The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right

• Author: Thomas Kurer
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912283
• Date: 01 September 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912283

Comparative Political Studies

2020, Vol. 53(10-11) 1798 –1835

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912283

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Article

The Declining Middle:

Occupational Change,

Social Status, and the

Populist Right

Thomas Kurer1

Abstract

This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in

times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic

and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows

that the disadvantages of a transforming employment structure are strongly

concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class.

I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the

social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions.

A perception of relative economic decline among politically powerful

groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and,

especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from

three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate

this relationship. A possible interpretation of the findings is that traditional

welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-

wing populism.

Keywords

European politics, political economy, quantitative methods

1University of Zurich, Switzerland

Corresponding Author:

Thomas Kurer, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56,

8050 Zurich, Switzerland.

Email: kurer@ipz.uzh.ch

912283CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020912283Comparative Political StudiesKurer

research-article2020

Kurer 1799

Introduction

At least since the Industrial Revolution, pundits and the public alike have had

a keen interest in the social and political consequences of economic modern-

ization and the concomitant evolution of labor markets. In recent years, the

most important factor behind occupational change has been technology

(Goos et al., 2014; Oesch, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development [OECD], 2017). Rapid advances in automation and com-

puterization push us into a new era where many existing skills and competen-

cies become increasingly redundant. Yet, disadvantages are not distributed

uniformly and contemporary innovations in technology affect distinct occu-

pations in fundamentally different ways. Routine workers in the lower mid-

dle of the education and earnings distribution are particularly exposed to

workplace automation (Autor et al., 2003). How does this politically influen-

tial group react to previously unknown level of vulnerability?

This article asks about the economic fundamentals behind recent political dis-

ruptions and examines the electoral consequences of the declining share of rou-

tine work in postindustrial labor markets. Observers have been quick to suggest

that those “left behind” by economic modernization are at the root of widespread

political dissatisfaction and rising anti-establishment rhetoric. But we still lack a

clear picture of how a technology-induced transformation of the employment

structure shapes political attitudes. While some argue that workers susceptible to

automation will demand social security (Thewissen & Rueda, 2019), others who

study vote choice emphasize an anti-incumbent backlash (Frey et al., 2018) or a

right-wing populist anti-establishment effect (Anelli et al., 2019; Im et al., 2019).

The underlying mechanisms are not obvious, however, which is why other stud-

ies that have difficulties to reveal clear associations between material interests

and political reaction conclude that noneconomic motives must prevail over eco-

nomic ones (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). As a result, contemporary research con-

troversially discusses the cultural and economic roots of right-wing populism,

Trump, Brexit, and changing patterns of mass opinion more generally (Antonucci

et al., 2017; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Mutz, 2018).

I contribute to this debate by studying routine workers’ political reaction

to increasingly bleak labor market prospects in the face of rapid technologi-

cal progress. Routine work is prevalent in blue- and white-collar sectors

and still accounts for about 25%–30% of the work force in advanced capi-

talist democracies. It has long been a highly respected kind of labor that

guaranteed a decent standard of living and prospects of upward mobility

(Nachtwey, 2016). But due to routine workers’ distinctive susceptibility to

automation, the arrival of new technology fundamentally jeopardizes this

positive outlook.

1800 Comparative Political Studies 53(10-11)

Importantly, susceptibility to automation does not necessarily imply wide-

spread technological unemployment. Recent research has shown that the

strong aggregate decline in routine work does not go hand in hand with simi-

larly impressive replacement rates on the individual level. Technological

change is a very gradual process and many routine workers manage to cling

to their jobs until (early-)retirement (Cortes, 2016; Kurer & Gallego, 2019).

The aggregate decline is primarily driven by higher exit rates and lower entry

rates. Superficially considered, one could thus mistake routine workers’ eco-

nomic situation as relatively stable. However, stability (or stagnation) in an

increasingly hostile economic environment is of limited satisfaction when

other parts of society are catching up or pulling away.

Routine workers’ situation in an increasingly automated world of work

thus provides an ideal case to disentangle the political consequences of fear-

ing as opposed to experiencing economic adversity. In contrast to existing

work that relies on snap-shot indicators of absolute economic hardship, this

article brings different employment trajectories and relative shifts in eco-

nomic well-being into the spotlight. While routine workers all face similar

initial threats from automation, the materialized occupational trajectories are

diverse and strongly differ in their material implications. I will argue that

distinct employment trajectories crucially shape the relative salience of eco-

nomic and noneconomic political demands. While “surviving” in an increas-

ingly vulnerable occupational environment activates concerns about status

maintenance and increases the appeal of nostalgic, socially conservative

propositions, the actual experience of job loss prompts an economic response.

With that aim, I leverage individual-level panel data from Germany,

Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to analyze the effect of differential

employment trajectories on routine workers’ political behavior. The analysis

employs an empirical strategy tailored to the investigation of dynamic pro-

cesses such as repeated occupational transitions, so-called marginal struc-

tural models, to estimate the effect of three distinct paths out of routine work.

The results demonstrate that it is a perception of relative societal decline and

concerns about one’s position in the social hierarchy—not unemployment or

acute material hardship—that drives support for right-wing populist parties.

The presented theoretical argument and empirical findings provide a novel

reading of the economic roots of populism. I add to a burgeoning literature

(e.g., Burgoon et al., 2019; Kurer & Palier, 2019; Rodrik, 2018; Rovny &

Rovny, 2017) that relies on a relational understanding of economic disadvan-

tage to reconcile some of the contradictions manifest in previous research.

Extending the focus beyond the usual indicators of material hardship shows

that fundamentally economic processes like changing labor markets might very

well result in noneconomic—or not purely economic—political responses.