The Effect of Civil Society Organizations and Democratization Aid on Civil War Onset

• Author: Amanda Abigail Licht,Jessica Maves Braithwaite
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Date: 01 July 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719888684
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Effect of Civil

Society Organizations

and Democratization

Aid on Civil War Onset

Jessica Maves Braithwaite

1

, and Amanda Abigail Licht

2

Abstract

A growing literature identifies both situations where aid promotes peace and

those where aid encourages violence. Specifically, research shows lower

probability of conflict onset in democratizing states receiving high levels of

democracy assistance. However, theorizing has overlooked important actors

who have agency in spending such aid: civil society organizations (CSOs). We

posit that the status of civil society within recipient states conditions the effect

of democracy aid inflows on conflict probability. Using an instrumental variables

approach to account for endogeneity between aid allocation and conflict pro-

pensity, we find that democracy aid is destabilizing when directed to environ-

ments where CSOs are weak and poorly connected to the regime and thus are

less willing and able to seek change through peaceful means. When civil society

is stronger and more institutionalized, however, larger democracy aid flows

pose less threat.

Keywords

foreign aid, civil wars, civil society, democracy assistance

1

School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

2

Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Amanda Abigail Licht, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, PO Box 6000, Bin-

ghamton, NY 13905, USA.

Email: aalicht@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(6) 1095-1120

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719888684

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In the run-up to Algeria’s first multiparty elections in 1991, foreign aid flowed in,

allocated by Western governments and international organizations who aimed to

strengthen Algerian opposition groups and encourage a transition to democratic rule.

Around the same time, a movement among mosques and other religious associations

in the country worked to mobilize sympathetic candidates to run for political office.

In 1988, Islamist groups’ effort coalesced in Rabitat Dawa (League of the Islamic

Call), a coordinating organization of the sort that was able to take advantage of the

democracy aid flowing into the country to promote opposition party viability in the

upcoming elections. Although the military dictatorship historically repressed and

excluded Islamists from positions of power, Rabitat Dawa found itself with an

opportunity afforded by elections and the influx of foreign aid. They formed the

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party and fielded candidates who performed very well

in the first round of the legislative election. When the regime annulled the election

results, however, the FIS leveraged its existing mobilization networks facilitated

through democracy assistance and joined with other Islamist organizations in

Algeria, turning to armed resistance.

A similarstory played out in Nigeria in the early 2000s. Following a prolonged

period of military dictatorship, civilian rule returned to Nigeria in 1998 along with

a considerable expansion of foreign aid intended to promote the development of

democracy and civil society. Many localized social groups, such as a politically

oriented ethnic association known as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), received

financial assistance to develop their organizations and expand membership. Some

members of the IYC grew disillusioned with their lack of benefits from and

control over the considerable oil reserves in their home region of the Niger Delta;

they demanded greater autonomy and environmental oversight in the region.

When rebuffed by the government, elements within the IYC channeled their

discontent into armed rebellion under the name of the Niger Delta People’s

Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The NDPVF was very likely able to benefit from

heightened mobilization capacity and influx of resources that resulted from

democracy aid flowing into Nigeria to strengthen civil society groups like the

IYC. There is no evidence of external support for the rebel group, yet its fighters

were well equipped with small arms and other light weapons. In both the Algerian

and Nigerian cases, conflict onset was preceded by considerable inflows of

democracy assistance to environments where civil society had been repressed,

or at least marginalized, by the government.

We examine whether the streng th and vibrancy of c ivil society cond ition the

effect of democracy assistance on civil war risk. Prior research has reached mixed

conclusions regarding foreign aid’s relationship to civil conflict onset. Some argue

that aid increases the prize for capturing the state or provides funding for rebels to

begin an armed campaign, while others highlight the developmental effects of aid

that diminish opportunities or incentives to take up arms against the government

(e.g., Blattman and Miguel 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Findley et al. 2011;

Grossman 1992; Gutting and Steinwand 2015; Nielsen et al. 2011). Focusing on

1096 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(6)