The dialectics of privatization and advocacy in New York City's workfare state.
| Date | 22 September 2006 |
| Author | Krinsky, John |
| Published date | 22 September 2006 |
| Author | Krinsky, John |
Introduction
WITH THE RECENT PASSAGE OF WELFARE REFORMS IN 2006 AS A LITTLE-DISCUSSED element of a federal budget bill, welfare policy in the United States has moved ever closer to universal workfare. (1) Even before the more sweeping reforms of 1996, Bob Jessop described an emerging "workfare regime" that was replacing the welfare state in the industrialized democracies. The latter's logic of protecting citizens from the fortunes of the market was being supplanted by its opposite. This new regime emphasizes: (1) flexibility for enterprise; (2) geographic re-scaling of economic and social intervention; (3) replacement of entitlements with obligations on the part of citizens; and (4) coalitional power-holding spanning governmental, civil-society, and profit-motivated actors (Jessop, 1994; see also Jessop, 2003; Peck, 2002).
In this article, I explore the expansion of workfare programs in New York City and concentrate on the relationship of coalitional power to the form and content of opposition to workfare. From 1995 to 1998, New York City's program requiring welfare recipients to work as a condition of receiving benefits began a fourfold expansion (New York City Office of the Mayor, 1997, 1998, 1999), while welfare rolls contracted by nearly half. Workfare assignments in the city's Work Experience Program (WEP) created enormous disincentives to remain on welfare, and created more opportunities for the state to sanction-- or cut off--welfare recipients' grants. Stricter eligibility procedures and "hassle" (Mead, 2004) designed to get applicants to give up their efforts to sign up for relief also contributed to a sharp decline in the rolls. I attend most carefully to the dynamics by which the changes in welfare were put into play; the creation of an organized opposition to workfare; and the creation of a discourse among the opposition that highlighted WEP's shortcomings.
In the wake of its fiscal crisis in the 1970s, New York City developed what Jessop calls a "neocorporatist" rather than a fully "neoliberal" politics, i.e., one based, at least for social provision, on partnerships between the state and nonprofit social service providers. Many of these service providers had roots in urban movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, as DeFilippis (2003) suggests, many of these groups, which devoted their energies to housing rehabilitation and tenant organizing, became co-opted as specialized conduits for housing redevelopment and low-income housing management. As a result, many abandoned their roles as agitators for broader change. By the early 1990s, however, at the peak of a second fiscal crisis under the mayoral administration of David N. Dinkins (1990-1993), several of these organizations were actively exploring ways of re-infusing organizing into their development work (Krinsky and Hovde, 1996). When Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani (1994-2001) aggressively reneged on the neocorporatist recognition of community-based organizations in providing social services, some of the more progressive housing groups worked to oppose workfare with organizations that had recently faced similar dilemmas in service politics with respect to the city's homelessness crisis.
In spite of its apparent global hegemony, neoliberalism is not the same everywhere; wherever neoliberal governance is tried, its "roll-back" moment--i.e., the point at which it uproots the existing social policy infrastructure--generates specific sorts of opposition depending upon the existing configuration of, and division of labor in, the state and civil society groups. Specifically, this helps to highlight the dialectics of privatization and advocacy in New York. In New York City, the initial imposition of neoliberalism ended in at least a partial neocorporatist bargain. Yet the coalitional pressures created by New York's neocorporatism failed to contain politically the push for greater flexibility by the city's financial elite, and this, in turn, created a progressive-corporatist reaction in the 1990s. This reaction itself became cast--for reasons elaborated below--largely in terms of human capital theory. As criticism of workfare's failure to provide adequate education and training became a dominant discursive strategy among regime opponents, their political claims grew ever closer to the foundational, individualist ideas of neoliberal theory, even as they became a critique of the theory-in-practice. Put differently, workfare's opponents embraced demands for education and training even though they focus on "deficiencies" in the labor supply (and their constituents), rather than on the conditions and compensation of work.
How can we unpack these dialectics? First, it is important to focus on organizational and discursive dynamics separately. Second, it is important to take a longer-term, historical approach to the economic and social regulatory projects of elite and non-elite coalitions. Third, it is important to understand that the threats that dominant governance structures pose to various groups can sometimes mobilize them into opposition. This opposition can reform dominant structures, but it can also be disorganized and co-opted (Lieberman, 2002; see also Reese, Giedraitis, and Vega, 2005). Moreover, though this opposition can sometimes make its political claims in an idiom consistent with the claims of dominant groups, doing so may lay bare the basic contradictions at the heart of governing self-justifications. Below I will expand on these themes through a historical narrative of neoliberalism in New York City, which focuses on the imposition of workfare in the 1990s and the opposition it inspired. I then proceed to a finer-grained analysis of the channeling of this opposition's claims into human-capital arguments. I will conclude by suggesting broader lessons that opponents of neoliberalism can draw from the dialectics of governance and challenge.
The Formation of New York City's Workfare Regime
New York City's fiscal crisis (1975-1977) was a watershed moment in the history of neoliberalism. It transformed abstract ideas about laissez-faire capitalist management into an array of governance practices. For proponents of neoliberalism in the presidential administration of Gerald Ford and among New York City's financial elite, the municipal balance-of-payments crisis was a window of opportunity to impose privatization and austerity. Adapted from the restructuring imposed on Chile following the 1973 coup, these became models for urban policy under Ronald Reagan and for "structural adjustment" policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Freeman, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Sites, 2003; Tabb, 1982).
William Sites (2003) argues persuasively that these policies were not simply forced on the city by the larger processes of economic rescaling known by the shorthand of "globalization." Certainly, the relocation of much of New York City's manufacturing tax base to lower-labor-cost sites had unfolded rapidly over the previous decade. Nevertheless, the city's real estate developers and bankers encouraged industrial flight in anticipation of non-industrial rents, rather than create incentives for industrial retention (Sites, 2003; Fitch, 1993). This, and the economic crises facing developing countries mired in debt and crippled by the 1973 Oil Crisis, combined to press Wall Street investment houses to call in municipal public debt before cracking down on real estate moguls and strategically important Third World governments. Gambling that New York would not default on loans it had taken to cover operating rather than capital expenditures (which investment banks had willingly sold as good debt), the bankers forced the local social-democratic regime into submission. Municipal unions that just a decade earlier had won the right to collectively bargain with the city were forced to accept layoffs, lest their contracts be cancelled by the undemocratic public-private financial control board that the bankers insisted have veto power over the city's fiscal decisions as a condition of reopening debt markets. The Ford administration was goaded by its Treasury Secretary, William Simon, Jr., a key neoliberal, first to deny federal loan guarantees to the city, and then to provide them on terms "so punitive, the overall experience made so painful, that no city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same road" of funding services in as generous a way as New York City had for the previous quarter century (quoted in Freeman, 2000: 259).
There are differing views on why neoliberal austerity was imposed: it was a reassertion of class power, as David Harvey (2005) has suggested; an attempt to manage risk in the midst of a crisis of accumulation, as regulation theorists would understand it (e.g., Aglietta, 1979); or a second-order reaction to crises that emerged from earlier attempts at crisis management by the state, such as the Great Society or even the New Deal, as an extension of Jones and Ward's work on British municipal restructuring (2002) might suggest. Nonetheless, the effects were significant for what the policies achieved and for what they did not.
For one thing, the continued loss of middle-income jobs was compounded by the layoff of more than 20,000 city workers. Growing poverty and the resultant cuts in city services, including fire protection, found their sequelae in accelerated housing abandonment, increased job loss, and, by the end of the decade, in the appearance of significant amounts of homelessness. This, in turn, created new grievances, and many neighborhood and political activists active at the beginning of the decade for larger projects of social transformation--sometimes abetted by residual Great Society program funds, but more frequently not--turned their energies inward, to limit the damage of the widespread landlord disinvestment, abandonment, and arson in their neighborhoods. By the time the city's finances had...
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