The Devil Shift: Perceptions and Misperceptions of Opponents

• Date: 01 September 1987
• Published date: 01 September 1987
• DOI: 10.1177/106591298704000306
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

DEVIL

SHIFT:

PERCEPTIONS

AND

MISPERCEPTIONS

OF

OPPONENTS

PAUL

SABATIER,

University

of

California,

Davis

SUSAN

HUNTER,

West

Virginia

University

SUSAN

McLAUGHLIN,

Ohio

State

University

ITHIN

the

behavioral

sciences,

most

research

assumes

that

V

rationality

is

a

commonly

shared

attribute

of

mankind -

that

the

defining

characteristic

of

humans

is

their

ability

to

examine

al-

ternatives,

estimate

their

consequences,

and

then

select

one

which

allows

them

to

achieve

their

goals.

While

pure

rationality

-

with

its

assumptions

of

perfect

information,

a

complete

set

of

preference

orderings,

and

unlimited

computational

ability

-

has

been

subjected

to

devastating

criticism,

even

theories

of

bounded

rationality

assume

that

subjects

obtain

reasonably

ac-

curate

information

concerning

the

more

important

consequences

of

a

few

alternatives

before

making

decisions

(March

and

Simon

1958;

Braybrooke

and

Lindblom

1963;

Elster

1979;

Nesbitt

and

Ross

1980;

Simon

1985).

In

the

strategic

interaction

characteristic

of

most

political

situations,

one

of

the

critical

informational

requirements

for

choosing

among

alterna-

tive

strategies

of

goal

attainment

is

that

actors

be

able

to

assess

accurately

the

goals

and

resources

of

their

adversaries.

An

accurate

knowledge

of

op-

ponents’

goals

and

probable

strategies

is

necessary

for

determining

when

to

counter

them.

Allocating

scarce

resources

to

fight

someone

makes

little

sense

unless

one

is

reasonably

sure

that

the

opponent’s

strategies

will

ad-

versely

affect

one’s

interests

or

goals.

And

an

accurate

assessment

of

oppo-

nents’

resources

(and

one’s

own)

is

required

if

one

is

to

maximize

chances

for

success.

Allocating

too

many

resources

is

wasteful,

and

allocating

too

few

will

lead

to

defeat

(Goodin

and

Dryzek

1980).

Despite

the

importance

of

accurately

perceiving

opponents’

goals

and

resources,

there

is

surprisingly

little

solid

evidence

on

the

extent

to

which

adversaries

accurately

perceive

each

other’s

motives,

values,

and

resources.

Scholars

of

international

relations

have

probably

given

the

most

attention

to

this

subject

(Buchanan

and

Cantril 1953;

Finlay

et

al.

1967; Jervis

1976),

but

the

conclusions

are

contradictory.

On

the

one

hand,

most

actors

in

Received:

December

11,

1985

Revision

Received:

August

4,

1986

Accepted

for

Publication:

August

7,

1986

NOTE:

This

research

has

been

made

possible

by

grants

from

the

National

Science

Founda-

tion

(NSF

SES

84-11032),

the

Institute

of

Governmental

Affairs,

and

the

Dean

of

the

College

of Agricultural

and

Environmental

Sciences

(U.C.

Davis).

We

are

very

grate-

ful

for

their

support;

note,

however,

that

neither

NSF,

nor

IGA,

nor

the

Dean

are

at

all

responsible

for

the

findings

in

this

paper.

The

authors

would

like

to

thank

Neil

Pelkey

for

his

important

contributions

to

portions

of

the

data

analysis

-

particularly

scale

con-

struction

-

as

well

as

to

Aage

Clausen,

Paul

Culhane,

Joel

Johnson

and

Randy

Siver-

son

for

their

helpful

comments

on

previous

versions

of

this

paper.

450

World

War

I

and

in

the

American

Civil

War

seriously

underestimated

op-

ponents’

strength

(Catton

1951;

Tuchman

1962;

Holsti

1965);

the

Japa-

nese

underestimated

American

strength

during

WWII

(Hoyt

1972);

and John

Forster

Dulles

underestimated

the

political

and

economic

strength

of

the

Soviet

Union

in

the

1950s

(Holsti

1967).

But

there

are

also

examples

of

overes-

timating

opponents’

strength.

McClellan

was

so

convinced

that

Lee

had

a

vastly

superior

force

during

the

latter

stages

of

the

Civil

War

that

he

re-

fused

to

attack

Rebel

forces

(Catton

1951).

Finally,

there

is

evidence

that

Hitler

accurately

estimated

opponents’

strength

and

strategies

at

the

onset

of

World

War

II

(Mosley

1969).

One

would

think

that

the

public

opinion

and

political

campaign

litera-

ture

would

be

a

rich

source

of

evidence,

but

we

have

found

very

little

solid

work.

Perhaps

the

classic

example

of

underestimating

an

opponent

was

the

Dewey-Truman

campaign,

when

Dewey

so

underestimated

Truman’s

strength

that

he

failed

to

campaign

seriously.

In

addition,

Brady

and

Snider-

man

(1985:

Table

1)

have

shown

that

liberals

perceive

conservatives

to

be

less

conservative

than

they

actually

are,

while

conservatives

perceive

liberals

to

be

more

liberal

than

is

the

case.

But

this

research

on

the

&dquo;left

shift&dquo;

con-

cerning

values

contains

no

information

on

perceptions

of

opponents’

strength.

The

interest

group

literature

provides

similarly

mixed

results.

This

is

epitomized

by

Milbrath’s

(1963:

139)

study

of

Washington

lobbyists

in

which

he

found

that

they

generally

perceived

themselves

to

be

more

successful

than

their

opponents,

but

that,

when

asked

to

name

the

most

successful

lob-

byist,

generally

picked

their

most

recent

opponent.

In

a

similar

study,

with

opposite

findings,

Cherington

and

Gillen

(1962)

concluded

that

lobbyists

often

rated

themselves

as

weaker

than

their

opponents.

This

is

the

more

general

trend.

For

example,

Culhane’s

(1981:

212)

study

of

the

Forest

Serv-

ice

and

Bureau

of

Land

Management

found

that

both

environmentalists

and

economic

user

groups

perceived

the

land

management

agencies

to

be

&dquo;captured&dquo;

by

their

opponents -

thus

suggesting

that

opponents

were

stronger

than themselves

and/or

that

public

officials

were

predisposed

to-

wards

their

adversaries.

And,

in

a

partial

replication

of

Culhane,

Davis

and

Davis

(1985)

found

that

economic

users

and

environmentalists

gener-

ally

perceived

their

opponents

to

be

stronger

than

did

most

other

mem-

bers

of

the

policy

community

concerned

with

public

lands

management

in

Wyoming.

In

an

effort

to

focus

additional

attention

on

this

confused

and -

out-

side

of

international

relations

-

neglected

topic,

this

paper

first

develops

a

general

argument

and

then

examines

data

from

an

elite

survey.

The

ar-

gument

involves

what

we

term

&dquo;the

devil

shift, &dquo;

i.e.,

that

actors

perceive

opponents

to

be

stronger

and

more

&dquo;evil&dquo;

than

they

actually

are.

It

then

tests

specific

aspects

of

the

general

argument

with

respect

to

a

survey

of

200

actors

involved

in

land

use

and

water

quality

policy-making

at

Lake

Tahoe,

one

of

the

country’s

most

beautiful

recreational

areas

and

the

scene

of

intense

conflict

since

the

mid-1960s.

The

concluding

section

briefly

ad-