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide,
of which 45.7 million were internally displaced. This is almost double the same figure
in 2000, and alongside an ever increasing global migrant population, it has catalyzed a
significant interest in the political attitudes of these groups (Ozden et al. 2011,UNHCR
2020). Initial research suggested that migrant communities, particularly those displaced
due to conflict or oppression, were a radicalizing influence, financing co-ethnic rebel
groups, and providing political support to co-ethnics internationally and domestically
(Anderson 1998,Bock-Luna 2007,Collier and Hoeffler 2004,Gleditsch 2007,Roth
2015). Yet, the empirical support for these arguments has been often weak or partial,
rarely capturing representative individual-level variation in the attitudes of migrants
(Hall 2016). In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the peace-building
and moderating influence of migrant communities. Using more granular data, this
research shows that migrants appear to have less extreme views than those who remain,
provide greater support for nonviolent interventions and in countries which are not
suffering from conflict they may even help to strengthen democracy (Cochrane, Baser
and Swain 2009,Hall 2016,Hall 2018,Koinova 2011,P´
erez-Armend´
ariz and Crow
2010). Explanations for these divergent findings highlight the different groups of
migrants studied, the time period in which data was collected and, in particular, the
absence of “micro-level data necessary to validate claims about migrant attitudes”(Hall
2016).
In this paper, we attempt to provide some reconciliation of these competing per-
spectives by differentiating between first- and second-generation migrants. Focusing on
migrants who move away from conflict-afflicted regions and their descendants, we
argue that as a result of growing up away from conflict, second-generation migrants will
have weaker attachments to their ethnic group and thus lower support for co-ethnic
political parties than first-generation migrants and those who remain.
1
Conversely, first-
generation migrants and those who remain, grew up amidst inte rgroup conflict, and thus
will have similarly high levels of support for co-ethnic political parties, which endure
even after migration.
2
This granular comparison of subgroups within migrant pop-
ulations, and between migrant populations and those who remain, is made possible by a
rich and extensive dataset that was not available in previous studies.
The core argument of this paper is that the act of migration and resettlement in a new
community is not the primary determinant of migrant community attitudes towards
politics and conflict in their country of origin. For first-generation migrants, growing up
in an environment where there is ongoing intergroup conflict has hardened their at-
titudes. They maintain relatively strong support for the political objectives of their co-
ethnics, despite migration and resettlement. Conversely, second-generation migrants
have grown up in a relatively peaceful environment away from violent intergroup
conflict and therefore have weaker support for co-ethnic political parties. By taking into
account the differences between migrant generations and their variation in conflict
exposure, we are able to account for studies which claim diaspora communities exhibit
strong political support for co-ethnics and more recent studies that contradict these
findings.
868 Journal of Conflict Resolution 66(4-5)
We test our argument through an analysis of Kurdish migration patterns within
Turkey, comparing people who migrated out of the conflict zone with those who
remained. Using monthly survey data collected over 7 years, we have more than 20,
000 respondents and are therefore able to capture the differential effect of conflict
exposure and migration. We do this by splitting our sample into those who remain, first-
generation migrants, and second-generation migrants, something which has not been
done in any prior research, to our knowledge. We then use this data to analyze variation
in their support for the Kurdish nationalist party. The results indicate that whilst first-
generation migrants maintain similar attitudes to those who remain, second-generation
migrants have significantly less support for the Kurdish nationalist party. The results fit
with recent research which found that the effect of migration on the attitudes of first-
generation migrants towards political institutions in their place of origin is relatively
limited (Careja and Emmenegger 2012).
We also address a number of alternative explanations (particularly with respect to
socialization through education and language, and the level of intergroup contact),
potential issues raised by self-selection into migration, and employed coefficient
stability analysis to ensure our results are robust (Oster 2019). Our main results hold
through all these tests. Finally, in an exploratory analysis section, we show that this
theoretical framework extends to attitudes towards conflict resolution and identity, with
second-generation migrants demonstrating weaker Kurdish identity and greater support
for aggressive military action against co-ethnic rebel groups.
This article provides an important reconciliation of the competing perspectives
regarding the attitudes of migrants towards political conflict in their country of origin.
In doing so, it highlights the problems with treating migrant communities as a ho-
mogeneous block and the importance of integrating the different experiences of mi-
grants, particularly conflict exposure, into the theoretical framework. We also address a
number of methodological shortcomings in prior literature with a rich dataset which
allows us to use matching and a range of statistical models to ensure our results are
robust whilst also isolating the different attitudes of those who remain, first- and
second-generation migrants. Finally, the additional analysis of attitudes towards
identity and conflict resolution highlights the broader implications of our theoretical
framework and provides avenue for future research.
In the following section, we first describe the traditional nostalgia nationalism thesis
which argued that migrants hold extreme political attitudes before discussing more
recent research that challenges these findings. We then outline our theoretical
framework which provides a potential reconciliation by differentiating between first-
and second-generation migrants and integrating conflict exposure.
Understanding the Political Attitudes of Migrants
The scale of migration in the second half the 20
th
century has been unprecedented
(Marsella and Ring 2003). Alongside increased global interconnectedness, this has led
to large and influential migrant communities (Cohen 2008)
3
. Initial academic research
Canavan and Turkoglu 869
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