The Distributive Politics of “Compassion in Action”

• Published date: 01 June 2012
• Author: Amy Yuen,Michael Leo Owens
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912910391474
• Date: 01 June 2012
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

65(2) 422 –442

© 2012 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912910391474

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The Distributive Politics of

“Compassion in Action”: Federal

Funding, Faith-Based Organizations,

and Electoral Advantage

Michael Leo Owens1 and Amy Yuen2

Abstract

Incorporating race into tactical spending for electoral gain, this article revisits the relative effects of vote production

and vote retention on distributive politics. It investigates whether a “compassion strategy” to influence the electoral

behavior of voters while being responsive to need-based social welfare demands affected federal discretionary grants

to faith-based organizations (FBOs) during the administration of George W. Bush. The findings suggest that federal

domestic social welfare funding of FBOs may have involved a combination of the tactical use of grants for both

electoral purposes (i.e., vote production and vote retention) and the reduction of need among the states.

Keywords

distributive politics, race, political behavior, faith-based initiative, George W. Bush, compassionate conservatism

Studies of distributive politics—“the politics of expendi-

ture programs where the benefits can be targeted to spe-

cific localities, paid for via general revenues”—seek to

determine why, ceteris paribus, more national funding

flows to some subnational locales, governments, organi-

zations, and initiatives than to others (Weingast 1994, 319).

The degree to which “expenditure decisions are political

decisions, which answer the question ‘who to support’ more

than they define what to do,” is a key inquiry (Anton,

Cawley, and Kramer 1980, xvi). Scholars generally

deduce that political incumbents use distributive politics

in two ways for electoral purposes. One, they allocate

federal grants in aid and other financial resources to

reward supporters and to hold electoral bases (e.g., Cox

and McCubbins 1986; McCarty 2000; Bertelli and Grose

2009). Two, they dispense incentives to swing voters to

increase vote shares for retaining their offices (e.g., Lindbeck

and Weibull 1993; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Bickers

and Stein 1996). Both streams of this political allocation

theory of distributive politics are logical, even in the face

of empirical results providing mixed support for the vote

retention and vote production arguments (Cox 2010) and

evidence that incumbents may allocate awards to respond

to need and merit regardless of potential electoral advan-

tage (Rich 1989; Bickers and Stein 1996; Lowry and

Potoski 2004).

Identifying the dominant electoral explanation for the

political allocation of federal revenues remains central to

the study of distributive politics. We revisit political

allocation theory to assess the relative effects of vote

production and vote retention on distributive politics.

Our study diverges from much of the distributive poli-

tics literature by incorporating race into the theory of

tactical spending for electoral gain. In addition, it exam-

ines discretionary social welfare spending during an

administrative presidency.

We focus on the effect of incumbent calculation and

support by voters on political allocations. However, in

the literature race is never central to general consider-

ations about the effects of need and merit of subnational

jurisdictions and actors. Furthermore, needs-driven argu-

ments that we might broadly relate to race overlook how

decisions to direct greater funds to needier locales may

buttress electoral calculations related to distributive poli-

tics. Yet some awards may reflect race-influenced elec-

toral calculations. This is especially plausible regarding

social welfare spending. In particular, the flow of discre-

tionary federal funds to faith-based organizations (FBOs)

1Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

2Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USA

Corresponding Author:

Michael Leo Owens, Emory University, Department of Political

Science, 1555 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322

Email: michael.leo.owens@emory.edu

Owens and Yuen 423

across the states for domestic social welfare activities

during the presidential administration of George W. Bush

provides an interesting case for observing distributive

politics with an eye toward spying the effect of racial-

electoral calculations on political allocations. We explore

it here, guided by the nascent “compassion cues” litera-

ture (Hutchings et al. 2004, 514; Streb 2001; Fraga and

Leal 2004; Philpot 2007; McDaniel and Ellison 2008).

Federal funding of FBOs through discretionary grants

during the Bush administration ostensibly was about

increasing the capacity of nongovernmental organiza-

tions to manage the effects of social marginalization and

the federal government to assist in the reduction of pov-

erty as well as broadening the space for religion in the

public square. However, the allocation of federal funds to

FBOs from across the states happened amid overt appeals

to African American and Hispanic clergy and lay leaders

to collaborate with government, highlighting their strengths

for minimizing the effects of racial and structural inequal-

ity in America. It is conceivable that some of the geo-

graphic spread of federal funding and appeals to African

American and Hispanic FBOs may have reflected elec-

toral calculations that emphasized race as much as a pas-

sion to reduce poverty and other measures of social

welfare needs. We posit that the strategic use of social

welfare grants under the banner of “compassion” was

intended to influence the voting behavior of swing voters,

as well as African American and Hispanic voters, during

the Bush administration.

Unlike much of the distributive politics research that

examines grant making by Congress, we focus on

bureaucratic allocations of grants. The literature notes,

“[D]iscretionary grant programs are perhaps unlikely

places to find strong [political allocation] effects since

these awards are made in the byways of bureaucracies,

insulated to some degree from congressional and presi-

dential political pressures” (Lowry and Potoski 2004, 517).

Still, the influence of bureaucracies over distributive politics

can be substantive (see, e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2009).

This should be true during an administrative presidency

(Nathan 1983; McCarty 2000). Such presidencies like that

of George W. Bush seek to achieve political ends as much

as they strive for efficiency and effectiveness (Farris, Nathan ,

and Wright 2004; Aberbach 2005; Waterman 2009).

In addition, whereas the literature tends to study non-

competitive or formula-based grant making, we study

competitive or nonformula-based grant making. Agen-

cies allocate such awards per bureaucratic review of for-

mal submissions of proposals meeting objective criteria.

Like typical competitive, nonformula-based grants, the

awards themselves are composed of relatively nominal

amounts open to narrow targeting to particular interests

(Gamkhar 2002). Inequality is inherent in their allocation.

All may make claims on such grants but, as Arnold (1981,

109) reminds us, “[not] all claimants deserve a share of

benefits. The concentration of benefits in some areas and

the denial of shares for other areas is perfectly legiti-

mate.” Also, their nature makes them most open to direct

influence by a president (Lowry and Potoski 2004; Bertelli

and Grose 2009). Here, we rely on an original data set of

competitive, nonformula grants awarded by federal agen-

cies to FBOs (i.e., religion-affiliated nonprofits and reli-

gious congregations) across the fifty states from 2002

through 2007.

Generally, our results support the theory that incum-

bents tactically use grants for political purposes, both

vote production and vote retention. They also suggest

that racial-electoral calculations have a substantive effect

on the distribution of social welfare spending, far more

than demand and merit.

Presidential Advocacy

for Funding FBOs

Presidential advocacy for increased federal funding to

better deliver “public services” at the local level was a

hallmark of the Bush administration.1 In 2001, the Bush

administration issued Executive Orders 13198 and

13199, laying the foundation for its “faith-based and

community initiatives” (FBCI), which it built on through

subsequent orders (National Archives and Records

Administration 2001; for analyses of the executive

orders, see Black, Koopman, and Ryden 2004; Roberts-

DeGennaro 2007). The orders established FBCI offices

and centers in the White House and federal agencies such

as the Department of Housing and Urban Development,

the Agency for International Development, and the

Administration for Children and Families. There were

mixed motivations for the FBCI (Formicola, Segers, and

Weber 2003; Black, Koopman, and Ryden 2004; DiIulio

2007; Wineburg 2007).

The offices and the broader effort of the FBCI were to

“help the Federal Government coordinate a national

effort to expand opportunities for faith-based and other

community organizations and to strengthen their capacity

to better meet social needs in America’s communities”

(National Archives and Records Administration 2001,

8499).2 The president was genuine in his calls to reduce

the scale of social welfare problems (e.g., large welfare

caseloads, recidivating felons, low-performing public

schools). He routinely spoke of the need for government

(and the Republican Party) to create opportunities for the

poor to enter the mainstream in terms of employment,

educational attainment, desistance from crime, and hom-

eownership (Gerson 2007). As a candidate in 2000, for

example, Bush delivered a message before the National