The Diplomacy of Bitterness: Genesis of the Potsdam Decision To Expel Germans From Czechoslovakia
| DOI | 10.1177/106591295801100312 |
| Published date | 01 September 1958 |
| Author | Macalister Brown |
| Date | 01 September 1958 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
607
THE
DIPLOMACY
OF
BITTERNESS:
GENESIS
OF
THE
POTSDAM
DECISION
TO
EXPEL
GERMANS
FROM
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
MACALISTER
BROWN
Williams
College
HE
EXPULSION
of
the
German-speaking
population
of
Czech-
)
slovakia
at
the
end
of
World
War
II
was
scarcely
noticed
by
the
American
public,
even
though
their
President
joined
in
authorizing
this
action
at
the
Potsdam
Conference.
Some
religious
leaders
and
social-
ists
protested
but
their
cause
was
neither
popular
nor
well
understood
in
the
United
States.
As
time
passed
the
fate
of
the
so-called
Sudeten-Ger-
mans
became
better
know
here,
but
the
story
was
often
written
in
great
distress.
The
German
expellees,
on
the
one
hand,
vent
their
acrimony
upon
the
late
Eduard
Benes;
and
Czechoslovaks,
on
the
other
hand,
who
left
their
homeland
because
of
the
coup
of
1948,
focus
particularly
upon
the
machinations
of
their
Communist
rivals.
At
either
of
these
two
poles
of
historical
interpretation
the
role
of
the
Great
Powers
is
generally
under-
estimated.
A
truly
historical
account
of
the
diplomacy
behind
the
transfer
of
ethnic
German
from
Czechoslovakia
must
properly
balance
all
of
these
elements
and
also
examine
the
role
of
the
wartime
Sudeten-German
as
well.
THE
FORMATION
OF
THE
CZECHOSLOVAK
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE
The
Munich
Pact
of
1938
provides
the
starting
point
for
the
Czecho-
slovak
diplomacy
of
bitterness.
By
this
pact
desperate
Great
Britain
and
France
tried
to
appease
Hitler
by
insisting
that
Czechoslovakia
relinquish
the
strategically
most
vital
section
of
its
territory
and
three-and-a-half
mil-
lion
of
its
inhabitants
to
the
Reich.
A
week
later,
President
Eduard
Benes
resigned
his
office
under
German
pressure
and
departed
for
London,
lest
his
presence
provoke
further
territorial
demands
from
Berlin.
In
Great
Britain,
though
Churchill
had
somberly
forecast
the
future,
Benes
witnessed
a
general
feeling
of
relief
that
war
had
been
averted
and
heard
frequent
rationalizations
about
the
need
for
national
self-determination
of
minorities.
An
obsession
with
rectifying
this
personal
and
national
humiliation
readily
possessed
the
former
President.
Propaganda
against
the
Czechs
had
been
rampant
in
England
for
some
time.
Benes,
in
particular,
had
been
subjected
to
charges
by
English-language
commentators
of
having
&dquo;consistently
tried
to
denationalize
and
assimilate&dquo;
and
of
having
inflicted
&dquo;great
social,
economic
and
biological
harm
upon
the
German-speaking
population
of
Czechoslovakia.&dquo; ~
1
His
basic
reply
to
such
charges
was
positive
and
simple,
and
he
had
expressed
it
to
Hitler’s
1 Diplomaticus,
The
Czechs
and
Their
Minorities
(London:
Butterworth,
1938),
pp.
39,
57.
608
emmissaries
to
Prague
four
years
before
the
Munich
crisis.
Benes
insisted
that
the
Czechoslovak
penetration
into
German-speaking
areas
of
the
Republic
was
&dquo;an
irresistible
urge
deeply
rooted
in
the
historical
and
eco-
nomic
background
of
the
last
two
centuries
and
must
be
accepted
as
a
fact.&dquo;
It
was
not
a
deliberate
policy
initiated
by
his
country
but
rather
an
ir-
reversible
sociological
process.2
At
the
same
time,
Benes
was
unable
to
see
the
German
Drang
nach
Osten
as
anything
but
a
determined
policy,
which
German
governments
would
pursue
whatever
their
complexion.
Believing
too,
that
ultimately
the
Western
Powers
would
resist
this
thrust,
he
was
confident
throughout
the
early
months
of
his
exile
that
war
would
soon
ensue.
The
decisive
step
in
this
direction
came
on
March
15,
1939,
when
Hitler
personally
bullied
Benes’
successor,
President
Hacha,
into
agreeing
to
the
separation
of
Slovakia
from
the
Czech
provinces
of
Bohemia
and
Moravia,
which
were
thereupon
occupied
as
a
German
protectorate.
Hungary
at
the
same
time
gobbled
up
Eastern
Slovakia
and
Sub-Carpatho-Ukraine.
In
spite
of
the
clearly
coercive
and
unconstitutional
manner
in
which
this
dissolu-
tion
of
the
Republic
was
effected,
the
anti-Axis
countries
limited
their
response
to
nonrecognition
of
the
resulting
regimes,
without
indicating
any
intention
of
fostering
a
government-in-exile
to
maintain
the
legal
continuity
of
the
Czechoslovak
state.
The
British
government
even
permitted
Czecho-
slovak
gold
assets
to
be
transferred
from
the
Bank
of
England
to
the
Ger-
man
protectorate
and
also
a
Slovak
consul
to
operate
in
London.
The
resort
to
arms
over
Poland
in
September,
1939,
reopened
the
door
of
the
British
Foreign
Office
somewhat
for
Benes
and
his
growing
following,
who
were
anxious
to
establish
a
government-in-exile.
The
French
govern-
ment
under
Daladier,
however,
preferred
to
deal
with
Dr.
Osusky,
a
Slovak,
who
had
been
the
last
Czechoslovak
Minister
to
France.
Benes
was
unable
even
to
obtain
an
interview
with
the
personally
hostile
French
Premier.
Not
until
November
17,
1939,
did
the
French
agree,
under
advise-
ment
from
London,
to
recognize
an
expandable
eight-man
Czechoslovak
National
Committee
which
included
Benes
and
was
simply
declared
quali-
fied
to
represent
the
Czechoslovak
people
and
to
execute
a
previous
agree-
ment
concerning
the
reconstruction
of
the
Czechoslovak
Army.
Following
the
collapse
of
France
in
the
blitzkrieg
of
June,
1940,
the
British
government,
under
Churchill,
became
more
receptive
to
the
Czecho-
slovak
exiles
and
their
battle-tested
Army
which
found
refuge
in
England.
A
new
provisional
Czechoslovak
government
established
by
the
Czecho-
slovak
National
Committee
was
recognized
by
Great
Britain
on
July
21,
1940.
Benes
was
President
and
under
him
were
a
Cabinet
and
a
forty-man
2
E.
Beneš,
Memoirs
of
Dr.
Eduard
Beneš,
trans.
Godfrey
Lies
(London:
Allen
&
Unwin,
1954),
pp.
17-18.
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