The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members

• Author: Keith Nicholls
• Published date: 01 March 1991
• Date: 01 March 1991
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591299104400109
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

DYNAMICS

OF

NATIONAL

EXECUTIVE

SERVICE:

AMBITION

THEORY

AND

THE

CAREERS

OF

PRESIDENTIAL

CABINET

MEMBERS

KEITH

NICHOLLS

University

of

South

Alabama

n

1966,

Joseph

A.

Schlesinger

claimed

that the

wellspring

of pol-

t

itics

is

ambition

and

that

the

political

behavior

of

politicians

is

shaped

by

the

interplay

between

ambition

and

opportunity.

Once

an

individual’s

ambition

has

been

stirred

by

opportunities,

subsequent

behavior

is

designed

to

enhance

the

fulfillment

of

that

ambition.

While

Schlesinger’s

work

(and

that

of

myriad

other

researchers

in

this

area)

is

focused

on

public

sector

ambitions

and

elective

office

goals

of

poli-

ticians,

it

seems

clear

that

the

fundamental

objectives

of

ambition-

status,

power,

wealth - can

also

be

achieved

both

through

appointive

office

and

through

a

variety

of

private

sector

endeavors.

Surely

it

is

the

case

that

the

ambitions

of

individuals

are

stirred

by

the

opportunity

to

serve

in

high-level

appointive

office,

and

that

long-term

career

deci-

sions

of

executive

appointees

are

significantly

affected

by

the

availabil-

ity

of

a

variety

of

attractive

private

sector

opportunities.

This

paper

explores

the

utility

of

ambition

theory

in

analyzing

the

recruitment

and

career

patterns

of

cabinet

appointees

from

the

admin-

istrations

of

George

Washington

through

Ronald

Reagan.

This

is

accom-

plished

through

an

investigation

of

data

on

the

pre-cabinet

occupa-

tions

of

appointees

and

on

their

post-cabinet

opportunities

and

careers.

The

historical

breadth

of

these

data

allows

for

an

examination

of

the

manner

in

which

changes

in

both

public

and

private

sector

opportuni-

ties

have

driven

changes

in

the

careers

of

cabinet

members.

As

demonstrated

in

the

literature

review

below,

ambition

theory

has

undergone

numerous

refinements

and

has

been

tested

repeatedly

in

a

wide

variety

of

settings.

But

previous

research

has

consistently

focused

on

the

public

sector,

and

has

dealt

with

the

opportunities

driv-

ing

the

ambitions,

and

ultimately

the

careers,

of

elected

officials.

This

work

is

innovative

in

that

it

includes

both

the

public

and

private

sector

opportunity

structures

which

stir

the

ambitions

of

high-level

executive

RECEIVED:

August

28,

1989

REVISION

RECEIVED:

January

30,

1990

ACCEPTED

FOR

PUBLICATION:

February

5,

1990

150

appointees,

rather

than

elected

officials.

Similar

to

Schlesinger’s

pat-

tern,

data

on

the

careers

of

officials

are

organized

into

frequency

trees

which

demonstrate

the

typical

paths

of

recruitment.

But

further

differ-

entiating

this

work

from

previous

research,

these

trees

trace

paths

both

to

and

from

the

cabinet.

The

combination

of

these

variations

on

Schlesinger’s

theory

and

method,

and

the

new

setting

for

the

empirical

analysis

provide

a

fresh

and

unique

view

of

the

recruitment

and

careers

of

the

highest

level

executive

branch

officials.

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

As

noted

above,

this

analysis

is

rooted

in

ambition

theory.

Politi-

cians,

driven

by

ambition,

decide

when

to

seek

office

and

which

offices

to

seek

based

upon

their

perceptions

of

available

opportunities.

Their

political

behavior

reflects

strategies

to

enhance

their

ability

to

obtain

office,

maintain

themselves

in

office,

or

propel

themselves

to

higher

office.

Schlesinger

claims

that

his

theory

is

&dquo;not

so

much

concerned

with

predicting

what

a

man’s

ambitions

will

be

over

his

entire

career,

but

rather

with

taking

a

man’s

ambitions

and

predicting

from

them

his

political

behavior&dquo;

(1966:

10).

It

is

important

to

note

that

these

polit-

ical

ambitions

may

fall

into

one

of

three

categories.

An

individual

who

seeks

a

long-term

career

in

one

political

office,

such

as

the

U.S.

Con-

gress,

is

mainly

concerned

with

reelection

to

that

office

and

is

said

to

have

static

ambition.

An

elected

official

who

aspires

to

higher

office

will,

at

some

point,

attempt

to

appeal

to

the

constituency

of

that

higher

office

and

is

said

to

have

progressive

ambition.

An

elected

official

who

does

not

want

to

hold

an

office

long-term,

who

is

not

interested

in

advancing

to

a

higher

office,

who

consciously

chooses

to

limit

his

or

her

tenure

in

the

public

service,

is

said

to

have

discreet

ambition.

For

Schlesinger,

ambition

is

primary,

but

opportunity

is

paramount.

He

claims

(1966:

11),

&dquo;we

can

bring

order

to

the

office

ambitions

of

politicians

only

if

we

can

find

order

in their

chances

or

opportunities

for

office.&dquo;

Established

opportunity

structures

provide

the

necessary

information

and

predictability

upon

which

politicians

can

base

their

political

strategies.

Schlesinger’s

concern

with

opportunities

results

in

a

focus

on

the

structure

of

opportunities

in

American

politics,

with

particular

emphasis

on

identifying

the

typical

paths

of

recruitment

from

lower

to

higher

public

office.

To

provide

empirical

support

for

his

theory,

Schlesinger’s

primary

analysis

involves

the

political

opportunity

structures

within

the

Amer-